Waku is the minimal React framework. Prior to version 1.0.0-beta.1, the unstable_redirect() helper exported from waku/router/server (packages/waku/src/router/define-router.tsx:156–161) accepts an arbitrary string and reflects it unchanged into the HTTP Location response header with no URL validation, scheme restriction, or path-only enforcement. Any application that passes user-controlled input to this helper — the natural pattern documented in the JSDoc and official fixtures — is vulnerable to open redirect attacks. An attacker who convinces a victim to click a crafted link can silently redirect the browser to an arbitrary external domain, enabling phishing, credential harvesting, and OAuth token theft. Additionally, scheme-relative URLs (//evil.example/) bypass naive https?://-only allow-list filters that developers might add as ad-hoc mitigations. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.0-beta.1.
Waku is the minimal React framework. Prior to version 1.0.0-beta.1, the unstable_redirect() helper exported from waku/router/server (packages/waku/src/router/define-router.tsx:156–161) accepts an arbitrary string and reflects it unchanged into the HTTP Location response header with no URL validation, scheme restriction, or path-only enforcement. Any application that passes user-controlled input to this helper — the natural pattern documented in the JSDoc and official fixtures — is vulnerable to open redirect attacks. An attacker who convinces a victim to click a crafted link can silently redirect the browser to an arbitrary external domain, enabling phishing, credential harvesting, and OAuth token theft. Additionally, scheme-relative URLs (//evil.example/) bypass naive https?://-only allow-list filters that developers might add as ad-hoc mitigations. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.0-beta.1.
Waku is the minimal React framework. Prior to version 1.0.0-beta.1, the unstable_redirect() helper exported from waku/router/server (packages/waku/src/router/define-router.tsx:156–161) accepts an arbitrary string and reflects it unchanged into the HTTP Location response header with no URL validation, scheme restriction, or path-only enforcement. Any application that passes user-controlled input to this helper — the natural pattern documented in the JSDoc and official fixtures — is vulnerable to open redirect attacks. An attacker who convinces a victim to click a crafted link can silently redirect the browser to an arbitrary external domain, enabling phishing, credential harvesting, and OAuth token theft. Additionally, scheme-relative URLs (//evil.example/) bypass naive https?://-only allow-list filters that developers might add as ad-hoc mitigations. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.0-beta.1.
## Summary
The `unstable_redirect()` helper exported from `waku/router/server` (`packages/waku/src/router/define-router.tsx:156–161`) accepts an arbitrary string and reflects it unchanged into the HTTP `Location` response header with no URL validation, scheme restriction, or path-only enforcement. Any application that passes user-controlled input to this helper — the natural pattern documented in the JSDoc and official fixtures — is vulnerable to open redirect attacks. An attacker who convinces a victim to click a crafted link can silently redirect the browser to an arbitrary external domain, enabling phishing, credential harvesting, and OAuth token theft. Additionally, scheme-relative URLs (`//evil.example/`) bypass naive `https?://`-only allow-list filters that developers might add as ad-hoc mitigations.
Dynamic PoC confirmed against **waku 1.0.0-beta.0** (commit `8e9f542`) in an isolated Docker environment. Two independent dynamic runs produced identical results.
---
## Root Cause
`packages/waku/src/router/define-router.tsx:156–161`:
```ts
export function unstable_redirect(
location: string, // only URL `pathname` is supported.
status: 303 | 307 | 308 = 307,
): never {
throw createCustomError('Redirect', { status, location });
}
```
The JSDoc comment states "only URL `pathname` is supported", but this constraint is expressed as documentation only — the function performs **no validation**. The `location` value propagates via `createCustomError` (`custom-errors.ts:22–26`) into an error digest, is recovered by `getErrorInfo` in the request handler (`handler.ts:79–89`), and reflected directly into `headers.location` of the outgoing `Response` with no sanitization:
```ts
if (info?.location) {
headers.location = info.location; // handler.ts:87 — unvalidated reflection
}
return new Response(body, { status, headers });
```
---
## Trigger (one-line summary)
Any developer-supplied user input passed to `unstable_redirect()` is reflected unchanged into the HTTP `Location` header, enabling navigation to an attacker-controlled domain.
---
## Affected Entry Surfaces
- `unstable_redirect(location, status?)` — `waku/router/server` public export
- Any page/route component that passes `searchParams`, `query`, or other user-
controlled strings to `unstable_redirect` (the standard post-login or callback
redirect pattern)
- All waku adapters (Node.js, Cloudflare Workers, Vercel Edge, Deno) share the same
`handler.ts` reflection path; cross-runtime CRLF parity is unaudited (see note
below)
---
## Additional Defense-in-Depth Concern
On Node.js, CRLF injection via the `Location` header is rejected by `node:_http_outgoing.setHeader` (`ERR_INVALID_CHAR`). This defense is **platform-specific** and not present in the waku source. Cloudflare Workers, Deno Deploy, and other edge runtimes have not been verified to offer equivalent protection. A cross-runtime audit is recommended.
---
## Suggested Fix Outline
Validate the `location` argument inside `unstable_redirect` before the error is thrown: reject any value that does not begin with a single `/` (no `//`), and reject any value containing control characters (`\x00`–`\x1f`). An opt-in allow-list for intentional cross-origin redirects can be provided via a framework configuration option.
---
## Disclosure
| Field | Value |
|------------------|------------------------------------|
| Reporter | j0hndo (`[email protected]`) |
| Discovery date | 2026-05-17 |
| Embargo | 90 days from acknowledgment |
| Patched version | Not yet available |
| Public references| CWE-601; OWASP A01:2021 |
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Sep 3, 2026, 6:15:54 PM
dateUpdated: Sep 3, 2026, 6:29:02 PM
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NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-601
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-09-03T19:17:28.250
lastModified: 2026-09-09T20:20:21.673
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.