Deno: `fetch()` API sandbox bypass via missing DNS resolution check
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-49859
PublishedDeno is a JavaScript, TypeScript, and WebAssembly runtime. Prior to 2.8.1, when fetch() was called, Deno checked the destination hostname against --deny-net rules but did not re-check the IP addresses that hostname resolved to. An attacker-controlled script could use a specially crafted domain name that passes the hostname check yet resolves to a denied IP, bypassing the network restriction entirely. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.1.
- Source published
- 23 Jun 2026 17:14:16 UTC
- Source modified
- 24 Jun 2026 14:23:09 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 3.1 · 5.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-38541
PublishedDeno is a JavaScript, TypeScript, and WebAssembly runtime. Prior to 2.8.1, when fetch() was called, Deno checked the destination hostname against --deny-net rules but did not re-check the IP addresses that hostname resolved to. An attacker-controlled script could use a specially crafted domain name that passes the hostname check yet resolves to a denied IP, bypassing the network restriction entirely. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.1.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jun 23, 2026, 5:14:16 PM
dateUpdated: Jun 24, 2026, 2:23:09 PM
- Source published
- Jun 23, 2026, 5:14:16 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Jun 24, 2026, 2:23:09 PM (timezone not stated)
- Observed here
- 7 Nov 2026 11:32:14 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-49859
PublishedDeno is a JavaScript, TypeScript, and WebAssembly runtime. Prior to 2.8.1, when fetch() was called, Deno checked the destination hostname against --deny-net rules but did not re-check the IP addresses that hostname resolved to. An attacker-controlled script could use a specially crafted domain name that passes the hostname check yet resolves to a denied IP, bypassing the network restriction entirely. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.1.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-693 · CWE-918
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-06-23T18:18:03.927
lastModified: 2026-10-25T23:10:00.167
1 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:deno:deno:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 23 Jun 2026 18:18:03 UTC
- Source modified
- 25 Oct 2026 23:10:00 UTC
- Observed here
- 27 Oct 2026 13:11:58 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
osv · GHSA-cpgj-f7g3-2pp2
Published## Summary When `fetch()` was called, Deno checked the destination hostname against `--deny-net` rules but did not re-check the IP addresses that hostname resolved to. An attacker-controlled script could use a specially crafted domain name that passes the hostname check yet resolves to a denied IP, bypassing the network restriction entirely. ## Impact Code running under `--deny-net` could reach hosts that the user intended to block. In practice this means network isolation rules — for example, blocking access to `localhost` or internal services — could be silently circumvented by a malicious or compromised dependency. A companion advisory covers the same class of issue in the WebSocket API. ## Who is affected Users who: - run untrusted or third-party code with `deno run`, and - rely on `--deny-net` to restrict which hosts that code can reach. If you do not use `--deny-net`, or if you only run fully trusted code, you are not affected. ## Workaround No workaround is available short of upgrading. If upgrading immediately is not possible, avoid granting `--allow-net` to untrusted code that also has `--deny-net` restrictions you depend on for security. ## Fix The `fetch()` DNS resolver now performs a post-resolution check on every IP address before passing it to the HTTP connector, consistent with how `Deno.connect` already behaved.
- Source published
- 16 Jun 2026 19:02:55 UTC
- Source modified
- 20 Jul 2026 21:15:27 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE