CrateDB's Blob HTTP handler bypasses authorization
cve-program · CVE-2026-49989
PublishedCrateDB is a distributed SQL database. Prior to versions 6.2.8 and 6.3.2, any authenticated user can read or delete any blob whose SHA-1 digest they know, and can plant new blobs unconditionally, in any blob table, regardless of `GRANT`s. CrateDB has two ways to access blob storage: SQL (`SELECT ... FROM blob.<table>` and friends) and the blob HTTP API (`GET|PUT|DELETE /_blobs/{table}/{digest}`). The SQL path goes through `AccessControl`, which is what enforces privilege grants; that's why `SELECT digest FROM blob.secret_blobs` fails for a user who has no grants on the table. The HTTP path authenticates the request but never asks `AccessControl` whether the authenticated user is allowed to touch the table. So a user with no grants gets `MissingPrivilegeException` from SQL and `200 OK` plus the blob bytes from `GET /_blobs/secret_blobs/<digest>`. Deployments that don't use `BLOB TABLE` are unaffected. Authentication itself still works; the bug is strictly that being authenticated as anyone is treated as sufficient for any blob op. Versions 6.2.8 and 6.3.2 fix the issue.
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cve-program · CVE-2026-49989
PublishedCrateDB's Blob HTTP handler bypasses authorization
CrateDB is a distributed SQL database. Prior to versions 6.2.8 and 6.3.2, any authenticated user can read or delete any blob whose SHA-1 digest they know, and can plant new blobs unconditionally, in any blob table, regardless of `GRANT`s. CrateDB has two ways to access blob storage: SQL (`SELECT ... FROM blob.<table>` and friends) and the blob HTTP API (`GET|PUT|DELETE /_blobs/{table}/{digest}`). The SQL path goes through `AccessControl`, which is what enforces privilege grants; that's why `SELECT digest FROM blob.secret_blobs` fails for a user who has no grants on the table. The HTTP path authenticates the request but never asks `AccessControl` whether the authenticated user is allowed to touch the table. So a user with no grants gets `MissingPrivilegeException` from SQL and `200 OK` plus the blob bytes from `GET /_blobs/secret_blobs/<digest>`. Deployments that don't use `BLOB TABLE` are unaffected. Authentication itself still works; the bug is strictly that being authenticated as anyone is treated as sufficient for any blob op. Versions 6.2.8 and 6.3.2 fix the issue.
- Source published
- 14 Aug 2026 16:29:17 UTC
- Source modified
- 14 Aug 2026 17:06:58 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
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Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N