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RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698)

cve-program · severity unknownEUVD CVSS 3.1 4.3 CVSS 3.1 · 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 · Secondary 4.3 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by code.gitea.io/gitea 1.27.0osv · severity unknownFixed by gitea.dev 1.27.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-50105

Published

RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698)

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-58136

Published

RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698)

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-50105

Published

RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698)

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-6cqf-375w-639g

Published

### Summary Gitea's RSS/Atom feed handlers accept API-token Basic auth but perform **no token-scope or public-only enforcement**. A personal access token that is correctly blocked (HTTP 403) from a private repository on `/raw`, `/media`, `/archive`, and `/releases/download/...` — because it is marked *public-only* or lacks the `repository` scope category — still returns that repository's private content through the feed routes. This is a token-confinement bypass and appears to be an incomplete fix of #37698, which added that scope enforcement to the download handlers but not to the sibling feed handlers. This is **not** a cross-user access bug: the requesting account must still legitimately have repo read access (`RepoAssignment` + `reqUnitCodeReader` are enforced). What is bypassed is the guarantee that a *confined* token cannot reach private content — which is exactly the property #37698 was shipped to provide for downloads, and which matters when such a token is handed to a third-party service/CI, leaked, or used in a lower-trust integration. ### Details #37698 added `context.CheckTokenScopes` / `CheckRepoScopedToken` (`services/context/permission.go`) to the raw / media / archive / attachment download handlers, so a public-only or wrong-scope-category token cannot read private-repo content even when the owning user otherwise has access. The feed handlers are registered with `webAuth.AllowBasic` (so they accept token Basic auth) but call no scope / public-only check. A grep for `CheckTokenScopes` / `CheckRepoScopedToken` / `IsApiToken` across `routers/web/feed/` and the release feed handlers returns nothing. Affected routes (all token-reachable via `webAuth.AllowBasic`, none call the scope check): | Route | Handler | Private data exposed | |---|---|---| | `GET /{owner}/{repo}.rss` / `.atom` | `repo.Home` → `handleRepoHomeFeed` (`view_home.go`) | last-10 commits: SHA, full message, author name + email | | `GET /{owner}/{repo}/rss/branch/*`, `/atom/branch/*` | `feed.RenderBranchFeed*` → `ShowBranchFeed` (`routers/web/feed/branch.go`) | same commit data, any branch | | `GET /{owner}/{repo}/releases.rss` / `.atom` | `ReleasesFeedRSS/Atom` (`routers/web/repo/release.go`) → `ShowReleaseFeed` | private release names, notes, descriptions | | `GET /{owner}/{repo}/tags.rss` / `.atom` | `TagsListFeedRSS/Atom` → `ShowReleaseFeed` | private tag names + messages | | `GET /{user}.rss` / `.atom` | `showUserFeed` (`routers/web/feed/profile.go`), `includePrivate = self \|\| admin` | the token owner's private cross-repo activity stream | Inconsistency that pins this down: the branch-feed routes sit in the **same route group** as `/raw`, `/media`, `/archive` (all of which call `checkDownloadTokenScope`), and `releases.rss` sits next to `/releases/attachments/{uuid}` and `/releases/download/...` (both go through `ServeAttachment` → scope check). Only the feeds were missed. The API equivalents (`ListReleases` / `ListTags`) are scope-gated via `tokenRequiresScopes`. Two distinct confinement bypasses: 1. **Public-only bypass.** A token created with the *public-only* option is blocked (403) from a private repo on `/raw`, `/archive`, `/releases/download/...`, but returns private commit / release data via `.../releases.rss`, `.../rss/branch/*`, `/{owner}/{repo}.rss`, and the owner's private activity via `/{user}.rss`. 2. **Scope-category bypass.** A token scoped to only e.g. `read:issue` (no `read:repository`) is rejected by the download handlers but reads repository commit/release content via the feeds. ### PoC Verified live against the official `gitea/gitea:1.26.2` Docker image (sqlite, feeds enabled). Setup: non-admin user `alice`; private repo `alice/secret` with a commit `"SECRET-COMMIT-MARKER ..."` (file `secret.txt`) and a release `"Private Release"` / body `"SECRET-RELEASE-MARKER ..."`. Two confined personal access tokens, both sent via HTTP Basic so the auth method is identical across download and feed — only the route differs: - Token A: scopes `["public-only", "read:repository"]` - Token B: scopes `["read:issue"]` ```bash # Token A — download is correctly blocked, feeds leak private content: curl -u alice:$TOKEN_A https://<host>/alice/secret/raw/branch/main/secret.txt # => 403 (fix works) curl -u alice:$TOKEN_A https://<host>/alice/secret/rss/branch/main # => 200, <title>SECRET-COMMIT-MARKER ...</title> curl -u alice:$TOKEN_A https://<host>/alice/secret/releases.rss # => 200, SECRET-RELEASE-MARKER ... curl -u alice:$TOKEN_A "https://<host>/alice.rss" # => 200, private activity # Token B — wrong scope category, same split: curl -u alice:$TOKEN_B https://<host>/alice/secret/raw/branch/main/secret.txt # => 403 curl -u alice:$TOKEN_B https://<host>/alice/secret/rss/branch/main # => 200, private commit leaked ``` Anonymous baseline returns 404 on the repo feeds (data is genuinely private) and a marker-free 200 on `/alice.rss` (public activity only) — confirming the leak is gated only by the missing token check. ### Impact Information disclosure of private **commit metadata** (SHA, message, author name+email), **release/tag notes**, and the owner's **private activity stream**, to the holder of a confined token that was specifically configured *not* to reach private content. Not raw file blobs (feeds don't serve file contents). Requires a token belonging to an account that already has repo read access, so the realistic threat is a leaked / shared / lower-trust token rather than an anonymous attacker — which is precisely the threat model #37698 addressed for downloads. ### Suggested remediation Add a token-scope check at the top of each feed handler, mirroring `checkDownloadTokenScope`: ```go if context.CheckRepoScopedToken(ctx, ctx.Repo.Repository, auth_model.Read); ctx.Written() { return } ``` for `ShowBranchFeed`, `ShowRepoFeed`, `ShowFileFeed`, `ShowReleaseFeed` (repo feeds). For the user feed, gate `includePrivate` behind a non-public-only token (or require the `user` / `repository` scope) so a confined token can't pull private activity.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-6036

Published

Gitea: RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698) in gitea.dev

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

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cve-program · CVE-2026-50105

Published

RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698)

RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698)

Source published
13 Aug 2026 16:44:39 UTC
Source modified
14 Aug 2026 20:08:02 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

euvd · EUVD-2026-58136

Published

RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698)

RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698)

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Aug 13, 2026, 4:44:39 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 14, 2026, 8:08:02 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

WID-SEC-W-2026-2304: Gitea: Mehrere Schwachstellen

CVE-2026-58417 · CVE-2026-58420 · CVE-2026-58425 · CVE-2026-58427 · CVE-2026-58428 · CVE-2026-58429 · CVE-2026-58431 · CVE-2026-58432 · CVE-2026-58433 · CVE-2026-58434 · CVE-2026-58435 · CVE-2026-58436 · CVE-2026-58437 · CVE-2026-58438 · CVE-2026-58439 · CVE-2026-58440 · CVE-2026-58441 · CVE-2026-58442 · CVE-2026-58443 · CVE-2026-58444 · CVE-2026-58445 · CVE-2026-58507 · CVE-2026-58508 · CVE-2026-58510 · CVE-2026-58511 · CVE-2026-59763 · CVE-2026-59765 · CVE-2026-59766 · CVE-2026-23603 · CVE-2026-42931 · CVE-2026-50105 · CVE-2026-54481 · CVE-2026-55982 · CVE-2026-55984 · CVE-2026-55986 · CVE-2026-55987 · CVE-2026-56443 · CVE-2026-56654 · CVE-2026-56657 · CVE-2026-56750 · CVE-2026-56755 · CVE-2026-57886 · CVE-2026-57894 · CVE-2026-57897 · CVE-2026-58314 · CVE-2026-58416

Source published
Aug 13, 2026, 4:44:39 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 14, 2026, 8:08:02 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
19 Nov 2026 16:03:18 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 4.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

nvd · CVE-2026-50105

Published

RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698)

RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698)

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-200 · CWE-862

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-13T17:17:23.387

lastModified: 2026-08-26T16:53:48.300

Source published
13 Aug 2026 17:17:23 UTC
Source modified
26 Aug 2026 16:53:48 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 12:17:38 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 · Secondary · 4.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

osv · GHSA-6cqf-375w-639g

Published

Gitea: RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698)

### Summary Gitea's RSS/Atom feed handlers accept API-token Basic auth but perform **no token-scope or public-only enforcement**. A personal access token that is correctly blocked (HTTP 403) from a private repository on `/raw`, `/media`, `/archive`, and `/releases/download/...` — because it is marked *public-only* or lacks the `repository` scope category — still returns that repository's private content through the feed routes. This is a token-confinement bypass and appears to be an incomplete fix of #37698, which added that scope enforcement to the download handlers but not to the sibling feed handlers. This is **not** a cross-user access bug: the requesting account must still legitimately have repo read access (`RepoAssignment` + `reqUnitCodeReader` are enforced). What is bypassed is the guarantee that a *confined* token cannot reach private content — which is exactly the property #37698 was shipped to provide for downloads, and which matters when such a token is handed to a third-party service/CI, leaked, or used in a lower-trust integration. ### Details #37698 added `context.CheckTokenScopes` / `CheckRepoScopedToken` (`services/context/permission.go`) to the raw / media / archive / attachment download handlers, so a public-only or wrong-scope-category token cannot read private-repo content even when the owning user otherwise has access. The feed handlers are registered with `webAuth.AllowBasic` (so they accept token Basic auth) but call no scope / public-only check. A grep for `CheckTokenScopes` / `CheckRepoScopedToken` / `IsApiToken` across `routers/web/feed/` and the release feed handlers returns nothing. Affected routes (all token-reachable via `webAuth.AllowBasic`, none call the scope check): | Route | Handler | Private data exposed | |---|---|---| | `GET /{owner}/{repo}.rss` / `.atom` | `repo.Home` → `handleRepoHomeFeed` (`view_home.go`) | last-10 commits: SHA, full message, author name + email | | `GET /{owner}/{repo}/rss/branch/*`, `/atom/branch/*` | `feed.RenderBranchFeed*` → `ShowBranchFeed` (`routers/web/feed/branch.go`) | same commit data, any branch | | `GET /{owner}/{repo}/releases.rss` / `.atom` | `ReleasesFeedRSS/Atom` (`routers/web/repo/release.go`) → `ShowReleaseFeed` | private release names, notes, descriptions | | `GET /{owner}/{repo}/tags.rss` / `.atom` | `TagsListFeedRSS/Atom` → `ShowReleaseFeed` | private tag names + messages | | `GET /{user}.rss` / `.atom` | `showUserFeed` (`routers/web/feed/profile.go`), `includePrivate = self \|\| admin` | the token owner's private cross-repo activity stream | Inconsistency that pins this down: the branch-feed routes sit in the **same route group** as `/raw`, `/media`, `/archive` (all of which call `checkDownloadTokenScope`), and `releases.rss` sits next to `/releases/attachments/{uuid}` and `/releases/download/...` (both go through `ServeAttachment` → scope check). Only the feeds were missed. The API equivalents (`ListReleases` / `ListTags`) are scope-gated via `tokenRequiresScopes`. Two distinct confinement bypasses: 1. **Public-only bypass.** A token created with the *public-only* option is blocked (403) from a private repo on `/raw`, `/archive`, `/releases/download/...`, but returns private commit / release data via `.../releases.rss`, `.../rss/branch/*`, `/{owner}/{repo}.rss`, and the owner's private activity via `/{user}.rss`. 2. **Scope-category bypass.** A token scoped to only e.g. `read:issue` (no `read:repository`) is rejected by the download handlers but reads repository commit/release content via the feeds. ### PoC Verified live against the official `gitea/gitea:1.26.2` Docker image (sqlite, feeds enabled). Setup: non-admin user `alice`; private repo `alice/secret` with a commit `"SECRET-COMMIT-MARKER ..."` (file `secret.txt`) and a release `"Private Release"` / body `"SECRET-RELEASE-MARKER ..."`. Two confined personal access tokens, both sent via HTTP Basic so the auth method is identical across download and feed — only the route differs: - Token A: scopes `["public-only", "read:repository"]` - Token B: scopes `["read:issue"]` ```bash # Token A — download is correctly blocked, feeds leak private content: curl -u alice:$TOKEN_A https://<host>/alice/secret/raw/branch/main/secret.txt # => 403 (fix works) curl -u alice:$TOKEN_A https://<host>/alice/secret/rss/branch/main # => 200, <title>SECRET-COMMIT-MARKER ...</title> curl -u alice:$TOKEN_A https://<host>/alice/secret/releases.rss # => 200, SECRET-RELEASE-MARKER ... curl -u alice:$TOKEN_A "https://<host>/alice.rss" # => 200, private activity # Token B — wrong scope category, same split: curl -u alice:$TOKEN_B https://<host>/alice/secret/raw/branch/main/secret.txt # => 403 curl -u alice:$TOKEN_B https://<host>/alice/secret/rss/branch/main # => 200, private commit leaked ``` Anonymous baseline returns 404 on the repo feeds (data is genuinely private) and a marker-free 200 on `/alice.rss` (public activity only) — confirming the leak is gated only by the missing token check. ### Impact Information disclosure of private **commit metadata** (SHA, message, author name+email), **release/tag notes**, and the owner's **private activity stream**, to the holder of a confined token that was specifically configured *not* to reach private content. Not raw file blobs (feeds don't serve file contents). Requires a token belonging to an account that already has repo read access, so the realistic threat is a leaked / shared / lower-trust token rather than an anonymous attacker — which is precisely the threat model #37698 addressed for downloads. ### Suggested remediation Add a token-scope check at the top of each feed handler, mirroring `checkDownloadTokenScope`: ```go if context.CheckRepoScopedToken(ctx, ctx.Repo.Repository, auth_model.Read); ctx.Written() { return } ``` for `ShowBranchFeed`, `ShowRepoFeed`, `ShowFileFeed`, `ShowReleaseFeed` (repo feeds). For the user feed, gate `includePrivate` behind a non-public-only token (or require the `user` / `repository` scope) so a confined token can't pull private activity.

Source published
21 Jul 2026 20:40:24 UTC
Source modified
22 Jul 2026 21:11:29 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

osv · GO-2026-6036

Published

Gitea: RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698) in gitea.dev

Gitea: RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope & public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698) in gitea.dev

Source published
22 Jul 2026 20:36:35 UTC
Source modified
22 Jul 2026 21:00:28 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

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