ZEBRA: IPv4-Mapped Mempool Misbehavior Update Aborts Zebra Address Book

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ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, an unauthenticated IPv4 peer can deterministically terminate a synced Zebra node using the default Linux dual-stack listener configuration. The handshake path canonicalized an IPv4-mapped IPv6 PeerSocketAddr such as ::ffff:127.0.0.1 to plain IPv4 before storing it through MetaAddr::new_connected, but the mempool misbehavior path forwarded the raw transient address to MetaAddrChange::UpdateMisbehavior. In zebra-network/src/meta_addr.rs, apply_to_meta_addr then compared the canonical address-book entry with the raw update address and reached its unexpected address mismatch assertion. After the misbehavior batch flush, panic equals abort terminated zebrad; the peer only needed to complete a P2P handshake and advertise an invalid mempool transaction. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.

Source published

18 Aug 2026 19:27:57 UTC

Source modified

18 Aug 2026 19:44:56 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, an unauthenticated IPv4 peer can deterministically terminate a synced Zebra node using the default Linux dual-stack listener configuration. The handshake path canonicalized an IPv4-mapped IPv6 PeerSocketAddr such as ::ffff:127.0.0.1 to plain IPv4 before storing it through MetaAddr::new_connected, but the mempool misbehavior path forwarded the raw transient address to MetaAddrChange::UpdateMisbehavior. In zebra-network/src/meta_addr.rs, apply_to_meta_addr then compared the canonical address-book entry with the raw update address and reached its unexpected address mismatch assertion. After the misbehavior batch flush, panic equals abort terminated zebrad; the peer only needed to complete a P2P handshake and advertise an invalid mempool transaction. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.

Source published

Aug 18, 2026, 7:27:57 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Aug 18, 2026, 7:44:56 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

7 Nov 2026 11:36:16 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, an unauthenticated IPv4 peer can deterministically terminate a synced Zebra node using the default Linux dual-stack listener configuration. The handshake path canonicalized an IPv4-mapped IPv6 PeerSocketAddr such as ::ffff:127.0.0.1 to plain IPv4 before storing it through MetaAddr::new_connected, but the mempool misbehavior path forwarded the raw transient address to MetaAddrChange::UpdateMisbehavior. In zebra-network/src/meta_addr.rs, apply_to_meta_addr then compared the canonical address-book entry with the raw update address and reached its unexpected address mismatch assertion. After the misbehavior batch flush, panic equals abort terminated zebrad; the peer only needed to complete a P2P handshake and advertise an invalid mempool transaction. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.

Source published

18 Aug 2026 20:17:18 UTC

Source modified

22 Oct 2026 22:10:00 UTC

Observed here

25 Oct 2026 13:17:10 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

### Am I affected You are affected if: 1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`. 2. Your node listens on the default `[::]` address on a Linux host (the standard deployment configuration — `net.ipv6.bindv6only=0` is the default on all common Linux distributions). 3. Your node is synced near the chain tip (the expected production state for any node participating in the network). ### Summary An address normalization mismatch between the handshake path and the mempool misbehavior path causes a deterministic assertion panic when a peer connects via IPv4 to a dual-stack IPv6 listener and then triggers a mempool misbehavior penalty. The handshake path canonicalizes IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses to plain IPv4 when storing the peer in the address book via `MetaAddr::new_connected`. The mempool misbehavior path forwards the raw transient socket address (IPv4-mapped IPv6 form) when sending `MetaAddrChange::UpdateMisbehavior` to the address book. The address book looks up the canonical IPv4 entry but then asserts that the previous entry's address matches the change's address. The mismatch between the canonical IPv4 address and the raw IPv4-mapped IPv6 address triggers the assertion, and `panic = "abort"` terminates the process. ### Details On Linux with `net.ipv6.bindv6only=0`, an IPv4 connection accepted by a `[::]` listener is represented internally as an IPv4-mapped IPv6 socket address (e.g., `::ffff:127.0.0.1:8233`). Zebra's `canonical_peer_addr` helper converts these to plain IPv4 (e.g., `127.0.0.1:8233`). The handshake path uses `MetaAddr::new_connected`, which canonicalizes the address before storing in the address book. However, inbound inventory registration uses `connected_addr.get_transient_addr()`, preserving the raw IPv4-mapped form. When the mempool later downloads an invalid transaction from this peer and generates a misbehavior penalty, the raw transient address is forwarded through the misbehavior channel to `MetaAddrChange::UpdateMisbehavior`, which does not canonicalize. After the 30-second misbehavior batch flush, `AddressBook::update` retrieves the canonical IPv4 entry but `MetaAddrChange::apply_to_meta_addr` asserts that `previous.addr == self.addr()`, which fails because one is IPv4 and the other is IPv4-mapped IPv6. The attacker needs only to complete a P2P handshake over IPv4 to a dual-stack listener and advertise an invalid mempool transaction (such as a coinbase transaction). The assertion fires after the 30-second misbehavior batch flush. ### Patches Patched in Zebra 4.5.0. The fix canonicalizes the address in the misbehavior update path via a new `MetaAddr::new_misbehavior` constructor that applies `canonical_peer_addr` before creating the `UpdateMisbehavior` change. ### Workarounds Configuring `listen_addr` to an IPv4-only address (e.g., `0.0.0.0:8233`) avoids the IPv4-mapped IPv6 representation and prevents this specific assertion. Alternatively, setting `net.ipv6.bindv6only=1` on Linux prevents dual-stack acceptance. ### Impact A remote unauthenticated peer can deterministically crash any synced Zebra node running the default Linux dual-stack configuration with a single invalid mempool transaction advertisement, followed by a 30-second wait. The attack requires no mining capability, no RPC access, no funds, and no special privileges. The crash can be repeated after each restart, causing persistent downtime. Linux dual-stack sockets and mempool activation are the default production state, not special preconditions. ### Credit Reported by `@Haxatron`.

Source published

2 Jul 2026 20:26:56 UTC

Source modified

2 Jul 2026 20:41:29 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Publisher rating · HIGH