jxl-oxide: Out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow in jxl-grid on 32-bit platforms

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

jxl-oxide is a pure Rust implementation of a JPEG XL decoder. Prior to jxl-grid 0.6.2, decoding a crafted JPEG XL image on a 32-bit platform can overflow length calculations in AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker and related grid and subgrid arithmetic. A 65536 x 65536 frame can pass the frame-area limit while overflowing the usize element count, causing modular, VarDCT, or filter rendering paths to allocate a backing buffer smaller than the logical grid. A tiny bitstream-controlled cropped frame combined with a huge canvas or requested region can also reach the vulnerable composition path in crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs through ordinary render_frame(). Later mutable subgrid and raw-pointer operations can then perform attacker-controlled out-of-bounds writes, causing memory corruption, denial of service, or arbitrary code execution. This issue is fixed in jxl-grid version 0.6.2.

Source published

19 Aug 2026 14:55:32 UTC

Source modified

19 Aug 2026 18:19:05 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 7.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H

jxl-oxide is a pure Rust implementation of a JPEG XL decoder. Prior to jxl-grid 0.6.2, decoding a crafted JPEG XL image on a 32-bit platform can overflow length calculations in AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker and related grid and subgrid arithmetic. A 65536 x 65536 frame can pass the frame-area limit while overflowing the usize element count, causing modular, VarDCT, or filter rendering paths to allocate a backing buffer smaller than the logical grid. A tiny bitstream-controlled cropped frame combined with a huge canvas or requested region can also reach the vulnerable composition path in crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs through ordinary render_frame(). Later mutable subgrid and raw-pointer operations can then perform attacker-controlled out-of-bounds writes, causing memory corruption, denial of service, or arbitrary code execution. This issue is fixed in jxl-grid version 0.6.2.

Source published

Aug 19, 2026, 2:55:32 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Aug 19, 2026, 6:19:05 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

30 Oct 2026 08:57:43 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H

jxl-oxide is a pure Rust implementation of a JPEG XL decoder. Prior to jxl-grid 0.6.2, decoding a crafted JPEG XL image on a 32-bit platform can overflow length calculations in AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker and related grid and subgrid arithmetic. A 65536 x 65536 frame can pass the frame-area limit while overflowing the usize element count, causing modular, VarDCT, or filter rendering paths to allocate a backing buffer smaller than the logical grid. A tiny bitstream-controlled cropped frame combined with a huge canvas or requested region can also reach the vulnerable composition path in crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs through ordinary render_frame(). Later mutable subgrid and raw-pointer operations can then perform attacker-controlled out-of-bounds writes, causing memory corruption, denial of service, or arbitrary code execution. This issue is fixed in jxl-grid version 0.6.2.

Source published

19 Aug 2026 15:17:09 UTC

Source modified

27 Oct 2026 13:10:00 UTC

Observed here

27 Oct 2026 14:13:17 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H

### Summary On 32-bit platforms, decoding a crafted image may lead to out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow in length calculation. ### Details & PoC The test listed below fail under miri with command `cargo +nightly miri test --release -p jxl-grid` Or you can use Address Sanitizer, which ignores Rust-specific UB like aliasing but still flags out-of-bounds accesses: `RUSTFLAGS=-Zsanitizer=address cargo +nightly test -Zbuild-std -p jxl-grid --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu` The following tests should be appended to `crates/jxl-grid/src/test/subgrids.rs`: ```rust mod miri_ub { use super::*; // `AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker` computes `width * height` unchecked. In release, overflow // can create a tiny backing buffer for huge logical dimensions. #[test] fn aligned_grid_dimension_product_overflows() { let width = usize::MAX / 2 + 1; let mut grid = AlignedGrid::<u8>::with_alloc_tracker(width, 2, None).unwrap(); let mut subgrid = grid.as_subgrid_mut(); *subgrid.get_mut(0, 1) = 1; std::hint::black_box(grid); } } ``` This issue can be reachable through decoding a crafted image in two ways: 1. **Huge actual frame** A frame such as `65536 x 65536` passes the current frame area limit (`2^32 <= 2^40`) but overflows `usize` element count on 32-bit. Rendering then allocates too-small `AlignedGrid`s in modular/VarDCT/filter paths and later writes through mutable subgrids. 2. **Huge canvas plus tiny cropped frame** This is the more practical “small payload, huge logical output” case. A bitstream-controlled frame crop can be tiny, but if the canvas/default requested region is huge, composition can allocate an output grid sized to the canvas/ROI at crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs. That is bitstream frame cropping, not API crop. With a 32-bit target and a full requested image region whose area overflows, this can happen through ordinary `render_frame()`. ### Impact On 32-bit platforms this can cause out-of-bounds writes with attacker-controlled data when decoding a crafted JPEG XL image. This could allow arbitrary code execution.

Source published

2 Jul 2026 20:45:59 UTC

Source modified

2 Jul 2026 21:11:21 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H

Publisher rating · HIGH

On 32-bit platforms, decoding a crafted image may lead to out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow in length calculation. This could allow arbitrary code execution. ### Details & PoC The test listed below fail under miri with command `cargo +nightly miri test --release -p jxl-grid` Or you can use Address Sanitizer, which ignores Rust-specific UB like aliasing but still flags out-of-bounds accesses: `RUSTFLAGS=-Zsanitizer=address cargo +nightly test -Zbuild-std -p jxl-grid --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu` The following tests should be appended to `crates/jxl-grid/src/test/subgrids.rs`: ```rust mod miri_ub { use super::*; // `AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker` computes `width * height` unchecked. In release, overflow // can create a tiny backing buffer for huge logical dimensions. #[test] fn aligned_grid_dimension_product_overflows() { let width = usize::MAX / 2 + 1; let mut grid = AlignedGrid::<u8>::with_alloc_tracker(width, 2, None).unwrap(); let mut subgrid = grid.as_subgrid_mut(); *subgrid.get_mut(0, 1) = 1; std::hint::black_box(grid); } } ``` This issue can be reachable through decoding a crafted image in two ways: 1. **Huge actual frame** A frame such as `65536 x 65536` passes the current frame area limit (`2^32 <= 2^40`) but overflows `usize` element count on 32-bit. Rendering then allocates too-small `AlignedGrid`s in modular/VarDCT/filter paths and later writes through mutable subgrids. 2. **Huge canvas plus tiny cropped frame** This is the more practical “small payload, huge logical output” case. A bitstream-controlled frame crop can be tiny, but if the canvas/default requested region is huge, composition can allocate an output grid sized to the canvas/ROI at crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs. That is bitstream frame cropping, not API crop. With a 32-bit target and a full requested image region whose area overflows, this can happen through ordinary `render_frame()`.

Source published

29 May 2026 12:00:00 UTC

Source modified

12 Oct 2026 18:00:13 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.