chrome-devtools-mcp: validatePath() does not canonicalize symlinks before enforcing roots

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Chrome DevTools for agents (chrome-devtools-mcp) lets your coding agent control and inspect a live Chrome browser. From 0.24.0 until 1.1.0, McpContext.validatePath() enforces workspace roots by checking whether path.resolve(filePath) textually falls under one of the configured root paths. path.resolve() does not canonicalize symbolic links. As a result, a symlink inside a configured workspace root can point to a file outside that root, pass validation, and then be followed by downstream file read/write operations. This bypass applies even when the MCP client correctly declares the roots capability with a non-empty list. It is separate from the documented legacy behavior where missing roots capability allows all paths. The practical impact is a workspace-boundary bypass. In the write direction, filePath-writing tools can overwrite out-of-root files through an in-root symlink. In the read direction, upload_file can read through the symlink and send the file to the currently selected web page. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.0.

Source published

24 Jun 2026 21:29:29 UTC

Source modified

25 Jun 2026 23:14:04 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 6.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

Chrome DevTools for agents (chrome-devtools-mcp) lets your coding agent control and inspect a live Chrome browser. From 0.24.0 until 1.1.0, McpContext.validatePath() enforces workspace roots by checking whether path.resolve(filePath) textually falls under one of the configured root paths. path.resolve() does not canonicalize symbolic links. As a result, a symlink inside a configured workspace root can point to a file outside that root, pass validation, and then be followed by downstream file read/write operations. This bypass applies even when the MCP client correctly declares the roots capability with a non-empty list. It is separate from the documented legacy behavior where missing roots capability allows all paths. The practical impact is a workspace-boundary bypass. In the write direction, filePath-writing tools can overwrite out-of-root files through an in-root symlink. In the read direction, upload_file can read through the symlink and send the file to the currently selected web page. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.0.

Source published

Jun 24, 2026, 9:29:29 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Jun 25, 2026, 11:14:04 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

7 Nov 2026 11:38:52 UTC

Source terms

ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 6.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

Chrome DevTools for agents (chrome-devtools-mcp) lets your coding agent control and inspect a live Chrome browser. From 0.24.0 until 1.1.0, McpContext.validatePath() enforces workspace roots by checking whether path.resolve(filePath) textually falls under one of the configured root paths. path.resolve() does not canonicalize symbolic links. As a result, a symlink inside a configured workspace root can point to a file outside that root, pass validation, and then be followed by downstream file read/write operations. This bypass applies even when the MCP client correctly declares the roots capability with a non-empty list. It is separate from the documented legacy behavior where missing roots capability allows all paths. The practical impact is a workspace-boundary bypass. In the write direction, filePath-writing tools can overwrite out-of-root files through an in-root symlink. In the read direction, upload_file can read through the symlink and send the file to the currently selected web page. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.0.

Source published

24 Jun 2026 22:16:47 UTC

Source modified

25 Oct 2026 23:10:00 UTC

Observed here

27 Oct 2026 14:13:22 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

### Summary I originally reported this through Google Bug Hunters. The Google Bug Hunters team said this is in OSS VRP scope but not reward-eligible due to the project tier, and asked me to file an issue or PR directly with this repository. I am reporting it privately here first because it is an unfixed security issue. `McpContext.validatePath()` enforces workspace `roots` by checking whether `path.resolve(filePath)` textually falls under one of the configured root paths. `path.resolve()` does not canonicalize symbolic links. As a result, a symlink inside a configured workspace root can point to a file outside that root, pass validation, and then be followed by downstream file read/write operations. This bypass applies even when the MCP client correctly declares the `roots` capability with a non-empty list. It is separate from the documented legacy behavior where missing `roots` capability allows all paths. The practical impact is a workspace-boundary bypass. In the write direction, filePath-writing tools can overwrite out-of-root files through an in-root symlink. In the read direction, `upload_file` can read through the symlink and send the file to the currently selected web page. ### Details Affected code: `src/McpContext.ts:178-199` ```ts validatePath(filePath?: string): void { if (filePath === undefined) { return; } const roots = this.roots(); if (roots === undefined) { return; } const absolutePath = path.resolve(filePath); for (const root of roots) { const rootPath = path.resolve(fileURLToPath(root.uri)); if ( absolutePath === rootPath || absolutePath.startsWith(rootPath + path.sep) ) { return; } } throw new Error( `Access denied: path ${filePath} is not within any of the workspace roots ${JSON.stringify(roots)}.`, ); } ``` `path.resolve()` only normalizes path text such as `.` and `..`. It does not call `realpath()` and does not resolve symlinks. Therefore, a path like: ```text /workspace/project/cache/profile ``` can textually pass the `/workspace` prefix check even when `cache/profile` is a symlink to: ```text /home/user/.aws/credentials ``` Downstream consumers then perform real filesystem operations without `O_NOFOLLOW`: - `src/McpContext.ts:720-738` `saveFile()` uses `fs.mkdir({recursive: true})` and `fs.writeFile()`. - `src/tools/input.ts:454-497` `upload_file` calls `puppeteer.uploadFile(filePath)` or `fileChooser.accept([filePath])`. - Other filePath-writing tools include screenshots, heap snapshots, network response save paths, snapshots, screencasts, Lighthouse output, and performance trace saves. This is not a TOCTOU/race condition. The symlink exists before validation and the PoC uses a single process. The issue is a canonicalization bypass / improper link resolution. Preconditions: - The MCP client declares `roots` and supplies at least one workspace root. - A symlink exists inside the workspace and points outside the workspace. - For the remote prompt-injection chain, the user processes untrusted page content while chrome-devtools-mcp is connected. A remote attacker does not need local access if a suitable workspace-internal symlink already exists, or if another trusted tool/workflow can create it. Without such a symlink, the issue is a local/workspace-state-dependent boundary bypass. ### PoC Conceptual exploitation with a configured root: ```text Configured roots: file:///workspace Workspace path: /workspace/project/cache/profile -> /home/user/.aws/credentials Tool call: upload_file({ filePath: "/workspace/project/cache/profile", uid: "<file input element on current page>" }) Result: validatePath() accepts the path because it textually starts with /workspace. Puppeteer follows the symlink and uploads the target file to the page. ``` Lab-only PoC that replicates the exact validation logic and subsequent write. It writes only inside a fresh temporary directory and touches no system paths: ```js const path = require('node:path'); const fs = require('node:fs'); const os = require('node:os'); const {pathToFileURL, fileURLToPath} = require('node:url'); const lab = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'cdtmcp-lab-')); try { fs.chmodSync(lab, 0o755); const workspace = path.join(lab, 'workspace'); fs.mkdirSync(workspace); const outside = path.join(lab, 'outside-secret.txt'); fs.writeFileSync(outside, 'sensitive outside content\n'); const symlinkInside = path.join(workspace, 'innocent.txt'); fs.symlinkSync(outside, symlinkInside); function validatePath(filePath, roots) { const absolutePath = path.resolve(filePath); for (const root of roots) { const rootPath = path.resolve(fileURLToPath(root.uri)); if ( absolutePath === rootPath || absolutePath.startsWith(rootPath + path.sep) ) { return true; } } throw new Error(`Access denied: ${filePath}`); } const roots = [{uri: pathToFileURL(workspace).href, name: 'workspace'}]; validatePath(symlinkInside, roots); fs.writeFileSync(symlinkInside, 'OVERWRITTEN BY MCP\n'); console.log(fs.readFileSync(outside, 'utf8')); // -> "OVERWRITTEN BY MCP" } finally { fs.rmSync(lab, {recursive: true, force: true}); } ``` Observed result: ```text validatePath() accepts the in-root symlink path. The subsequent write follows the symlink and modifies the out-of-root target. ``` I can provide an end-to-end MCP client reproduction if needed. The lab PoC above demonstrates the root cause using the same validation logic as the server. ### Impact Who can exploit: - A local process/user or trusted workflow that can create a symlink inside the workspace. - A remote page/prompt-injection attacker, if a suitable workspace-internal symlink already exists or can be created by another trusted workflow/tool. Security impact: - Integrity: tools that write to `filePath` can overwrite files outside the configured workspace root through an in-root symlink. - Confidentiality: `upload_file` can read a file outside the workspace through an in-root symlink and attach it to a file input on the current page. - Stealth/auditability: the exfiltration path goes through normal page file-upload behavior, and chrome-devtools-mcp does not appear to log the canonical path that was uploaded. Example sensitive files reachable if symlinked into the workspace: - Cloud credentials such as `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.config/gcloud/...`, or `~/.azure/...`. - SSH private keys or `.ssh` files readable by the user. - Project secrets such as `.env`, `.npmrc`, `.netrc`, `secrets.json`, and API tokens. - Out-of-workspace source files or configuration files. Severity: - Suggested GitHub severity: Moderate. - CVSS v3.1 chain estimate: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N`. - AC:H reflects that a workspace-internal symlink must exist at validation time. Suggested fix: Canonicalize paths before comparing against roots. For an existing file, use `fs.realpath()` on the path. For a new file, resolve the parent directory with `fs.realpath()` and re-join the basename. ```ts async validatePath(filePath?: string): Promise<void> { if (filePath === undefined) return; const roots = this.roots(); if (roots === undefined) return; const abs = path.resolve(filePath); let canonical; try { canonical = await fs.realpath(abs); } catch (err) { if (err.code === 'ENOENT') { const parent = await fs.realpath(path.dirname(abs)); canonical = path.join(parent, path.basename(abs)); } else { throw err; } } for (const root of roots) { const canonicalRoot = await fs.realpath(fileURLToPath(root.uri)); if ( canonical === canonicalRoot || canonical.startsWith(canonicalRoot + path.sep) ) { return; } } throw new Error( `Access denied: ${filePath} (canonical: ${canonical}) is not within any workspace root.`, ); }

Source published

17 Aug 2026 21:56:12 UTC

Source modified

17 Aug 2026 22:00:07 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

Publisher rating · MODERATE