chrome-devtools-mcp: validatePath() does not canonicalize symlinks before enforcing roots
Exact source revision recorded 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.
cve-program · CVE-2026-53766
PublishedChrome DevTools for agents (chrome-devtools-mcp) lets your coding agent control and inspect a live Chrome browser. From 0.24.0 until 1.1.0, McpContext.validatePath() enforces workspace roots by checking whether path.resolve(filePath) textually falls under one of the configured root paths. path.resolve() does not canonicalize symbolic links. As a result, a symlink inside a configured workspace root can point to a file outside that root, pass validation, and then be followed by downstream file read/write operations. This bypass applies even when the MCP client correctly declares the roots capability with a non-empty list. It is separate from the documented legacy behavior where missing roots capability allows all paths. The practical impact is a workspace-boundary bypass. In the write direction, filePath-writing tools can overwrite out-of-root files through an in-root symlink. In the read direction, upload_file can read through the symlink and send the file to the currently selected web page. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.0.
- Source published
- 24 Jun 2026 21:29:29 UTC
- Source modified
- 25 Jun 2026 23:14:04 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
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CVSS 3.1 · 6.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L