OpenClaw before 2026.5.18 contains an identity header validation vulnerability allowing local same-host callers to forge trusted-proxy identity headers. Attackers with access to the proxy-facing Gateway port can supply forged identity headers to assume operator identity and potentially escalate privileges.
OpenClaw before 2026.5.18 contains an identity header validation vulnerability allowing local same-host callers to forge trusted-proxy identity headers. Attackers with access to the proxy-facing Gateway port can supply forged identity headers to assume operator identity and potentially escalate privileges.
OpenClaw before 2026.5.18 contains an identity header validation vulnerability allowing local same-host callers to forge trusted-proxy identity headers. Attackers with access to the proxy-facing Gateway port can supply forged identity headers to assume operator identity and potentially escalate privileges.
### Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-rggc-m335-3wvj. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
### Original Description
OpenClaw before 2026.5.18 contains an identity header validation vulnerability allowing local same-host callers to forge trusted-proxy identity headers. Attackers with access to the proxy-facing Gateway port can supply forged identity headers to assume operator identity and potentially escalate privileges.
### Summary
Same-host trusted-proxy deployments could accept local forged identity headers. In affected versions, a local same-host caller that can reach the proxy-facing Gateway port could supply identity headers normally reserved for the trusted proxy.
This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.
### Impact
When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could receive operator identity associated with the forged headers. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.
### Patched Versions
The first stable patched version is `2026.5.18`.
### Mitigations
bind trusted-proxy ingress behind the actual proxy and firewall direct same-host access. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jun 12, 2026, 9:56:57 PM
dateUpdated: Jun 15, 2026, 9:40:00 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2026-1738: OpenClaw: Mehrere Schwachstellen
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-290
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-06-12T22:16:54.790
lastModified: 2026-07-23T09:10:00.113
1 source CPE criteria · context only
cpe:2.3:a:openclaw:openclaw:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.