next-video: Unauthenticated arbitrary file read via /api/video request handler
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-54150
Publishednext-video is a library for adding video to Next.js applications. Prior to 2.8.1, the GET endpoint exported by next-video/request-handler and commonly mounted at /api/video accepts an unauthenticated url query parameter, while src/utils/utils.ts isRemote() treats any value without an HTTP or HTTPS prefix as a local path. src/request-handler.ts passes that value through src/assets.ts getAssetPath() to src/config.ts loadAsset(), which appends a JSON suffix and uses fs.readFile without canonicalizing the path or verifying that it remains inside the configured video folder. A remote attacker can therefore escape the intended asset directory and read JSON files accessible to the application process, including Next.js server-action encryption material, preview-mode keys, build manifests, route metadata, absolute paths, and application video asset identifiers. Applications that do not expose the runtime request handler are not affected through this route. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.1.
- Source published
- 14 Sep 2026 17:25:38 UTC
- Source modified
- 14 Sep 2026 19:03:28 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 4.0 · 6.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-77690
Publishednext-video is a library for adding video to Next.js applications. Prior to 2.8.1, the GET endpoint exported by next-video/request-handler and commonly mounted at /api/video accepts an unauthenticated url query parameter, while src/utils/utils.ts isRemote() treats any value without an HTTP or HTTPS prefix as a local path. src/request-handler.ts passes that value through src/assets.ts getAssetPath() to src/config.ts loadAsset(), which appends a JSON suffix and uses fs.readFile without canonicalizing the path or verifying that it remains inside the configured video folder. A remote attacker can therefore escape the intended asset directory and read JSON files accessible to the application process, including Next.js server-action encryption material, preview-mode keys, build manifests, route metadata, absolute paths, and application video asset identifiers. Applications that do not expose the runtime request handler are not affected through this route. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.1.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Sep 14, 2026, 5:25:38 PM
dateUpdated: Sep 14, 2026, 7:03:28 PM
- Source published
- Sep 14, 2026, 5:25:38 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Sep 14, 2026, 7:03:28 PM (timezone not stated)
- Observed here
- 11 Nov 2026 13:58:58 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 6.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
nvd · CVE-2026-54150
Publishednext-video is a library for adding video to Next.js applications. Prior to 2.8.1, the GET endpoint exported by next-video/request-handler and commonly mounted at /api/video accepts an unauthenticated url query parameter, while src/utils/utils.ts isRemote() treats any value without an HTTP or HTTPS prefix as a local path. src/request-handler.ts passes that value through src/assets.ts getAssetPath() to src/config.ts loadAsset(), which appends a JSON suffix and uses fs.readFile without canonicalizing the path or verifying that it remains inside the configured video folder. A remote attacker can therefore escape the intended asset directory and read JSON files accessible to the application process, including Next.js server-action encryption material, preview-mode keys, build manifests, route metadata, absolute paths, and application video asset identifiers. Applications that do not expose the runtime request handler are not affected through this route. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.1.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-22
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-09-14T18:17:52.277
lastModified: 2026-09-30T19:57:08.043
- Source published
- 14 Sep 2026 18:17:52 UTC
- Source modified
- 30 Sep 2026 19:57:08 UTC
- Observed here
- 25 Oct 2026 13:17:22 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.9 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
osv · GHSA-2p39-2jf3-fv2q
Published### Impact The HTTP route handler exported by `next-video/request-handler` — which the README instructs consumers to mount at `/api/video` — allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to read arbitrary `.json` files from the production filesystem of any application following the documented setup. The handler's `GET` endpoint accepts a `url` query parameter and uses it to locate and serve a JSON asset descriptor from disk. The only guard between "remote URL" and "local file path" is a regex check for `^https?://`. Any value that does not match that prefix is treated as a local path, `.json` is appended, and the file is read with `fs.readFile` and returned in the HTTP response — with no authentication, no path canonicalization, and no traversal guard. On a typical Next.js deployment this exposes, at minimum: - The **Next.js Server Actions AES encryption key** (`.next/server/server-reference-manifest.json`) - The **Next.js Preview/Draft Mode keys** (`previewModeId`, `previewModeSigningKey`, `previewModeEncryptionKey`) - Internal build manifests, route registries, and absolute runtime paths - Application-specific asset metadata (e.g. Mux `uploadId`, `assetId`, `playbackId` values stored in `videos/*.json`) Any application that mounted `/api/video` following the documented one-liner is affected. ### Patches 2.8.1 ### Workarounds Until a patched version is available, wrap the exported handler in your own route file and validate the `url` parameter before passing it through: - Reject any `url` value that does not begin with `https://`, or that does not match a known allowlist of trusted remote hosts. - Alternatively, remove the `/api/video` route entirely if your application only uses build-time `import` of local video files and does not use `<Video src="https://...">` with string URLs at runtime. ### References - `src/request-handler.ts` — the vulnerable GET handler - `src/assets.ts` — `getAssetPath()`, where the local-vs-remote branching occurs - `src/utils/utils.ts` — `isRemote()`, the sole guard between the two branches - `src/config.ts` — `loadAsset()`, which performs the unconstrained `fs.readFile`
- Source published
- 20 Aug 2026 18:35:11 UTC
- Source modified
- 20 Aug 2026 18:48:09 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE