Skipper routesrv-no-auth: All routesrv API Endpoints Lack Authentication
cve-program · CVE-2026-54246
PublishedSkipper is an HTTP router and reverse proxy for service composition. Prior to 0.27.13, the routesrv component serves cluster-wide control-plane data without application-layer authentication through /routes, /routes/{zone}, /swarm/redis/shards, and /swarm/valkey/shards. The handlers registered in routesrv/routesrv.go, eskipBytes.ServeHTTP in routesrv/eskipbytes.go, RedisHandler.ServeHTTP in routesrv/redishandler.go, and ValkeyHandler.ServeHTTP in routesrv/valkeyhandler.go only restrict HTTP methods and do not authenticate callers. A compromised or otherwise attacker-controlled pod that can reach routesrv on the Kubernetes cluster network can bypass its namespace-scoped RBAC and read Ingress and RouteGroup backend URLs, filter-chain and OAuth or OIDC path details, and Redis or Valkey shard addresses across namespaces. NetworkPolicy can restrict reachability but does not remove the missing-authentication condition, and the established impact is confidentiality exposure rather than direct integrity or availability loss. This issue is fixed in version 0.27.13.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-78061
PublishedSkipper is an HTTP router and reverse proxy for service composition. Prior to 0.27.13, the routesrv component serves cluster-wide control-plane data without application-layer authentication through /routes, /routes/{zone}, /swarm/redis/shards, and /swarm/valkey/shards. The handlers registered in routesrv/routesrv.go, eskipBytes.ServeHTTP in routesrv/eskipbytes.go, RedisHandler.ServeHTTP in routesrv/redishandler.go, and ValkeyHandler.ServeHTTP in routesrv/valkeyhandler.go only restrict HTTP methods and do not authenticate callers. A compromised or otherwise attacker-controlled pod that can reach routesrv on the Kubernetes cluster network can bypass its namespace-scoped RBAC and read Ingress and RouteGroup backend URLs, filter-chain and OAuth or OIDC path details, and Redis or Valkey shard addresses across namespaces. NetworkPolicy can restrict reachability but does not remove the missing-authentication condition, and the established impact is confidentiality exposure rather than direct integrity or availability loss. This issue is fixed in version 0.27.13.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-54246
PublishedSkipper is an HTTP router and reverse proxy for service composition. Prior to 0.27.13, the routesrv component serves cluster-wide control-plane data without application-layer authentication through /routes, /routes/{zone}, /swarm/redis/shards, and /swarm/valkey/shards. The handlers registered in routesrv/routesrv.go, eskipBytes.ServeHTTP in routesrv/eskipbytes.go, RedisHandler.ServeHTTP in routesrv/redishandler.go, and ValkeyHandler.ServeHTTP in routesrv/valkeyhandler.go only restrict HTTP methods and do not authenticate callers. A compromised or otherwise attacker-controlled pod that can reach routesrv on the Kubernetes cluster network can bypass its namespace-scoped RBAC and read Ingress and RouteGroup backend URLs, filter-chain and OAuth or OIDC path details, and Redis or Valkey shard addresses across namespaces. NetworkPolicy can restrict reachability but does not remove the missing-authentication condition, and the established impact is confidentiality exposure rather than direct integrity or availability loss. This issue is fixed in version 0.27.13.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-5587-2x54-jj6h
Published## Description The `routesrv` component exposes the full cluster route topology (Ingress/RouteGroup configurations, backend URLs, filter chains, OAuth/OIDC callback paths) and cache-cluster topology (Redis/Valkey shard addresses) over plain HTTP with **zero authentication**. Any pod in the Kubernetes cluster can reach routesrv via its predictable DNS name and retrieve sensitive cluster-wide routing and cache infrastructure data. ## Vulnerable Code **routesrv/routesrv.go:87-99,114-137** — all handler registrations on the main mux: ```go mux.Handle("/routes", b) // eskipBytes.ServeHTTP — all route data mux.Handle("/routes/{zone}", b) // zone-scoped route data mux.Handle("/swarm/redis/shards", rh) // Redis cluster addresses mux.Handle("/swarm/valkey/shards", vh) // Valkey cluster addresses ``` **routesrv/eskipbytes.go:134-196** — `eskipBytes.ServeHTTP`: ```go func (e *eskipBytes) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // ... only checks GET/HEAD method, NO auth check if r.Method != "GET" && r.Method != "HEAD" { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed) return } // ... serves all route data immediately } ``` **routesrv/redishandler.go:28-41** — `RedisHandler.ServeHTTP`: ```go func (rh *RedisHandler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if r.Method != "GET" { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed) return } // ... serves Redis cluster addresses immediately, NO auth check } ``` **routesrv/valkeyhandler.go:28-41** — `ValkeyHandler.ServeHTTP`: ```go func (vh *ValkeyHandler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if r.Method != "GET" { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed) return } // ... serves Valkey cluster addresses immediately, NO auth check } ``` ## Attack Path 1. **Initial Compromise**: Attacker compromises any pod in the Kubernetes cluster (via application CVE, supply-chain attack, malicious container image, etc.) 2. **Discovery**: Attacker discovers routesrv via predictable Kubernetes DNS name: `skipper-ingress-routesrv.kube-system.svc.cluster.local:9090` (documented at `docs/tutorials/operations.md:108`, `docs/tutorials/ratelimit.md:137,197`) 3. **Data Extraction without Auth**: - `GET http://<routesrv>:9090/routes` → All Ingress/RouteGroup configurations across ALL namespaces - `GET http://<routesrv>:9090/swarm/redis/shards` → Redis cache cluster node addresses - `GET http://<routesrv>:9090/swarm/valkey/shards` → Valkey cache cluster node addresses 4. **Subsequent Attacks**: With cache cluster topology, attacker can perform direct cache-level attacks (ratelimit data manipulation, session data exfiltration) ## Permission Boundary Analysis The routesrv uses a ServiceAccount with **cluster-wide RBAC** to list Ingress (networking.k8s.io), RouteGroup (zalando.org), Endpoints, and Services across all namespaces (see `clusterclient.go:648-653` `fetchClusterState`). The kube-apiserver requires proper ServiceAccount token + RBAC authorization for the Kubernetes API itself, but **routesrv exposes the aggregated data over HTTP with zero authentication**. A compromised pod with limited RBAC (restricted to its own namespace) can bypass Kubernetes RBAC entirely by reading routesrv. This crosses the boundary from *"namespace-scoped Kubernetes workload with restricted RBAC"* to *"full cluster route topology across all namespaces"*. No NetworkPolicy manifests exist in the `deploy/` directory. The default Kubernetes flat network model allows any pod to reach any service, further widening the attack surface. ## Exposed Data | Endpoint | Data Exposed | Impact | |----------|-------------|--------| | `GET /routes` | All ingress/routegroup backends: internal service URLs, filter chains (auth, rate limiting, OAuth, JWT, OPA policies), load balancer group membership | Cluster-wide reconnaissance, targeted backend attacks | | `GET /routes/{zone}` | Zone-scoped subset of above route data | Same, scoped | | `GET /swarm/redis/shards` | Redis cluster internal IP:port pairs | Direct cache-level attacks, ratelimit data manipulation | | `GET /swarm/valkey/shards` | Valkey cluster internal IP:port pairs | Same | Additionally, the data-plane client (`eskipfile/remote.go:190-219`) also performs plain HTTP GET with no credentials — only an ETag header is sent — confirming that no auth capability exists in the architecture at all. ## Mitigation 1. Add authentication to all routesrv HTTP endpoints (basic auth, bearer token, mTLS, or shared secret) via flag `-route-server-filters=""` 2. Deploy Kubernetes NetworkPolicies restricting ingress to routesrv to only the data-plane skipper pod selectors 3. Consider using mutual TLS authentication between data-plane and control-plane components ### NetworkPolicy does not remove the missing-auth condition Restrictive NetworkPolicies are a valid mitigation, but they are not an application-layer authentication mechanism. The security-relevant defect remains that routesrv serves control-plane-derived data to unauthenticated callers whenever network reachability exists. ### Impact framing This report does **not** rely on claiming direct integrity or availability impact. The verified issue is a confidentiality-focused control-plane exposure: route definitions, backend topology, filter-chain details, and Redis/Valkey shard addresses become readable to any reachable in-cluster client. ## Resources - `routesrv/routesrv.go:87-99` — handler registration (zero auth) - `routesrv/eskipbytes.go:134-196` — route data handler (no auth) - `routesrv/redishandler.go:28-41` — Redis shard handler (no auth) - `routesrv/valkeyhandler.go:28-41` — Valkey shard handler (no auth) - `dataclients/kubernetes/clusterclient.go:648-653` — `fetchClusterState()` — shows cluster-wide RBAC - `eskipfile/remote.go:190-219` — data-plane client also has no auth capability - `docs/tutorials/operations.md:108`, `docs/tutorials/ratelimit.md:137,197` — documented routesrv DNS name
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GO-2026-6018
PublishedSkipper's routesrv-no-auth component: All routesrv API Endpoints Lack Authentication in github.com/zalando/skipper
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cve-program · CVE-2026-54246
PublishedSkipper routesrv-no-auth: All routesrv API Endpoints Lack Authentication
Skipper is an HTTP router and reverse proxy for service composition. Prior to 0.27.13, the routesrv component serves cluster-wide control-plane data without application-layer authentication through /routes, /routes/{zone}, /swarm/redis/shards, and /swarm/valkey/shards. The handlers registered in routesrv/routesrv.go, eskipBytes.ServeHTTP in routesrv/eskipbytes.go, RedisHandler.ServeHTTP in routesrv/redishandler.go, and ValkeyHandler.ServeHTTP in routesrv/valkeyhandler.go only restrict HTTP methods and do not authenticate callers. A compromised or otherwise attacker-controlled pod that can reach routesrv on the Kubernetes cluster network can bypass its namespace-scoped RBAC and read Ingress and RouteGroup backend URLs, filter-chain and OAuth or OIDC path details, and Redis or Valkey shard addresses across namespaces. NetworkPolicy can restrict reachability but does not remove the missing-authentication condition, and the established impact is confidentiality exposure rather than direct integrity or availability loss. This issue is fixed in version 0.27.13.
- Source published
- 14 Sep 2026 20:03:14 UTC
- Source modified
- 15 Sep 2026 14:38:38 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
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CVSS 3.1 · 5.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-78061
PublishedSkipper is an HTTP router and reverse proxy for service composition. Prior to 0.27.13, the routesrv component serves cluster-wide control-plane data without application-layer authentication through /routes, /routes/{zone}, /swarm/redis/shar…
Skipper is an HTTP router and reverse proxy for service composition. Prior to 0.27.13, the routesrv component serves cluster-wide control-plane data without application-layer authentication through /routes, /routes/{zone}, /swarm/redis/shards, and /swarm/valkey/shards. The handlers registered in routesrv/routesrv.go, eskipBytes.ServeHTTP in routesrv/eskipbytes.go, RedisHandler.ServeHTTP in routesrv/redishandler.go, and ValkeyHandler.ServeHTTP in routesrv/valkeyhandler.go only restrict HTTP methods and do not authenticate callers. A compromised or otherwise attacker-controlled pod that can reach routesrv on the Kubernetes cluster network can bypass its namespace-scoped RBAC and read Ingress and RouteGroup backend URLs, filter-chain and OAuth or OIDC path details, and Redis or Valkey shard addresses across namespaces. NetworkPolicy can restrict reachability but does not remove the missing-authentication condition, and the established impact is confidentiality exposure rather than direct integrity or availability loss. This issue is fixed in version 0.27.13.
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EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
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datePublished: Sep 14, 2026, 8:03:14 PM
dateUpdated: Sep 15, 2026, 2:38:38 PM
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- Sep 14, 2026, 8:03:14 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Sep 15, 2026, 2:38:38 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 11 Nov 2026 13:59:10 UTC
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- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
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EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 5.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-54246
PublishedSkipper is an HTTP router and reverse proxy for service composition. Prior to 0.27.13, the routesrv component serves cluster-wide control-plane data without application-layer authentication through /routes, /routes/{zone}, /swarm/redis/shar…
Skipper is an HTTP router and reverse proxy for service composition. Prior to 0.27.13, the routesrv component serves cluster-wide control-plane data without application-layer authentication through /routes, /routes/{zone}, /swarm/redis/shards, and /swarm/valkey/shards. The handlers registered in routesrv/routesrv.go, eskipBytes.ServeHTTP in routesrv/eskipbytes.go, RedisHandler.ServeHTTP in routesrv/redishandler.go, and ValkeyHandler.ServeHTTP in routesrv/valkeyhandler.go only restrict HTTP methods and do not authenticate callers. A compromised or otherwise attacker-controlled pod that can reach routesrv on the Kubernetes cluster network can bypass its namespace-scoped RBAC and read Ingress and RouteGroup backend URLs, filter-chain and OAuth or OIDC path details, and Redis or Valkey shard addresses across namespaces. NetworkPolicy can restrict reachability but does not remove the missing-authentication condition, and the established impact is confidentiality exposure rather than direct integrity or availability loss. This issue is fixed in version 0.27.13.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-306
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-09-14T20:16:45.697
lastModified: 2026-09-16T13:42:48.877
- Source published
- 14 Sep 2026 20:16:45 UTC
- Source modified
- 16 Sep 2026 13:42:48 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 13:17:22 UTC
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CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
osv · GHSA-5587-2x54-jj6h
PublishedSkipper's routesrv-no-auth component: All routesrv API Endpoints Lack Authentication
## Description The `routesrv` component exposes the full cluster route topology (Ingress/RouteGroup configurations, backend URLs, filter chains, OAuth/OIDC callback paths) and cache-cluster topology (Redis/Valkey shard addresses) over plain HTTP with **zero authentication**. Any pod in the Kubernetes cluster can reach routesrv via its predictable DNS name and retrieve sensitive cluster-wide routing and cache infrastructure data. ## Vulnerable Code **routesrv/routesrv.go:87-99,114-137** — all handler registrations on the main mux: ```go mux.Handle("/routes", b) // eskipBytes.ServeHTTP — all route data mux.Handle("/routes/{zone}", b) // zone-scoped route data mux.Handle("/swarm/redis/shards", rh) // Redis cluster addresses mux.Handle("/swarm/valkey/shards", vh) // Valkey cluster addresses ``` **routesrv/eskipbytes.go:134-196** — `eskipBytes.ServeHTTP`: ```go func (e *eskipBytes) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { // ... only checks GET/HEAD method, NO auth check if r.Method != "GET" && r.Method != "HEAD" { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed) return } // ... serves all route data immediately } ``` **routesrv/redishandler.go:28-41** — `RedisHandler.ServeHTTP`: ```go func (rh *RedisHandler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if r.Method != "GET" { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed) return } // ... serves Redis cluster addresses immediately, NO auth check } ``` **routesrv/valkeyhandler.go:28-41** — `ValkeyHandler.ServeHTTP`: ```go func (vh *ValkeyHandler) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { if r.Method != "GET" { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusMethodNotAllowed) return } // ... serves Valkey cluster addresses immediately, NO auth check } ``` ## Attack Path 1. **Initial Compromise**: Attacker compromises any pod in the Kubernetes cluster (via application CVE, supply-chain attack, malicious container image, etc.) 2. **Discovery**: Attacker discovers routesrv via predictable Kubernetes DNS name: `skipper-ingress-routesrv.kube-system.svc.cluster.local:9090` (documented at `docs/tutorials/operations.md:108`, `docs/tutorials/ratelimit.md:137,197`) 3. **Data Extraction without Auth**: - `GET http://<routesrv>:9090/routes` → All Ingress/RouteGroup configurations across ALL namespaces - `GET http://<routesrv>:9090/swarm/redis/shards` → Redis cache cluster node addresses - `GET http://<routesrv>:9090/swarm/valkey/shards` → Valkey cache cluster node addresses 4. **Subsequent Attacks**: With cache cluster topology, attacker can perform direct cache-level attacks (ratelimit data manipulation, session data exfiltration) ## Permission Boundary Analysis The routesrv uses a ServiceAccount with **cluster-wide RBAC** to list Ingress (networking.k8s.io), RouteGroup (zalando.org), Endpoints, and Services across all namespaces (see `clusterclient.go:648-653` `fetchClusterState`). The kube-apiserver requires proper ServiceAccount token + RBAC authorization for the Kubernetes API itself, but **routesrv exposes the aggregated data over HTTP with zero authentication**. A compromised pod with limited RBAC (restricted to its own namespace) can bypass Kubernetes RBAC entirely by reading routesrv. This crosses the boundary from *"namespace-scoped Kubernetes workload with restricted RBAC"* to *"full cluster route topology across all namespaces"*. No NetworkPolicy manifests exist in the `deploy/` directory. The default Kubernetes flat network model allows any pod to reach any service, further widening the attack surface. ## Exposed Data | Endpoint | Data Exposed | Impact | |----------|-------------|--------| | `GET /routes` | All ingress/routegroup backends: internal service URLs, filter chains (auth, rate limiting, OAuth, JWT, OPA policies), load balancer group membership | Cluster-wide reconnaissance, targeted backend attacks | | `GET /routes/{zone}` | Zone-scoped subset of above route data | Same, scoped | | `GET /swarm/redis/shards` | Redis cluster internal IP:port pairs | Direct cache-level attacks, ratelimit data manipulation | | `GET /swarm/valkey/shards` | Valkey cluster internal IP:port pairs | Same | Additionally, the data-plane client (`eskipfile/remote.go:190-219`) also performs plain HTTP GET with no credentials — only an ETag header is sent — confirming that no auth capability exists in the architecture at all. ## Mitigation 1. Add authentication to all routesrv HTTP endpoints (basic auth, bearer token, mTLS, or shared secret) via flag `-route-server-filters=""` 2. Deploy Kubernetes NetworkPolicies restricting ingress to routesrv to only the data-plane skipper pod selectors 3. Consider using mutual TLS authentication between data-plane and control-plane components ### NetworkPolicy does not remove the missing-auth condition Restrictive NetworkPolicies are a valid mitigation, but they are not an application-layer authentication mechanism. The security-relevant defect remains that routesrv serves control-plane-derived data to unauthenticated callers whenever network reachability exists. ### Impact framing This report does **not** rely on claiming direct integrity or availability impact. The verified issue is a confidentiality-focused control-plane exposure: route definitions, backend topology, filter-chain details, and Redis/Valkey shard addresses become readable to any reachable in-cluster client. ## Resources - `routesrv/routesrv.go:87-99` — handler registration (zero auth) - `routesrv/eskipbytes.go:134-196` — route data handler (no auth) - `routesrv/redishandler.go:28-41` — Redis shard handler (no auth) - `routesrv/valkeyhandler.go:28-41` — Valkey shard handler (no auth) - `dataclients/kubernetes/clusterclient.go:648-653` — `fetchClusterState()` — shows cluster-wide RBAC - `eskipfile/remote.go:190-219` — data-plane client also has no auth capability - `docs/tutorials/operations.md:108`, `docs/tutorials/ratelimit.md:137,197` — documented routesrv DNS name
- Source published
- 17 Jul 2026 21:46:18 UTC
- Source modified
- 22 Jul 2026 21:11:26 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
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CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE
osv · GO-2026-6018
PublishedSkipper's routesrv-no-auth component: All routesrv API Endpoints Lack Authentication in github.com/zalando/skipper
Skipper's routesrv-no-auth component: All routesrv API Endpoints Lack Authentication in github.com/zalando/skipper
- Source published
- 22 Jul 2026 20:36:35 UTC
- Source modified
- 22 Jul 2026 21:00:24 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.