Angular is a development platform for building mobile and desktop web applications using TypeScript/JavaScript and other languages. Prior to 22.0.1, 21.2.17, and 20.3.25, to optimize client-side bootstrap in Server-Side Rendered (SSR) environments, Angular supports Hydration via provideClientHydration(). During SSR, Angular serializes the application's runtime state (such as cached HttpClient responses) and outputs it into the HTML stream as a <script> tag with a predictable identifier. During client bootstrap, Angular recovers this state by looking up the element via document.getElementById('ng-state') and parsing its text content. Because the DOM element lookup for the state container is predictable and relies solely on the ID selector (ng-state), it is susceptible to DOM Clobbering. If the application binds untrusted user input or CMS content to element properties such as id (e.g., <div [id]="userInput"> or <a id="ng-state">) before the genuine <script> tag is parsed by the browser, the attacker-controlled element takes precedence in the DOM lookup. During hydration, when Angular calls document.getElementById('ng-state'), the browser returns the attacker's clobbered element. Angular then attempts to parse the text content or attributes of this clobbered element as JSON. This vulnerability is fixed in 22.0.1, 21.2.17, and 20.3.25.
Angular is a development platform for building mobile and desktop web applications using TypeScript/JavaScript and other languages. Prior to 22.0.1, 21.2.17, and 20.3.25, to optimize client-side bootstrap in Server-Side Rendered (SSR) environments, Angular supports Hydration via provideClientHydration(). During SSR, Angular serializes the application's runtime state (such as cached HttpClient responses) and outputs it into the HTML stream as a <script> tag with a predictable identifier. During client bootstrap, Angular recovers this state by looking up the element via document.getElementById('ng-state') and parsing its text content. Because the DOM element lookup for the state container is predictable and relies solely on the ID selector (ng-state), it is susceptible to DOM Clobbering. If the application binds untrusted user input or CMS content to element properties such as id (e.g., <div [id]="userInput"> or <a id="ng-state">) before the genuine <script> tag is parsed by the browser, the attacker-controlled element takes precedence in the DOM lookup. During hydration, when Angular calls document.getElementById('ng-state'), the browser returns the attacker's clobbered element. Angular then attempts to parse the text content or attributes of this clobbered element as JSON. This vulnerability is fixed in 22.0.1, 21.2.17, and 20.3.25.
Angular is a development platform for building mobile and desktop web applications using TypeScript/JavaScript and other languages. Prior to 22.0.1, 21.2.17, and 20.3.25, to optimize client-side bootstrap in Server-Side Rendered (SSR) environments, Angular supports Hydration via provideClientHydration(). During SSR, Angular serializes the application's runtime state (such as cached HttpClient responses) and outputs it into the HTML stream as a <script> tag with a predictable identifier. During client bootstrap, Angular recovers this state by looking up the element via document.getElementById('ng-state') and parsing its text content. Because the DOM element lookup for the state container is predictable and relies solely on the ID selector (ng-state), it is susceptible to DOM Clobbering. If the application binds untrusted user input or CMS content to element properties such as id (e.g., <div [id]="userInput"> or <a id="ng-state">) before the genuine <script> tag is parsed by the browser, the attacker-controlled element takes precedence in the DOM lookup. During hydration, when Angular calls document.getElementById('ng-state'), the browser returns the attacker's clobbered element. Angular then attempts to parse the text content or attributes of this clobbered element as JSON. This vulnerability is fixed in 22.0.1, 21.2.17, and 20.3.25.
To optimize client-side bootstrap in Server-Side Rendered (SSR) environments, Angular supports **Hydration** via `provideClientHydration()`. During SSR, Angular serializes the application's runtime state (such as cached `HttpClient` responses) and outputs it into the HTML stream as a `<script>` tag with a predictable identifier:
```html
<script type="application/json" id="ng-state">
{"some-api-url": {"body": ...}}
</script>
````
During client bootstrap, Angular recovers this state by looking up the element via `document.getElementById('ng-state')` and parsing its text content.
Because the DOM element lookup for the state container is predictable and relies solely on the ID selector (`ng-state`), it is susceptible to **DOM Clobbering**.
If the application binds untrusted user input or CMS content to element properties such as `id` (e.g., `<div [id]="userInput">` or `<a id="ng-state">`) *before* the genuine `<script>` tag is parsed by the browser, the attacker-controlled element takes precedence in the DOM lookup.
During hydration, when Angular calls `document.getElementById('ng-state')`, the browser returns the attacker's clobbered element. Angular then attempts to parse the text content or attributes of this clobbered element as JSON.
### Impact
By clobbering the state element, the attacker can inject a custom JSON payload into Angular's `TransferState` cache. The most critical exploitation vector is poisoning the **HTTP Transfer Cache**.
1. The attacker injects a clobbered `ng-state` element containing custom JSON.
2. The JSON maps a key (representing a target API endpoint URL) to a malicious payload of the attacker's choice.
3. During client-side initialization, Angular's `HttpClient` checks `TransferState` before making requests. Finding the poisoned key, `HttpClient` returns the forged response instantly instead of requesting the genuine backend API.
Depending on how the application processes and renders the affected API response, this can lead to:
* **DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)** if poisoned fields are rendered using unsafe bindings.
* **Privilege Escalation** by spoofing user info or session details retrieved from poisoned API payloads.
* **UI Hijacking** and redirection by spoofing configuration endpoints.
### Patched Versions
* 22.0.1
* 21.2.17
* 20.3.25
### Workarounds
If you cannot immediately update to a patched Angular version, apply the following workarounds:
#### A. Avoid Dynamic/User-Controlled IDs
Avoid binding raw user-supplied values or dynamic CMS IDs directly to element attributes. If dynamic IDs are required, sanitize them or prepend a static safe prefix:
```html
<!-- Vulnerable Pattern -->
<div [id]="userControlledInput">...</div>
<!-- Mitigated Pattern -->
<div [id]="'safe-prefix-' + userControlledInput">...</div>
```
#### B. Configure a Custom Application ID
Declaring a unique, non-predictable `APP_ID` changes the ID suffix of the state element, making it harder for attackers to predict and target:
```ts
// app.config.ts
import { APP_ID } from '@angular/core';
import { provideClientHydration } from '@angular/platform-browser';
export const appConfig = {
providers: [
{ provide: APP_ID, useValue: 'unique-obfuscated-app-id' },
provideClientHydration()
]
};
```
This changes the state element lookup ID from `ng-state` to `unique-obfuscated-app-id-state`.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jun 22, 2026, 3:30:48 PM
dateUpdated: Jun 22, 2026, 4:00:36 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2026-1930: Angular: Mehrere Schwachstellen
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-79 · CWE-471
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-06-22T16:16:39.457
lastModified: 2026-07-09T15:39:24.360
1 source CPE criteria · context only
cpe:2.3:a:angular:angular:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.