Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

Budibase: Potential SSRF DNS rebinding bypass in outbound fetch validation

CVSS 3.1 8.5 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 8.5 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 8.5 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 7.1 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by @budibase/backend-core 3.39.9KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-54353

Published

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist before the request is sent, but the actual socket connection later performs a separate DNS lookup through node-fetch. Since the validated IPs are never pinned to the connection, an attacker-controlled hostname can return a public IP during validation and a private/internal IP during the real connection. This results in a non-blind SSRF primitive against internal services reachable from the Budibase host, including loopback, RFC1918 ranges, and cloud metadata endpoints. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-39915

Published

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist before the request is sent, but the actual socket connection later performs a separate DNS lookup through node-fetch. Since the validated IPs are never pinned to the connection, an attacker-controlled hostname can return a public IP during validation and a private/internal IP during the real connection. This results in a non-blind SSRF primitive against internal services reachable from the Budibase host, including loopback, RFC1918 ranges, and cloud metadata endpoints. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-54353

Published

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist before the request is sent, but the actual socket connection later performs a separate DNS lookup through node-fetch. Since the validated IPs are never pinned to the connection, an attacker-controlled hostname can return a public IP during validation and a private/internal IP during the real connection. This results in a non-blind SSRF primitive against internal services reachable from the Budibase host, including loopback, RFC1918 ranges, and cloud metadata endpoints. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.39.9.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-gfq7-5x4g-3xhf

Published

Summary Authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist before the request is sent, but the actual socket connection later performs a separate DNS lookup through node-fetch. Since the validated IPs are never pinned to the connection, an attacker-controlled hostname can return a public IP during validation and a private/internal IP during the real connection. This results in a non-blind SSRF primitive against internal services reachable from the Budibase host, including loopback, RFC1918 ranges, and cloud metadata endpoints. Details The issue comes from the outbound fetch validation flow resolving DNS twice: During blacklist validation Again during the real socket connection The first lookup result is discarded after validation, so the second lookup is free to resolve to a different IP. This creates a classic TOCTOU DNS rebinding issue. Affected flow in: packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts ``` async function throwIfUnsafe(url: string): Promise<void> { const parsed = parseUrl(url) if (await isBlacklisted(parsed.hostname)) { throw new Error("URL is blocked or could not be resolved safely.") } } for (let redirects = 0; redirects <= MAX_REDIRECTS; redirects++) { await throwIfUnsafe(nextUrl) const response = await fetchFn(nextUrl, nextRequest) // ... } ``` fetchFn uses plain node-fetch with no custom http.Agent / https.Agent, so the underlying socket performs its own independent dns.lookup after validation completes. The same pattern also exists in: packages/server/src/automations/steps/utils.ts ``` await throwIfBlacklisted(nextUrl) const response = await fetch(nextUrl, nextRequest) ``` The blacklist implementation resolves hostnames but only returns a boolean: packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts ``` async function lookup(address: string): Promise<string[]> { address = parseAddress(address) const addresses = await performLookup(address, { all: true }) return addresses.map(addr => addr.address) } export async function isBlacklisted(address: string): Promise<boolean> { // ... if (!net.isIP(address)) { try { ips = await lookup(address) } catch (e) { /* ... */ } } else { ips = [address] } return ips.some(ip => blackList!.check(ip, getIpVersion(ip))) } ``` The resolved IPs are discarded, so callers cannot pin the later socket connection to the validated addresses. An attacker controlling authoritative DNS for a hostname can therefore return: a public IP during validation a private/internal IP during the actual connection Anything routing through these helpers inherits the issue, including: outgoing webhook Slack Discord Make Zapier n8n AI extract object-store fetches Several of these steps return upstream response content directly into automation output, which makes the SSRF non-blind. PoC Tested locally against a self-hosted build from master. No Budibase-operated infrastructure was touched. Run Budibase locally. Start a harmless local HTTP listener: python3 -m http.server 8080 --bind 127.0.0.1 Use a rebinding hostname such as: 7f000001.cb007264.rbndr.us which rotates between: 127.0.0.1 203.0.113.100 Steps to reproduce: Log into Budibase with automation permissions. Create an automation using the Outgoing Webhook step. Set the URL to: http://<rebinding-host>:8080/ Trigger the automation. Observed result: The blacklist validation resolves the hostname to the public IP and allows the request. node-fetch performs a second DNS lookup during socket creation. The second lookup resolves to 127.0.0.1. The TCP connection lands on the local service. The local server response body appears directly in the automation output. Impact This produces a non-blind read-SSRF primitive against anything reachable from the Budibase host process, including: loopback services (127.0.0.1) RFC1918 ranges internal Kubernetes/VPC services cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254) On cloud deployments without IMDSv2 enforcement, this may expose temporary IAM credentials via: /latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role> On multi-tenant hosted deployments, this may also create potential cross-tenant access paths through shared internal infrastructure.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

Which CVEs have scores here?

This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

Risk history

Compare earlier KEV listings and EPSS scores. Advisory wording and affected versions have a separate history.

When does an EPSS score appear as a change?

A prediction change is reported when EPSS rises from below 10% to 10% or higher. Every daily score change from the last 30 days stays in this history. Before that, it keeps KEV changes and moves between EPSS bands (0.1%, 1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 50% and 90%).

Advisory history

16 saved versions

See how the publisher's advisory changed over time. Each link opens the version saved at that time. The publisher's update date can differ from the date shown here.

How advisory history works

Each link identifies one complete publisher record. History can include advisories that previously shared an identifier; an identifier removed by a publisher no longer establishes a current relationship. A historical link shows only that record and earlier saved versions. Failed checks and unchanged reads do not create new versions.

21 Nov 2026 17:18:40 UTC

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist be…

euvd · EUVD-2026-39915 · Published

19 Nov 2026 16:49:46 UTC

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist be…

euvd · EUVD-2026-39915 · Published

17 Nov 2026 16:32:39 UTC

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist be…

euvd · EUVD-2026-39915 · Published

15 Nov 2026 15:48:37 UTC

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist be…

euvd · EUVD-2026-39915 · Published

13 Nov 2026 15:01:22 UTC

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist be…

euvd · EUVD-2026-39915 · Published

11 Nov 2026 14:00:15 UTC

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist be…

euvd · EUVD-2026-39915 · Published

9 Nov 2026 13:07:21 UTC

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist be…

euvd · EUVD-2026-39915 · Published

7 Nov 2026 12:29:49 UTC

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist be…

euvd · EUVD-2026-39915 · Published

5 Nov 2026 11:41:57 UTC

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist be…

euvd · EUVD-2026-39915 · Published

3 Nov 2026 11:01:30 UTC

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist be…

euvd · EUVD-2026-39915 · Published

1 Nov 2026 10:07:18 UTC

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist be…

euvd · EUVD-2026-39915 · Published

30 Oct 2026 09:51:30 UTC

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist be…

euvd · EUVD-2026-39915 · Published

28 Oct 2026 08:08:32 UTC

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist be…

euvd · EUVD-2026-39915 · Published

25 Oct 2026 13:17:28 UTC

Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.9, authenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding. The outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist be…

nvd · CVE-2026-54353 · Published

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

@budibase/backend-core has potential SSRF DNS rebinding bypass in outbound fetch validation

osv · GHSA-gfq7-5x4g-3xhf · Published

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Budibase: Potential SSRF DNS rebinding bypass in outbound fetch validation

cve-program · CVE-2026-54353 · Published

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 22 Nov 05:58 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current