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electron-builder · Vulnerability

CVSS 4.0 8.2 HIGHEUVD CVSS 4.0 8.2 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 8.2 HIGHCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Primary 6.5 MEDIUMCVSS_V4 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by builder-util-runtime 9.7.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-54673

Published

electron-updater allows for automatic updates for Electron apps. Prior to 9.7.0, the HTTP redirect handler (HttpExecutor.prepareRedirectUrlOptions) only stripped a credential header whose key string matched exactly lowercase "authorization", exposing credentials. Other credential-bearing headers — most notably PRIVATE-TOKEN (used by GitLab's personal access token flow) and mixed-case Authorization (used by GitLab's Bearer/OAuth flow) — were not stripped and could be forwarded to an attacker-controlled cross-origin redirect destination. This issue has been fixed in version 9.7.0.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-40455

Published

electron-updater allows for automatic updates for Electron apps. Prior to 9.7.0, the HTTP redirect handler (HttpExecutor.prepareRedirectUrlOptions) only stripped a credential header whose key string matched exactly lowercase "authorization", exposing credentials. Other credential-bearing headers — most notably PRIVATE-TOKEN (used by GitLab's personal access token flow) and mixed-case Authorization (used by GitLab's Bearer/OAuth flow) — were not stripped and could be forwarded to an attacker-controlled cross-origin redirect destination. This issue has been fixed in version 9.7.0.

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nvd · CVE-2026-54673

Published

electron-updater allows for automatic updates for Electron apps. Prior to 9.7.0, the HTTP redirect handler (HttpExecutor.prepareRedirectUrlOptions) only stripped a credential header whose key string matched exactly lowercase "authorization", exposing credentials. Other credential-bearing headers — most notably PRIVATE-TOKEN (used by GitLab's personal access token flow) and mixed-case Authorization (used by GitLab's Bearer/OAuth flow) — were not stripped and could be forwarded to an attacker-controlled cross-origin redirect destination. This issue has been fixed in version 9.7.0.

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osv · GHSA-p2f4-r6v6-j797

Published

## Summary In `electron-builder`'s `builder-util-runtime` package, the HTTP redirect handler (`HttpExecutor.prepareRedirectUrlOptions`) only stripped a credential header whose key string matched exactly lowercase `"authorization"`. Other credential-bearing headers — most notably `PRIVATE-TOKEN` (used by GitLab's personal access token flow) and mixed-case `Authorization` (used by GitLab's Bearer/OAuth flow) — were not stripped and could be forwarded to an attacker-controlled cross-origin redirect destination. --- ## Details ### Root cause `HttpExecutor.prepareRedirectUrlOptions` (introduced in `builder-util-runtime` via [PR #9211](https://github.com/electron-userland/electron-builder/pull/9211), first released in `v26.0.20`) performed its cross-origin credential strip with a single case-sensitive property check: ```typescript // vulnerable code (electron-builder v26.0.20 – v26.14.x) [via builder-util-runtime <9.7.0] if (headers?.authorization) { if (HttpExecutor.isCrossOriginRedirect(originalUrl, parsedRedirectUrl)) { delete headers.authorization // only removes the exact key "authorization" } } ``` JavaScript object property access is case-sensitive. The guard `headers?.authorization` evaluates to `undefined` (falsy) when the key is `"Authorization"`, `"AUTHORIZATION"`, or any other casing, so the branch is never entered and **no header is deleted** for those cases. ### Affected updater flows The clearest reproduced path is the private GitLab updater flow. `packages/electron-updater/src/providers/GitLabProvider.ts` sets one of two credential headers depending on the token type: ```typescript // GitLabProvider.setAuthHeaderForToken (affected versions) if (token.startsWith("Bearer")) { headers.authorization = token // Bearer / OAuth token → key is lowercase } else { headers["PRIVATE-TOKEN"] = token // personal access token → key is "PRIVATE-TOKEN" } ``` During a private release update check, the updater requests a release asset through GitLab's `direct_asset_url`. GitLab commonly redirects asset downloads to an external object-storage origin (e.g., S3, GCS). Because the redirect crosses origins: 1. A personal access token in `PRIVATE-TOKEN` **is never inspected** by the vulnerable strip guard — it is forwarded intact. 2. A Bearer token set as `headers.authorization` (lowercase) **is stripped** correctly. 3. A Bearer token set as `headers.Authorization` (capital A) or any other mixed-case variant **bypasses the guard** and is forwarded intact. GitLab is the concrete reproduced case; any other provider or custom updater configuration that places credentials in a non-lowercase-`authorization` header is equally affected. ### Before v26.0.20 Versions prior to `v26.0.20` did not contain `prepareRedirectUrlOptions` at all. All credential headers were forwarded unchanged on every redirect, regardless of origin. This represents a broader, pre-existing version of the same class of vulnerability. --- ## Proof of concept (reproduction shape) 1. Configure the updater with an authenticated GitLab provider, supplying a personal access token (non-Bearer). The provider will set `PRIVATE-TOKEN: <token>` on requests. 2. Trigger an update check. The updater fetches release metadata and then requests a release asset URL. 3. The trusted GitLab origin returns a 3xx cross-origin redirect (e.g., to S3 object storage). 4. `HttpExecutor.prepareRedirectUrlOptions` is called. The guard `headers?.authorization` is falsy (the key is `"PRIVATE-TOKEN"`). No header is deleted. 5. The request to the redirect destination is issued with `PRIVATE-TOKEN: <token>` present in the headers. **Observed result:** The personal access token is forwarded to the redirect destination. An attacker who controls or can observe the redirect destination receives the token. --- ## Impact This is a credential disclosure vulnerability. An automatic update check can leak: - GitLab personal access tokens (`PRIVATE-TOKEN`) - Bearer/OAuth tokens sent under a mixed-case `Authorization` key - Any other credential header not named exactly `"authorization"` in lowercase Disclosure of a GitLab PAT grants the attacker whatever repository and API permissions the token carries, enabling unauthorized access to private source code, packages, or release artifacts. --- ## Patches Fixed in electron-builder `v26.15.0` [included via `v9.7.0` `builder-util-runtime`] via [PR #9834](https://github.com/electron-userland/electron-builder/pull/9834) (commit [`22a7532bd`](https://github.com/electron-userland/electron-builder/commit/22a7532bd01b9fb42cff7c58d599c7ad683569fe)). The incomplete property-access guard was replaced with a separator-agnostic, case-insensitive lookup against a registry of known sensitive header names: ```typescript // fixed code (v9.7.0+) const normalizeName = (name: string): string => name.toLowerCase().replace(/[-_]/g, "") const SENSITIVE_REDIRECT_HEADERS = new Set([ "authorization", "proxyauthorization", "privatetoken", "xapikey", "xauthtoken", "xaccesstoken", "xgitlabtoken", "cookie", "xcsrftoken", ]) // In prepareRedirectUrlOptions, on cross-origin redirect: for (const key of Object.keys(headers)) { if (SENSITIVE_REDIRECT_HEADERS.has(normalizeName(key))) { delete (headers as Record<string, unknown>)[key] } } ``` `normalizeName` converts to lowercase and strips `-` and `_` separators, so `PRIVATE-TOKEN`, `Private-Token`, `Authorization`, `AUTHORIZATION`, `X-Api-Key`, etc. are all matched. The fix also exports `addSensitiveRedirectHeader()` to allow custom publishers to register additional headers. **Upgrade path:** Update `builder-util-runtime` to `>= 9.7.0`. --- ## Workarounds There is no configuration-level workaround that prevents header forwarding in affected versions. The only mitigation short of upgrading is to avoid authenticated GitLab updater flows on versions `< 9.7.0`. If operating in a network environment where you control all possible redirect destinations, you may be able to prevent the token from reaching an attacker-controlled host through network-layer controls, but this is not a reliable mitigation.

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