Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

hatchet · Vulnerability

CVSS 3.1 6.4 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 6.4 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 6.4 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet 0.91.2osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet 0.91.2KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-54746

Published

Hatchet is a platform for orchestrating background tasks, AI agents, and durable workflows at scale. From 0.40.0 until 0.91.1, the Dispatcher gRPC service does not verify that a request's worker ID belongs to the tenant identified by the bearer-token context in Dispatcher/UpsertWorkerLabels and Dispatcher/Unsubscribe. An authenticated owner of any tenant who guesses another tenant's worker UUID can overwrite that worker's affinity labels or disconnect the worker from the dispatcher. This can cause cross-tenant integrity impact and denial of service on multi-tenant Hatchet Cloud or shared self-hosted deployments. Single-tenant deployments are not practically affected because the attacker and target tenant are the same. This issue is fixed in version 0.91.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-67791

Published

Hatchet is a platform for orchestrating background tasks, AI agents, and durable workflows at scale. From 0.40.0 until 0.91.1, the Dispatcher gRPC service does not verify that a request's worker ID belongs to the tenant identified by the bearer-token context in Dispatcher/UpsertWorkerLabels and Dispatcher/Unsubscribe. An authenticated owner of any tenant who guesses another tenant's worker UUID can overwrite that worker's affinity labels or disconnect the worker from the dispatcher. This can cause cross-tenant integrity impact and denial of service on multi-tenant Hatchet Cloud or shared self-hosted deployments. Single-tenant deployments are not practically affected because the attacker and target tenant are the same. This issue is fixed in version 0.91.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-54746

Published

Hatchet is a platform for orchestrating background tasks, AI agents, and durable workflows at scale. From 0.40.0 until 0.91.1, the Dispatcher gRPC service does not verify that a request's worker ID belongs to the tenant identified by the bearer-token context in Dispatcher/UpsertWorkerLabels and Dispatcher/Unsubscribe. An authenticated owner of any tenant who guesses another tenant's worker UUID can overwrite that worker's affinity labels or disconnect the worker from the dispatcher. This can cause cross-tenant integrity impact and denial of service on multi-tenant Hatchet Cloud or shared self-hosted deployments. Single-tenant deployments are not practically affected because the attacker and target tenant are the same. This issue is fixed in version 0.91.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-8x7x-83cf-c3pg

Published

### Summary A **cross-tenant write / DoS** vulnerability in the Hatchet `Dispatcher` gRPC service allows any holder of a normal tenant-scoped API token (the lowest credential Hatchet issues — an `OWNER` of a brand-new tenant) to overwrite the affinity labels of, or disconnect from the dispatcher, any worker UUID belonging to any other tenant on the same Hatchet instance. The two affected RPCs — `Dispatcher/UpsertWorkerLabels` and `Dispatcher/Unsubscribe` — read the caller's tenant from the bearer-token context only for analytics and response shaping, and never use it to authorise the `worker_id` from the request body. ### Impact This CVE requires the attacker to successfully guess the target UUID. **Who is impacted.** Any Hatchet deployment that hosts more than one tenant on the same instance: - **Hatchet Cloud (multi-tenant SaaS)** — every tenant is exposed to every other tenant. - **Self-hosted Hatchet with multiple internal teams / business units sharing one instance** — each team is exposed to every other team on the box. - **Any deployment where a single tenant's API token can be obtained by an attacker** (e.g. a leaked low-privilege CI token from a single tenant). One token is enough to attack every other tenant on the same instance. Single-tenant self-hosted deployments are unaffected in practice (the "victim" and "attacker" tenants would be the same).

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-6309

Published

Hatchet allows cross-tenant write/DoS to other tenants' workers via Dispatcher gRPC UpsertWorkerLabels and Unsubscribe in github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Related advisories and sources

Related changes

Linked by CVE identifier

No related changes are available here.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 19 Nov 05:53 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current