Traefik is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. Prior to v2.11.51, v3.6.22, and v3.7.6, Traefik's ForwardAuth middleware, even when configured with trustForwardHeader: false, derives the X-Forwarded-Port header sent to the authentication service from the original incoming request instead of the sanitized forwarded request. As a result, an unauthenticated remote attacker can inject an X-Forwarded-Proto: https header over a plain HTTP connection and cause Traefik to forward X-Forwarded-Port: 443 to the authentication service, bypassing port-based authorization checks. This issue is fixed in versions v2.11.51, v3.6.22, and v3.7.6.
Traefik is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. Prior to v2.11.51, v3.6.22, and v3.7.6, Traefik's ForwardAuth middleware, even when configured with trustForwardHeader: false, derives the X-Forwarded-Port header sent to the authentication service from the original incoming request instead of the sanitized forwarded request. As a result, an unauthenticated remote attacker can inject an X-Forwarded-Proto: https header over a plain HTTP connection and cause Traefik to forward X-Forwarded-Port: 443 to the authentication service, bypassing port-based authorization checks. This issue is fixed in versions v2.11.51, v3.6.22, and v3.7.6.
Traefik is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. Prior to v2.11.51, v3.6.22, and v3.7.6, Traefik's ForwardAuth middleware, even when configured with trustForwardHeader: false, derives the X-Forwarded-Port header sent to the authentication service from the original incoming request instead of the sanitized forwarded request. As a result, an unauthenticated remote attacker can inject an X-Forwarded-Proto: https header over a plain HTTP connection and cause Traefik to forward X-Forwarded-Port: 443 to the authentication service, bypassing port-based authorization checks. This issue is fixed in versions v2.11.51, v3.6.22, and v3.7.6.
## Summary
There is a medium severity vulnerability in Traefik's ForwardAuth middleware. Even when configured with `trustForwardHeader: false`, Traefik derives the `X-Forwarded-Port` header sent to the authentication service from the original incoming request instead of the sanitized forwarded request. As a result, an unauthenticated remote attacker can inject an `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` header over a plain HTTP connection and cause Traefik to forward `X-Forwarded-Port: 443` to the auth service, bypassing port-based authorization checks. This is a regression of the incomplete fix for GHSA-6384-m2mw-rf54, which addressed the `X-Forwarded-Proto` and `X-Forwarded-Prefix` spoofing vectors but missed the `X-Forwarded-Port` vector.
## Patches
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.51
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.22
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.6
## For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).
<details>
<summary>Original Description</summary>
### Summary
The ForwardAuth middleware, even when configured with `trustForwardHeader: false`,
still derives the `X-Forwarded-Port` header sent to the authentication service by
reading the **attacker-controlled** `X-Forwarded-Proto` header from the original
incoming request. This allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause Traefik
to forward `X-Forwarded-Port: 443` to the auth service on a plain HTTP connection,
creating an inconsistency that can bypass port-based authorization checks.
### Details
The fix introduced in commit `5e1de2258` (released as part of the April 2026 security
advisory GHSA-6384-m2mw-rf54) correctly strips all X-Forwarded-* headers from the
forwarded auth request when `trustForwardHeader=false`, and reconstructs
`X-Forwarded-Proto` from the actual TLS state of the connection (`req.TLS`).
However, the reconstruction of `X-Forwarded-Port` is delegated to the helper
`forwardedPort(req)` which receives the **original request** (`req`) rather than
the sanitized forward request (`forwardReq`):
```go
// pkg/middlewares/auth/forward.go – writeHeader()
if !trustForwardHeader {
forwardedheaders.DeleteXForwardedHeaders(forwardReq.Header) // strips all X-Fwd-* from forwardReq
}
// ...
if _, ok := forwardReq.Header[forwardedheaders.XForwardedPort]; !ok {
forwardReq.Header.Set(forwardedheaders.XForwardedPort, forwardedPort(req)) // ← req = ORIGINAL
}
// pkg/middlewares/auth/forward.go – forwardedPort()
func forwardedPort(req *http.Request) string {
if _, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(req.Host); err == nil && port != "" {
return port
}
// Reads attacker-controlled header on the ORIGINAL request:
if req.Header.Get(forwardedheaders.XForwardedProto) == "https" || ... {
return "443"
}
if req.TLS != nil {
return "443"
}
return "80"
}
Result when trustForwardHeader=false and attacker sends X-Forwarded-Proto: https
on a plain HTTP connection:
┌──────────────────────────────────┬──────────┬────────┐
│ Header forwarded to auth service │ Expected │ Actual │
├──────────────────────────────────┼──────────┼────────┤
│ X-Forwarded-Proto │ http │ http ✓ │
├──────────────────────────────────┼──────────┼────────┤
│ X-Forwarded-Port │ 80 │ 443 ✗ │
└──────────────────────────────────┴──────────┴────────┘
```
The inconsistency between Proto=http and Port=443 is exploitable against any
authentication service that gates access based on X-Forwarded-Port.
### PoC
Traefik configuration:
```http:
middlewares:
my-auth:
forwardAuth:
address: "http://auth-service/"
trustForwardHeader: false # security setting, but still bypassable
routers:
api:
rule: "PathPrefix(`/api`)"
middlewares:
- my-auth
service: backend
Auth service logic (example victim):
# auth-service checks: only port 443 requests are considered "secure"
port = request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-Port", "80")
proto = request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-Proto", "http")
if port == "443":
return 200 # grant access
return 403
```
Attack:
Plain HTTP connection, no TLS – but spoofs port 443
curl -H "X-Forwarded-Proto: https" http://traefik.example.com/api/admin
Auth service receives X-Forwarded-Port: 443 → grants access
Verification: Enable Traefik debug logging and observe X-Forwarded-Port: 443
in the auth request while the connection is plain HTTP.
### Impact
Any deployment using the ForwardAuth middleware with trustForwardHeader: false where
the downstream authentication service uses X-Forwarded-Port to make authorization
decisions is vulnerable to privilege escalation. An unauthenticated attacker can
bypass port-based security checks (e.g., "only allow requests arriving on HTTPS port
443") by injecting a single X-Forwarded-Proto: https header on a plain HTTP
connection.
This is a regression of the incomplete fix for GHSA-6384-m2mw-rf54: while the
X-Forwarded-Prefix and X-Forwarded-Proto spoofing vectors were addressed, the
X-Forwarded-Port vector was missed.
</details>
---
Traefik: ForwardAuth middleware leaks X-Forwarded-Port spoofing via untrusted X-Forwarded-Proto when trustForwardHeader=false in github.com/traefik/traefik
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jul 6, 2026, 8:20:29 PM
dateUpdated: Jul 7, 2026, 2:03:17 PM
2 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
openSUSE-SU-2026:11251-1: traefik-3.7.7-1.1 on GA media
openSUSE-SU-2026:11243-1: traefik2-2.11.52-1.1 on GA media
CVE-2026-54763 · CVE-2026-54764
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-345
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-07-06T21:16:56.930
lastModified: 2026-07-08T03:01:46.417
1 source CPE criteria · context only
cpe:2.3:a:traefik:traefik:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.