etherpad · Vulnerability
cve-program · CVE-2026-55086
PublishedEtherpad is a real-time collaborative editor. Prior to 3.1.0, src/node/handler/ImportHandler.ts and src/node/handler/ExportHandler.ts derive temporary filenames from Math.random() and place them in os.tmpdir(). On a host with a shared world-writable temporary directory, a local unprivileged attacker who predicts a filename can precreate a symbolic link to a file writable by the Etherpad process. Subsequent import or export operations can follow the link through fs.writeFile, fs.rename, or document-conversion output and overwrite the target with partially attacker-controlled content. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.0.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-62741
PublishedEtherpad is a real-time collaborative editor. Prior to 3.1.0, src/node/handler/ImportHandler.ts and src/node/handler/ExportHandler.ts derive temporary filenames from Math.random() and place them in os.tmpdir(). On a host with a shared world-writable temporary directory, a local unprivileged attacker who predicts a filename can precreate a symbolic link to a file writable by the Etherpad process. Subsequent import or export operations can follow the link through fs.writeFile, fs.rename, or document-conversion output and overwrite the target with partially attacker-controlled content. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.0.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-55086
PublishedEtherpad is a real-time collaborative editor. Prior to 3.1.0, src/node/handler/ImportHandler.ts and src/node/handler/ExportHandler.ts derive temporary filenames from Math.random() and place them in os.tmpdir(). On a host with a shared world-writable temporary directory, a local unprivileged attacker who predicts a filename can precreate a symbolic link to a file writable by the Etherpad process. Subsequent import or export operations can follow the link through fs.writeFile, fs.rename, or document-conversion output and overwrite the target with partially attacker-controlled content. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.0.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-2jwf-f4xq-f24h
Published## Description `src/node/handler/ImportHandler.ts` and `src/node/handler/ExportHandler.ts` both compute their temporary working-file paths as: ```ts const randNum = Math.floor(Math.random() * 0xFFFFFFFF); const srcFile = `${os.tmpdir()}/etherpad_export_${randNum}.html`; const destFile = `${os.tmpdir()}/etherpad_export_${randNum}.${type}`; ``` Two flaws compound: 1. **`Math.random()` is not crypto-secure.** It yields at most ~32 bits of entropy and is **predictable across calls within the same Node process** (V8 shares PRNG state between consecutive `Math.random()` invocations). An attacker on the same host who observes any earlier temp-file name from logs or other side channels can predict subsequent names. 2. **The paths land in `os.tmpdir()`.** On a typical Linux system this is `/tmp` — a shared world-writable directory. An unprivileged local attacker can pre-create a symbolic link at a predicted path pointing at any file the Etherpad process can write: ``` ln -s /etc/etherpad/SESSIONKEY.txt /tmp/etherpad_export_<predicted>.html ``` When `ExportHandler` calls `fs.writeFile(srcFile, html)` (or `ImportHandler` calls `fs.rename(srcFile, destFile)` / `soffice` writes its converted output to the path), the open syscall follows the symlink and either reads from or overwrites the linked target. For deployments where the Etherpad process runs as a privileged user (notably some Docker base images that run as root, snap confinement edge cases, or hand-rolled systemd units), this becomes arbitrary file overwrite. The Import path is more impactful in practice: the file content the attacker can land in the symlink target is partially attacker-controlled (the post-soffice/post-mammoth conversion output of the uploaded document). ## Severity rationale - **AV:L** — requires local access to the host that runs Etherpad. Multi-tenant hosts (shared dev boxes, k8s shared-node setups, single-server CI workers) are the realistic threat surface. - **AC:H** — attacker needs to predict the temp filename, which requires observing prior names or shared PRNG state. - **PR:L** — any unprivileged local account. - **UI:N** — no user interaction. - **S:C** — scope change from local user to whatever the Etherpad process can write. - **C:L / I:L / A:N** — bounded by what the Etherpad process can already touch; confidentiality is via secondary read-paths (the LibreOffice conversion error log can echo bytes from the symlinked file). Single-tenant deployments where only the Etherpad operator has shell access on the host are not exposed. ## Affected versions - All `ep_etherpad-lite` versions through `v3.0.0` (inclusive). The `Math.floor(Math.random() * 0xFFFFFFFF)` pattern is present in `src/node/handler/ImportHandler.ts` and `src/node/handler/ExportHandler.ts` for as far back as the repository history extends — older than the 2024-03-16 snapshot at commit [`107598b`](https://github.com/ether/etherpad/commit/107598b) where it first appears in the current file paths, and predating the v1.x era. ## Patched versions - `ep_etherpad-lite >= 3.1.0` — the fix is on `develop` HEAD as commit `8c6104c`. Update this field with the actual tagged release version when it ships. ## Proof of concept (sketch) ``` # Pre-condition: attacker has shell on the same host as Etherpad, # has read access to /tmp, and Etherpad's process can write to the # chosen target (e.g. runs as root inside a Docker container). # 1. Observe a temp filename from logs (or guess via prior exports). TARGET=/etc/etherpad/SESSIONKEY.txt GUESS=/tmp/etherpad_export_$(./predict-next-random)$EXT # implementation-specific # 2. Place the symlink before Etherpad creates the file. ln -s "$TARGET" "$GUESS" # 3. Trigger an export from the Etherpad UI (or via the API). # Etherpad calls fs.writeFile(srcFile, ...) which open()s the symlink # target with O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC and clobbers $TARGET with HTML content. ``` In practice the exact reproduction depends on the host's PRNG state predictability and the deployment's process-owner privileges. A reliable exploit chain needs `setpriv`-style host access or a sibling tenant. ## Workarounds - Run Etherpad in a container with a private `/tmp` (Docker: `--tmpfs /tmp:rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev,size=64m`, systemd: `PrivateTmp=true`). - Ensure the Etherpad process does NOT run as root and has write access only to its own data directory. - Set `TMPDIR` to an Etherpad-private directory in the environment. ## Fix Patched in [`8c6104c`](https://github.com/ether/etherpad/commit/8c6104c) (PR [#7784](https://github.com/ether/etherpad/pull/7784)): ```diff -const randNum = Math.floor(Math.random() * 0xFFFFFFFF); +const randNum = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex'); ``` 128 bits of CSPRNG entropy. Predicting the next filename is no longer feasible. A bigger follow-up — per-request `mkdtemp` subdirectories with `O_EXCL`/`O_NOFOLLOW` semantics — is deferred to a later release; the immediate window (predictable 32-bit collisions across processes) is what the patch closes. ## Resources - Patched in: https://github.com/ether/etherpad/pull/7784 (squash commit `8c6104c`). - `Math.random()` is not appropriate for security-sensitive contexts. See the MDN guidance for [`Math.random()`](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/Math/random) and the Node.js recommendation to use [`crypto.randomBytes`](https://nodejs.org/api/crypto.html#cryptorandombytessize-callback) for unpredictable values. ## Credits Reported during an internal security audit by Claude (via @JohnMcLear).
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Exploitation and risk
Source statusCISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.
Which CVEs have scores here?
This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.
No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.
cve-program · CVE-2026-55086
PublishedEtherpad: Import/export use Math.random() for temp file paths; predictable paths on shared /tmp enable symlink-based file overwrite
Etherpad is a real-time collaborative editor. Prior to 3.1.0, src/node/handler/ImportHandler.ts and src/node/handler/ExportHandler.ts derive temporary filenames from Math.random() and place them in os.tmpdir(). On a host with a shared world-writable temporary directory, a local unprivileged attacker who predicts a filename can precreate a symbolic link to a file writable by the Etherpad process. Subsequent import or export operations can follow the link through fs.writeFile, fs.rename, or document-conversion output and overwrite the target with partially attacker-controlled content. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.0.
- Source published
- 19 Aug 2026 19:35:46 UTC
- Source modified
- 25 Aug 2026 13:59:03 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 4.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-62741
PublishedEtherpad is a real-time collaborative editor. Prior to 3.1.0, src/node/handler/ImportHandler.ts and src/node/handler/ExportHandler.ts derive temporary filenames from Math.random() and place them in os.tmpdir(). On a host with a shared world…
Etherpad is a real-time collaborative editor. Prior to 3.1.0, src/node/handler/ImportHandler.ts and src/node/handler/ExportHandler.ts derive temporary filenames from Math.random() and place them in os.tmpdir(). On a host with a shared world-writable temporary directory, a local unprivileged attacker who predicts a filename can precreate a symbolic link to a file writable by the Etherpad process. Subsequent import or export operations can follow the link through fs.writeFile, fs.rename, or document-conversion output and overwrite the target with partially attacker-controlled content. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.0.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 19, 2026, 7:35:46 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 25, 2026, 1:59:03 PM
- Source published
- Aug 19, 2026, 7:35:46 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Aug 25, 2026, 1:59:03 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 17 Nov 2026 16:34:56 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 4.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-55086
PublishedEtherpad is a real-time collaborative editor. Prior to 3.1.0, src/node/handler/ImportHandler.ts and src/node/handler/ExportHandler.ts derive temporary filenames from Math.random() and place them in os.tmpdir(). On a host with a shared world…
Etherpad is a real-time collaborative editor. Prior to 3.1.0, src/node/handler/ImportHandler.ts and src/node/handler/ExportHandler.ts derive temporary filenames from Math.random() and place them in os.tmpdir(). On a host with a shared world-writable temporary directory, a local unprivileged attacker who predicts a filename can precreate a symbolic link to a file writable by the Etherpad process. Subsequent import or export operations can follow the link through fs.writeFile, fs.rename, or document-conversion output and overwrite the target with partially attacker-controlled content. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.0.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-59 · CWE-377
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-19T20:17:17.520
lastModified: 2026-09-09T21:15:59.613
- Source published
- 19 Aug 2026 20:17:17 UTC
- Source modified
- 9 Sep 2026 21:15:59 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 13:17:34 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 4.2 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
osv · GHSA-2jwf-f4xq-f24h
Publishedep_etherpad-lite: Import/export uses Math.random() for temp file paths; predictable paths on shared /tmp enable symlink-based file overwrite
## Description `src/node/handler/ImportHandler.ts` and `src/node/handler/ExportHandler.ts` both compute their temporary working-file paths as: ```ts const randNum = Math.floor(Math.random() * 0xFFFFFFFF); const srcFile = `${os.tmpdir()}/etherpad_export_${randNum}.html`; const destFile = `${os.tmpdir()}/etherpad_export_${randNum}.${type}`; ``` Two flaws compound: 1. **`Math.random()` is not crypto-secure.** It yields at most ~32 bits of entropy and is **predictable across calls within the same Node process** (V8 shares PRNG state between consecutive `Math.random()` invocations). An attacker on the same host who observes any earlier temp-file name from logs or other side channels can predict subsequent names. 2. **The paths land in `os.tmpdir()`.** On a typical Linux system this is `/tmp` — a shared world-writable directory. An unprivileged local attacker can pre-create a symbolic link at a predicted path pointing at any file the Etherpad process can write: ``` ln -s /etc/etherpad/SESSIONKEY.txt /tmp/etherpad_export_<predicted>.html ``` When `ExportHandler` calls `fs.writeFile(srcFile, html)` (or `ImportHandler` calls `fs.rename(srcFile, destFile)` / `soffice` writes its converted output to the path), the open syscall follows the symlink and either reads from or overwrites the linked target. For deployments where the Etherpad process runs as a privileged user (notably some Docker base images that run as root, snap confinement edge cases, or hand-rolled systemd units), this becomes arbitrary file overwrite. The Import path is more impactful in practice: the file content the attacker can land in the symlink target is partially attacker-controlled (the post-soffice/post-mammoth conversion output of the uploaded document). ## Severity rationale - **AV:L** — requires local access to the host that runs Etherpad. Multi-tenant hosts (shared dev boxes, k8s shared-node setups, single-server CI workers) are the realistic threat surface. - **AC:H** — attacker needs to predict the temp filename, which requires observing prior names or shared PRNG state. - **PR:L** — any unprivileged local account. - **UI:N** — no user interaction. - **S:C** — scope change from local user to whatever the Etherpad process can write. - **C:L / I:L / A:N** — bounded by what the Etherpad process can already touch; confidentiality is via secondary read-paths (the LibreOffice conversion error log can echo bytes from the symlinked file). Single-tenant deployments where only the Etherpad operator has shell access on the host are not exposed. ## Affected versions - All `ep_etherpad-lite` versions through `v3.0.0` (inclusive). The `Math.floor(Math.random() * 0xFFFFFFFF)` pattern is present in `src/node/handler/ImportHandler.ts` and `src/node/handler/ExportHandler.ts` for as far back as the repository history extends — older than the 2024-03-16 snapshot at commit [`107598b`](https://github.com/ether/etherpad/commit/107598b) where it first appears in the current file paths, and predating the v1.x era. ## Patched versions - `ep_etherpad-lite >= 3.1.0` — the fix is on `develop` HEAD as commit `8c6104c`. Update this field with the actual tagged release version when it ships. ## Proof of concept (sketch) ``` # Pre-condition: attacker has shell on the same host as Etherpad, # has read access to /tmp, and Etherpad's process can write to the # chosen target (e.g. runs as root inside a Docker container). # 1. Observe a temp filename from logs (or guess via prior exports). TARGET=/etc/etherpad/SESSIONKEY.txt GUESS=/tmp/etherpad_export_$(./predict-next-random)$EXT # implementation-specific # 2. Place the symlink before Etherpad creates the file. ln -s "$TARGET" "$GUESS" # 3. Trigger an export from the Etherpad UI (or via the API). # Etherpad calls fs.writeFile(srcFile, ...) which open()s the symlink # target with O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC and clobbers $TARGET with HTML content. ``` In practice the exact reproduction depends on the host's PRNG state predictability and the deployment's process-owner privileges. A reliable exploit chain needs `setpriv`-style host access or a sibling tenant. ## Workarounds - Run Etherpad in a container with a private `/tmp` (Docker: `--tmpfs /tmp:rw,noexec,nosuid,nodev,size=64m`, systemd: `PrivateTmp=true`). - Ensure the Etherpad process does NOT run as root and has write access only to its own data directory. - Set `TMPDIR` to an Etherpad-private directory in the environment. ## Fix Patched in [`8c6104c`](https://github.com/ether/etherpad/commit/8c6104c) (PR [#7784](https://github.com/ether/etherpad/pull/7784)): ```diff -const randNum = Math.floor(Math.random() * 0xFFFFFFFF); +const randNum = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex'); ``` 128 bits of CSPRNG entropy. Predicting the next filename is no longer feasible. A bigger follow-up — per-request `mkdtemp` subdirectories with `O_EXCL`/`O_NOFOLLOW` semantics — is deferred to a later release; the immediate window (predictable 32-bit collisions across processes) is what the patch closes. ## Resources - Patched in: https://github.com/ether/etherpad/pull/7784 (squash commit `8c6104c`). - `Math.random()` is not appropriate for security-sensitive contexts. See the MDN guidance for [`Math.random()`](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/Math/random) and the Node.js recommendation to use [`crypto.randomBytes`](https://nodejs.org/api/crypto.html#cryptorandombytessize-callback) for unpredictable values. ## Credits Reported during an internal security audit by Claude (via @JohnMcLear).
- Source published
- 13 Aug 2026 14:11:07 UTC
- Source modified
- 13 Aug 2026 14:25:58 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE