Goobi viewer: OpenID JWT audience not enforced by the verifier
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-55459
PublishedThe Goobi viewer is a web application that allows digitised material to be displayed in a web browser. From version 25.01 to before version 26.05, AuthenticationEndpoint.verifyOpenIdToken builds its verifier as JWT.require(algorithm).withIssuer(issuer).build() and does not enforce the aud claim during cryptographic validation. The aud check is performed manually afterwards via a single string-equality call, which only handles single-string aud values. In a multi-RP IdP setup, a token whose single-string aud matches the viewer's client ID but was issued for a different relying party passes the check and authenticates the attacker as the token's sub. This issue has been patched in version 26.05.
- Source published
- 23 Oct 2026 14:16:44 UTC
- Source modified
- 23 Oct 2026 14:57:39 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 16:01:20 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
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CVSS 3.1 · 7.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N