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Cloudreve: Path Traversal in WOPI PUT_RELATIVE Allows Arbitrary File Creation in Owner Account

CVSS 3.1 4.3 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 4.3 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 4.3 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 4.0.0-20260613023150-7968e50429efosv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 4.0.0-20260613023150-7968e50429efKEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-55495

Published

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, the WOPI PUT_RELATIVE handler passes X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget to URI.JoinRaw as a path rather than a filename, allowing slash and dot-dot segments to escape the source file directory and create or conditionally overwrite files elsewhere in the same owner account. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-51388

Published

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, the WOPI PUT_RELATIVE handler passes X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget to URI.JoinRaw as a path rather than a filename, allowing slash and dot-dot segments to escape the source file directory and create or conditionally overwrite files elsewhere in the same owner account. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-55495

Published

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, the WOPI PUT_RELATIVE handler passes X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget to URI.JoinRaw as a path rather than a filename, allowing slash and dot-dot segments to escape the source file directory and create or conditionally overwrite files elsewhere in the same owner account. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-49h3-cwhj-4737

Published

## Summary Cloudreve's WOPI `PUT_RELATIVE` handler treats `X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget` as a path, not a filename. It splits the header on `/` and joins the segments onto the source file's directory with `URI.JoinRaw`, which feeds Go's `url.JoinPath`. `url.JoinPath` resolves `.`/`..` segments, so a slash-bearing target such as `a/../../evil.docx` collapses to a location outside the source file's directory. The lower-level upload path then validates only the final, already-cleaned basename (`evil.docx`), which is harmless, and checks ownership against the *resolved ancestor* — which is still the same user's drive. A WOPI access token is bound to exactly one file (the route enforces `fileId == session.FileID` with a 403 otherwise). `PUT_RELATIVE` escapes that per-file scope: a token issued for one file can create (and, conditionally, overwrite) files elsewhere in the same account. ## Root cause (verified at `26b6b10`) **1. Token is single-file scoped (the boundary being escaped)** — `middleware` `ViewerSessionValidation`: ```go fileId := hashid.FromContext(c) if fileId != session.FileID { // 403 — token is bound to ONE file c.Status(http.StatusForbidden); c.Abort(); return } ``` Route: `wopi := noAuth.Group("file/wopi", middleware.HashID(hashid.FileID), middleware.ViewerSessionValidation())`; `wopi.POST(":id", controllers.ModifyFile)` → `POST /api/v4/file/wopi/:id?access_token=<token>`. **2. `PUT_RELATIVE` dispatch** — `routers/controllers/wopi.go`: ```go case wopi.MethodPutRelative: // X-WOPI-Override: PUT_RELATIVE err = service.PutContent(c, true) ``` **3. SuggestedTarget joined as a path** — `service/explorer/viewer.go`: ```go fileName, _ := wopi.UTF7Decode(c.GetHeader(wopi.SuggestedTargetHeader)) // X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget fileUriParsed, _ := fs.NewUriFromString(fileUri) if strings.HasPrefix(fileName, ".") { /* treat as extension */ } fileUri = fileUriParsed.DirUri().JoinRaw(fileName).String() // <-- path join, not basename ... subService := FileUpdateService{ Uri: fileUri } res, err := subService.PutContent(c, lockSession) ``` **4. `JoinRaw` splits on `/` and normalizes via `url.JoinPath`** — `pkg/filemanager/fs/uri.go`: ```go func (u *URI) Join(elem ...string) *URI { newUrl, _ := url.Parse(u.U.String()) return &URI{U: newUrl.JoinPath(/* PathEscape each elem */ ...)} // JoinPath cleans ./ and ../ } func (u *URI) JoinRaw(elem string) *URI { return u.Join(strings.Split(strings.TrimPrefix(elem, Separator), Separator)...) } ``` `PathEscape` leaves `.` unescaped (it is in the unreserved set), so `..` segments survive into `JoinPath`, which resolves them. `URI.Name()` returns `path.Base(path.Clean(path))` — the cleaned basename. **5. Upload checks ownership of the resolved ancestor and validates only the clean basename** — `pkg/filemanager/fs/dbfs/upload.go`: ```go ancestor, err := f.getFileByPath(ctx, navigator, req.Props.Uri) // URI already traversal-normalized ... if _, ok := ctx.Value(ByPassOwnerCheckCtxKey{}).(bool); !ok && ancestor.OwnerID() != f.user.ID { return nil, fs.ErrOwnerOnly // same-user -> passes } ... if err := validateNewFile(req.Props.Uri.Name(), req.Props.Size, policy); err != nil { // checks "evil.docx" only return nil, err } ``` `validateFileName` rejects `/ \ : * ? " < > |` and bare `.`/`..` — but the traversal is already gone by the time it sees the basename. ## Validation performed Independent validation against commit `26b6b10` in a clean sandbox. **Source-verified (static):** the full chain confirmed verbatim — single-file-scoped token (403 on mismatch) → `PUT_RELATIVE` dispatch → `DirUri().JoinRaw(SuggestedTarget)` → `url.JoinPath` normalization → ancestor ownership check (same-user passes) → basename-only validation of the cleaned name. **Dynamic (control-flow executed):** the full binary is not buildable offline here (modules behind an unreachable Go proxy, embedded frontend, DB). I built and ran a harness using the **real Go `net/url` stdlib** plus the **verbatim** `Join`/`JoinRaw`/`DirUri`/`Path`/`Name`/`PathEscape`/`shouldEscape` and the `validateFileName` gate, driving the same transformation `PUT_RELATIVE` performs. Source = `cloudreve://my/folder/current.docx`: ``` SuggestedTarget resolved URI final basename validator "copy.docx" cloudreve://my/folder/copy.docx "copy.docx" ACCEPT "a/../../evil.docx" cloudreve://my/evil.docx "evil.docx" ACCEPT <- ESCAPED to / "a/../../../top.docx" cloudreve://my/top.docx "top.docx" ACCEPT <- ESCAPED to / "sub/evil.docx" cloudreve://my/folder/sub/evil.docx "evil.docx" ACCEPT <- different subdir ".pdf" cloudreve://my/folder/current.pdf "current.pdf" ACCEPT "a%2f..%2f..%2fenc.docx" cloudreve://my/folder/a%252f..%252f.. "a%2f..%2f..%2f" ACCEPT (NO escape) ``` The headline payload `a/../../evil.docx` deterministically resolves to `cloudreve://my/evil.docx` (account root) with a clean, accepted basename. Output matches the original audit probe exactly. Honest caveat: a leading non-`..` segment (e.g. `a/`) is required to prime the join; a single `../evil.docx` does not cleanly escape, and **URL-encoded separators (`%2f`) do not traverse** through this path (they are re-escaped into one literal segment). Only literal `/` separators work. **Confidence tier: source-verified + control-flow dynamically reproduced (no full live HTTP write against a deployed instance).** **Deduplication:** no existing CVE/GHSA matches. Known Cloudreve advisories are CVE-2022-32167 (XSS, v1–v3.5.3) and CVE-2026-25726 (weak-PRNG ATO, instances initialized < v4.10.0) — both unrelated. `SECURITY.md` lists "user permissions" as high-impact and in scope for all 4.x, so this qualifies as a vulnerability under the project's own policy. ## Steps to reproduce **Setup:** user owns `cloudreve://my/folder/current.docx`; open it in the WOPI editor to obtain `<token>` (the session is bound to that file's ID). 1. Send the crafted `PUT_RELATIVE`: ``` POST /api/v4/file/wopi/<file-id>?access_token=<token> HTTP/1.1 Host: target X-WOPI-Override: PUT_RELATIVE X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget: <UTF-7 of "a/../../evil.docx"> Content-Type: application/octet-stream <file bytes> ``` 2. Cloudreve rewrites the target from `cloudreve://my/folder/current.docx` to `cloudreve://my/evil.docx`, validates the basename `evil.docx` (passes), and writes the content. **Expected:** the target is rejected or constrained to the source file's directory. **Actual:** a file is written at the account root, outside the token's single-file scope. ## Impact A WOPI access token scoped to one file can write files to other locations in the same user's account. A malicious or compromised WOPI integration (or a leaked token) can plant or, conditionally, overwrite files at attacker-chosen paths the account owns, defeating the per-file scoping the WOPI session is meant to enforce. Confined to the session user's account (not cross-user). ## Remediation - Treat `X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget` (and `X-WOPI-RequestedName`) as a **filename**, not a path: reject `/`, `\`, dot segments, and percent-encoded separator variants before joining. - Prefer `DirUri().Join(sanitizedBaseName)` over `JoinRaw`, and after constructing the target URI assert it is a direct child of the source file's directory. - Add regression tests for `a/../../evil.docx`, `sub/evil.docx`, and encoded-separator variants.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-6097

Published

Cloudreve: Path Traversal in WOPI PUT_RELATIVE Allows Arbitrary File Creation in Owner Account in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve

Read the publisher's advisory

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cve-program · CVE-2026-55495

Published

Cloudreve: Path Traversal in WOPI PUT_RELATIVE Allows Arbitrary File Creation in Owner Account

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, the WOPI PUT_RELATIVE handler passes X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget to URI.JoinRaw as a path rather than a filename, allowing slash and dot-dot segments to escape the source file directory and create or conditionally overwrite files elsewhere in the same owner account. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Source published
31 Jul 2026 02:58:14 UTC
Source modified
31 Jul 2026 19:27:00 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 4.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-51388

Published

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, the WOPI PUT_RELATIVE handler passes X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget to URI.JoinRaw as a path rather than a filename, allowing slash and dot-dot segments to escape the s…

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, the WOPI PUT_RELATIVE handler passes X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget to URI.JoinRaw as a path rather than a filename, allowing slash and dot-dot segments to escape the source file directory and create or conditionally overwrite files elsewhere in the same owner account. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

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EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

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datePublished: Jul 31, 2026, 2:58:14 AM

dateUpdated: Jul 31, 2026, 7:27:00 PM

Source published
Jul 31, 2026, 2:58:14 AM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Jul 31, 2026, 7:27:00 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
18 Nov 2026 05:34:58 UTC
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ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 4.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

nvd · CVE-2026-55495

Published

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, the WOPI PUT_RELATIVE handler passes X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget to URI.JoinRaw as a path rather than a filename, allowing slash and dot-dot segments to escape the s…

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, the WOPI PUT_RELATIVE handler passes X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget to URI.JoinRaw as a path rather than a filename, allowing slash and dot-dot segments to escape the source file directory and create or conditionally overwrite files elsewhere in the same owner account. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-22

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published: 2026-07-31T04:17:22.597

lastModified: 2026-09-08T20:51:43.490

Source published
31 Jul 2026 04:17:22 UTC
Source modified
8 Sep 2026 20:51:43 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 13:17:34 UTC
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NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 4.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

osv · GHSA-49h3-cwhj-4737

Published

Cloudreve: Path Traversal in WOPI PUT_RELATIVE Allows Arbitrary File Creation in Owner Account

## Summary Cloudreve's WOPI `PUT_RELATIVE` handler treats `X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget` as a path, not a filename. It splits the header on `/` and joins the segments onto the source file's directory with `URI.JoinRaw`, which feeds Go's `url.JoinPath`. `url.JoinPath` resolves `.`/`..` segments, so a slash-bearing target such as `a/../../evil.docx` collapses to a location outside the source file's directory. The lower-level upload path then validates only the final, already-cleaned basename (`evil.docx`), which is harmless, and checks ownership against the *resolved ancestor* — which is still the same user's drive. A WOPI access token is bound to exactly one file (the route enforces `fileId == session.FileID` with a 403 otherwise). `PUT_RELATIVE` escapes that per-file scope: a token issued for one file can create (and, conditionally, overwrite) files elsewhere in the same account. ## Root cause (verified at `26b6b10`) **1. Token is single-file scoped (the boundary being escaped)** — `middleware` `ViewerSessionValidation`: ```go fileId := hashid.FromContext(c) if fileId != session.FileID { // 403 — token is bound to ONE file c.Status(http.StatusForbidden); c.Abort(); return } ``` Route: `wopi := noAuth.Group("file/wopi", middleware.HashID(hashid.FileID), middleware.ViewerSessionValidation())`; `wopi.POST(":id", controllers.ModifyFile)` → `POST /api/v4/file/wopi/:id?access_token=<token>`. **2. `PUT_RELATIVE` dispatch** — `routers/controllers/wopi.go`: ```go case wopi.MethodPutRelative: // X-WOPI-Override: PUT_RELATIVE err = service.PutContent(c, true) ``` **3. SuggestedTarget joined as a path** — `service/explorer/viewer.go`: ```go fileName, _ := wopi.UTF7Decode(c.GetHeader(wopi.SuggestedTargetHeader)) // X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget fileUriParsed, _ := fs.NewUriFromString(fileUri) if strings.HasPrefix(fileName, ".") { /* treat as extension */ } fileUri = fileUriParsed.DirUri().JoinRaw(fileName).String() // <-- path join, not basename ... subService := FileUpdateService{ Uri: fileUri } res, err := subService.PutContent(c, lockSession) ``` **4. `JoinRaw` splits on `/` and normalizes via `url.JoinPath`** — `pkg/filemanager/fs/uri.go`: ```go func (u *URI) Join(elem ...string) *URI { newUrl, _ := url.Parse(u.U.String()) return &URI{U: newUrl.JoinPath(/* PathEscape each elem */ ...)} // JoinPath cleans ./ and ../ } func (u *URI) JoinRaw(elem string) *URI { return u.Join(strings.Split(strings.TrimPrefix(elem, Separator), Separator)...) } ``` `PathEscape` leaves `.` unescaped (it is in the unreserved set), so `..` segments survive into `JoinPath`, which resolves them. `URI.Name()` returns `path.Base(path.Clean(path))` — the cleaned basename. **5. Upload checks ownership of the resolved ancestor and validates only the clean basename** — `pkg/filemanager/fs/dbfs/upload.go`: ```go ancestor, err := f.getFileByPath(ctx, navigator, req.Props.Uri) // URI already traversal-normalized ... if _, ok := ctx.Value(ByPassOwnerCheckCtxKey{}).(bool); !ok && ancestor.OwnerID() != f.user.ID { return nil, fs.ErrOwnerOnly // same-user -> passes } ... if err := validateNewFile(req.Props.Uri.Name(), req.Props.Size, policy); err != nil { // checks "evil.docx" only return nil, err } ``` `validateFileName` rejects `/ \ : * ? " < > |` and bare `.`/`..` — but the traversal is already gone by the time it sees the basename. ## Validation performed Independent validation against commit `26b6b10` in a clean sandbox. **Source-verified (static):** the full chain confirmed verbatim — single-file-scoped token (403 on mismatch) → `PUT_RELATIVE` dispatch → `DirUri().JoinRaw(SuggestedTarget)` → `url.JoinPath` normalization → ancestor ownership check (same-user passes) → basename-only validation of the cleaned name. **Dynamic (control-flow executed):** the full binary is not buildable offline here (modules behind an unreachable Go proxy, embedded frontend, DB). I built and ran a harness using the **real Go `net/url` stdlib** plus the **verbatim** `Join`/`JoinRaw`/`DirUri`/`Path`/`Name`/`PathEscape`/`shouldEscape` and the `validateFileName` gate, driving the same transformation `PUT_RELATIVE` performs. Source = `cloudreve://my/folder/current.docx`: ``` SuggestedTarget resolved URI final basename validator "copy.docx" cloudreve://my/folder/copy.docx "copy.docx" ACCEPT "a/../../evil.docx" cloudreve://my/evil.docx "evil.docx" ACCEPT <- ESCAPED to / "a/../../../top.docx" cloudreve://my/top.docx "top.docx" ACCEPT <- ESCAPED to / "sub/evil.docx" cloudreve://my/folder/sub/evil.docx "evil.docx" ACCEPT <- different subdir ".pdf" cloudreve://my/folder/current.pdf "current.pdf" ACCEPT "a%2f..%2f..%2fenc.docx" cloudreve://my/folder/a%252f..%252f.. "a%2f..%2f..%2f" ACCEPT (NO escape) ``` The headline payload `a/../../evil.docx` deterministically resolves to `cloudreve://my/evil.docx` (account root) with a clean, accepted basename. Output matches the original audit probe exactly. Honest caveat: a leading non-`..` segment (e.g. `a/`) is required to prime the join; a single `../evil.docx` does not cleanly escape, and **URL-encoded separators (`%2f`) do not traverse** through this path (they are re-escaped into one literal segment). Only literal `/` separators work. **Confidence tier: source-verified + control-flow dynamically reproduced (no full live HTTP write against a deployed instance).** **Deduplication:** no existing CVE/GHSA matches. Known Cloudreve advisories are CVE-2022-32167 (XSS, v1–v3.5.3) and CVE-2026-25726 (weak-PRNG ATO, instances initialized < v4.10.0) — both unrelated. `SECURITY.md` lists "user permissions" as high-impact and in scope for all 4.x, so this qualifies as a vulnerability under the project's own policy. ## Steps to reproduce **Setup:** user owns `cloudreve://my/folder/current.docx`; open it in the WOPI editor to obtain `<token>` (the session is bound to that file's ID). 1. Send the crafted `PUT_RELATIVE`: ``` POST /api/v4/file/wopi/<file-id>?access_token=<token> HTTP/1.1 Host: target X-WOPI-Override: PUT_RELATIVE X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget: <UTF-7 of "a/../../evil.docx"> Content-Type: application/octet-stream <file bytes> ``` 2. Cloudreve rewrites the target from `cloudreve://my/folder/current.docx` to `cloudreve://my/evil.docx`, validates the basename `evil.docx` (passes), and writes the content. **Expected:** the target is rejected or constrained to the source file's directory. **Actual:** a file is written at the account root, outside the token's single-file scope. ## Impact A WOPI access token scoped to one file can write files to other locations in the same user's account. A malicious or compromised WOPI integration (or a leaked token) can plant or, conditionally, overwrite files at attacker-chosen paths the account owns, defeating the per-file scoping the WOPI session is meant to enforce. Confined to the session user's account (not cross-user). ## Remediation - Treat `X-WOPI-SuggestedTarget` (and `X-WOPI-RequestedName`) as a **filename**, not a path: reject `/`, `\`, dot segments, and percent-encoded separator variants before joining. - Prefer `DirUri().Join(sanitizedBaseName)` over `JoinRaw`, and after constructing the target URI assert it is a direct child of the source file's directory. - Add regression tests for `a/../../evil.docx`, `sub/evil.docx`, and encoded-separator variants.

Source published
24 Jul 2026 20:41:16 UTC
Source modified
18 Aug 2026 15:10:37 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

osv · GO-2026-6097

Published

Cloudreve: Path Traversal in WOPI PUT_RELATIVE Allows Arbitrary File Creation in Owner Account in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve

Cloudreve: Path Traversal in WOPI PUT_RELATIVE Allows Arbitrary File Creation in Owner Account in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve

Source published
18 Aug 2026 14:32:29 UTC
Source modified
18 Aug 2026 15:00:19 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

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