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cloudreve · Vulnerability

CVSS 3.1 4.3 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 4.3 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 4.3 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 4.0.0-20260613030215-0b00dd308f13osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 4.0.0-20260613030215-0b00dd308f13KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-55499

Published

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, a single-file share event-stream subscription resolves the share root to the owner’s parent folder and subscribes to that folder topic, allowing an authenticated share recipient to receive names, paths, rename targets, event types, and hashed identifiers for unshared sibling files and folders. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-51393

Published

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, a single-file share event-stream subscription resolves the share root to the owner’s parent folder and subscribes to that folder topic, allowing an authenticated share recipient to receive names, paths, rename targets, event types, and hashed identifiers for unshared sibling files and folders. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-55499

Published

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, a single-file share event-stream subscription resolves the share root to the owner’s parent folder and subscribes to that folder topic, allowing an authenticated share recipient to receive names, paths, rename targets, event types, and hashed identifiers for unshared sibling files and folders. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-w8x7-h2px-xmq8

Published

## Summary When an authenticated recipient of a **single-file** share opens the file event stream (`GET /api/v4/file/events?uri=<share-root>`), Cloudreve validates the URI by listing it and then subscribes the caller to `parent.ID()`. For a single-file share, the share navigator resolves the bare share-root URI to the **owner-side parent folder** of the shared file (not the file), while the visible listing is filtered down to just the shared file. The event hub then keys topics by numeric file ID only and, on each file change, fans the event out to subscribers of **every ancestor topic**, filtering only the client ID that caused the event — never the subscriber's share scope. Consequently, a recipient of one shared file can receive Server-Sent Events (type, sibling path/name, rename target, hashed file ID) for other files and subfolders in the owner's parent folder that were never shared. Contents are not disclosed; file-activity metadata is. ### Details ## Root cause (verified at `26b6b10`) **1. Events route — authenticated, feature-flagged, no share-scope check** (`routers/router.go`): ```go file := v4.Group("file"); file.Use(middleware.RequiredScopes(types.ScopeFilesRead)) file.GET("events", middleware.LoginRequired(), middleware.IsFunctionEnabled(func(c *gin.Context) bool { return dep.SettingProvider().EventHubEnabled(c) }), controllers.FromQuery[explorer.ExplorerEventService](...), controllers.HandleExplorerEventsPush) ``` `EventHubEnabled` defaults `true` (`inventory/setting.go: "fs_event_push_enabled":"1"`). **2. Service subscribes to the listed parent's ID** (`service/explorer/events.go`): ```go parent, _, err := m.List(c, uri, &manager.ListArgs{Page:0, PageSize:1}) // also runs share validity/password ... rx, resumed, err := eventHub.Subscribe(c, parent.ID(), requestInfo.ClientID) ``` **3. Single-file share `Root` swaps the share root to the owner parent** (`share_navigator.go`): ```go n.shareRoot = newFile(nil, share.Edges.File) ... if n.shareRoot.Type() == types.FileTypeFile { n.singleFileShare = true n.shareRoot = n.shareRoot.Parent // <-- owner-side parent folder } ``` **4. `To` returns that parent for the bare root URI** (`share_navigator.go`): ```go elements := path.Elements() if len(elements) == 1 && n.singleFileShare { return latestSharedSingleFile(...) } // only when URI names the file ... return current // current == shareRoot == owner parent folder ``` The bare root share URI has **zero** path elements (`URI.Elements()` returns nil for path `/`), so the `len(elements)==1` guard is skipped and `To` returns the parent folder. `dbfs.List` returns that as `parent`, so `parent.ID()` is the owner parent folder's real ID. **5. `Children` masks the broader parent** — for `singleFileShare` it returns only `[]*File{sharedFile}`, so the recipient's listing shows just the shared file even though the subscribed topic is the whole parent. **6. Publication fans out to ancestor topics with only a client-ID filter** (`dbfs/events.go`): ```go func (f *DBFS) getEligibleSubscriber(ctx, file, checkParentPerm) []foundSubscriber { roots := file.Ancestors() for _, root := range roots { subscribers := f.eventHub.GetSubscribers(ctx, root.Model.ID) subscribers = lo.Filter(subscribers, func(s eventhub.Subscriber, _ int) bool { return !(requestInfo != nil && s.ID() == requestInfo.ClientID) // ONLY exclude the causing client }) ... } } // emit*: From: subscriber.relativePath(file) // owner-side path of the changed sibling ``` `relativePath` trims the changed file's owner path by the subscribed root's owner path, yielding the sibling's name (e.g. `/Secret-Plan.pdf`). No check that the subscriber is authorized for the changed file or within their share scope. ## Validation performed Independent validation against commit `26b6b10` in a clean sandbox. **Source-verified (static):** all of (1)–(6) confirmed verbatim, including the negative direction (an explicit `…/shared.txt` URI resolves to the file, and `oss`/`qiniu`-style flows are irrelevant here). **Dynamic (control-flow executed):** the full binary is not buildable offline (modules behind an unreachable proxy, embedded frontend, DB/eventhub). The reseacher ran two harnesses: - A `net/url`-based check of the linchpin — the bare root share URI yields `0` path elements (so `To` returns the parent), while `…/shared.txt` yields `1` (returns the file). This is the subtle point on which the whole finding turns, and it holds. - A model of `Root`/`To`/`getEligibleSubscriber`/`relativePath` driving the end-to-end flow: ``` [1] single-file share root URI -> m.List parent = "docs" (id 10), NOT shared.txt (id 11) -> subscribed to owner parent [2] owner renames /docs/Secret-Plan.pdf -> client 'attacker' receives: from="/Secret-Plan.pdf" file_id=12 (topic 10) [3] CONTROL: event caused by attacker's own client id -> suppressed (the only filter) [4] CONTROL: explicit URI 'shared.txt' -> resolves to file (id 11) -> no sibling events ``` ## Steps to reproduce 1. Owner shares a single file `shared.txt` from `/docs`, which also contains `Secret-Plan.pdf`. 2. Recipient (logged-in, `Files.Read`, with the share password if any) opens the event stream on the share root: ``` GET /api/v4/file/events?uri=cloudreve%3A%2F%2F<share-id>%40share Cookie: cloudreve-session=<recipient-session> X-Cr-Client-Id: <uuid> Accept: text/event-stream ``` 3. Owner creates/renames/modifies/moves/deletes `Secret-Plan.pdf`. 4. The recipient's stream receives, e.g.: ``` event: event data: {"type":"rename","file_id":"<hashed>","from":"/Secret-Plan.pdf","to":"/Secret-Plan-v2.pdf"} ``` **Expected:** the recipient only receives events for the shared file. **Actual:** the recipient receives activity events for unshared siblings in the owner's parent folder. ## Impact A single-file share recipient gains a real-time feed of file-activity metadata for the owner's parent folder — sibling names, operation types, and rename targets they were never granted access to. No file contents are exposed. ## Remediation - For single-file shares, subscribe to the shared file's ID, or reject event subscriptions on the single-file share root view. - Store an authorization scope (navigator/share root) per subscriber and publish only events whose path stays within that scope. - Incorporate user/share scope into topic keys, not just file ID + client ID. - On subscriber reactivation, re-verify the requester still matches the subscriber and is authorized for the topic.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-6102

Published

Cloudreve: Broken Access Control in file event stream: a single-file share recipient is subscribed to the owner's parent folder and receives activity events for unshared siblings in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

Source status

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cve-program · CVE-2026-55499

Published

Cloudreve: Broken access control in file event stream leaks activity events for unshared siblings to single-file share recipients

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, a single-file share event-stream subscription resolves the share root to the owner’s parent folder and subscribes to that folder topic, allowing an authenticated share recipient to receive names, paths, rename targets, event types, and hashed identifiers for unshared sibling files and folders. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Source published
31 Jul 2026 03:34:33 UTC
Source modified
31 Jul 2026 23:15:27 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 4.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-51393

Published

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, a single-file share event-stream subscription resolves the share root to the owner’s parent folder and subscribes to that folder topic, allowing an authenticate…

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, a single-file share event-stream subscription resolves the share root to the owner’s parent folder and subscribes to that folder topic, allowing an authenticated share recipient to receive names, paths, rename targets, event types, and hashed identifiers for unshared sibling files and folders. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Jul 31, 2026, 3:34:33 AM

dateUpdated: Jul 31, 2026, 11:15:27 PM

Source published
Jul 31, 2026, 3:34:33 AM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Jul 31, 2026, 11:15:27 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
18 Nov 2026 12:23:53 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 4.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

nvd · CVE-2026-55499

Published

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, a single-file share event-stream subscription resolves the share root to the owner’s parent folder and subscribes to that folder topic, allowing an authenticate…

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, a single-file share event-stream subscription resolves the share root to the owner’s parent folder and subscribes to that folder topic, allowing an authenticated share recipient to receive names, paths, rename targets, event types, and hashed identifiers for unshared sibling files and folders. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-863

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-07-31T04:17:23.380

lastModified: 2026-09-08T20:51:43.490

Source published
31 Jul 2026 04:17:23 UTC
Source modified
8 Sep 2026 20:51:43 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 13:17:34 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 4.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

osv · GHSA-w8x7-h2px-xmq8

Published

Cloudreve: Broken Access Control in file event stream: a single-file share recipient is subscribed to the owner's parent folder and receives activity events for unshared siblings

## Summary When an authenticated recipient of a **single-file** share opens the file event stream (`GET /api/v4/file/events?uri=<share-root>`), Cloudreve validates the URI by listing it and then subscribes the caller to `parent.ID()`. For a single-file share, the share navigator resolves the bare share-root URI to the **owner-side parent folder** of the shared file (not the file), while the visible listing is filtered down to just the shared file. The event hub then keys topics by numeric file ID only and, on each file change, fans the event out to subscribers of **every ancestor topic**, filtering only the client ID that caused the event — never the subscriber's share scope. Consequently, a recipient of one shared file can receive Server-Sent Events (type, sibling path/name, rename target, hashed file ID) for other files and subfolders in the owner's parent folder that were never shared. Contents are not disclosed; file-activity metadata is. ### Details ## Root cause (verified at `26b6b10`) **1. Events route — authenticated, feature-flagged, no share-scope check** (`routers/router.go`): ```go file := v4.Group("file"); file.Use(middleware.RequiredScopes(types.ScopeFilesRead)) file.GET("events", middleware.LoginRequired(), middleware.IsFunctionEnabled(func(c *gin.Context) bool { return dep.SettingProvider().EventHubEnabled(c) }), controllers.FromQuery[explorer.ExplorerEventService](...), controllers.HandleExplorerEventsPush) ``` `EventHubEnabled` defaults `true` (`inventory/setting.go: "fs_event_push_enabled":"1"`). **2. Service subscribes to the listed parent's ID** (`service/explorer/events.go`): ```go parent, _, err := m.List(c, uri, &manager.ListArgs{Page:0, PageSize:1}) // also runs share validity/password ... rx, resumed, err := eventHub.Subscribe(c, parent.ID(), requestInfo.ClientID) ``` **3. Single-file share `Root` swaps the share root to the owner parent** (`share_navigator.go`): ```go n.shareRoot = newFile(nil, share.Edges.File) ... if n.shareRoot.Type() == types.FileTypeFile { n.singleFileShare = true n.shareRoot = n.shareRoot.Parent // <-- owner-side parent folder } ``` **4. `To` returns that parent for the bare root URI** (`share_navigator.go`): ```go elements := path.Elements() if len(elements) == 1 && n.singleFileShare { return latestSharedSingleFile(...) } // only when URI names the file ... return current // current == shareRoot == owner parent folder ``` The bare root share URI has **zero** path elements (`URI.Elements()` returns nil for path `/`), so the `len(elements)==1` guard is skipped and `To` returns the parent folder. `dbfs.List` returns that as `parent`, so `parent.ID()` is the owner parent folder's real ID. **5. `Children` masks the broader parent** — for `singleFileShare` it returns only `[]*File{sharedFile}`, so the recipient's listing shows just the shared file even though the subscribed topic is the whole parent. **6. Publication fans out to ancestor topics with only a client-ID filter** (`dbfs/events.go`): ```go func (f *DBFS) getEligibleSubscriber(ctx, file, checkParentPerm) []foundSubscriber { roots := file.Ancestors() for _, root := range roots { subscribers := f.eventHub.GetSubscribers(ctx, root.Model.ID) subscribers = lo.Filter(subscribers, func(s eventhub.Subscriber, _ int) bool { return !(requestInfo != nil && s.ID() == requestInfo.ClientID) // ONLY exclude the causing client }) ... } } // emit*: From: subscriber.relativePath(file) // owner-side path of the changed sibling ``` `relativePath` trims the changed file's owner path by the subscribed root's owner path, yielding the sibling's name (e.g. `/Secret-Plan.pdf`). No check that the subscriber is authorized for the changed file or within their share scope. ## Validation performed Independent validation against commit `26b6b10` in a clean sandbox. **Source-verified (static):** all of (1)–(6) confirmed verbatim, including the negative direction (an explicit `…/shared.txt` URI resolves to the file, and `oss`/`qiniu`-style flows are irrelevant here). **Dynamic (control-flow executed):** the full binary is not buildable offline (modules behind an unreachable proxy, embedded frontend, DB/eventhub). The reseacher ran two harnesses: - A `net/url`-based check of the linchpin — the bare root share URI yields `0` path elements (so `To` returns the parent), while `…/shared.txt` yields `1` (returns the file). This is the subtle point on which the whole finding turns, and it holds. - A model of `Root`/`To`/`getEligibleSubscriber`/`relativePath` driving the end-to-end flow: ``` [1] single-file share root URI -> m.List parent = "docs" (id 10), NOT shared.txt (id 11) -> subscribed to owner parent [2] owner renames /docs/Secret-Plan.pdf -> client 'attacker' receives: from="/Secret-Plan.pdf" file_id=12 (topic 10) [3] CONTROL: event caused by attacker's own client id -> suppressed (the only filter) [4] CONTROL: explicit URI 'shared.txt' -> resolves to file (id 11) -> no sibling events ``` ## Steps to reproduce 1. Owner shares a single file `shared.txt` from `/docs`, which also contains `Secret-Plan.pdf`. 2. Recipient (logged-in, `Files.Read`, with the share password if any) opens the event stream on the share root: ``` GET /api/v4/file/events?uri=cloudreve%3A%2F%2F<share-id>%40share Cookie: cloudreve-session=<recipient-session> X-Cr-Client-Id: <uuid> Accept: text/event-stream ``` 3. Owner creates/renames/modifies/moves/deletes `Secret-Plan.pdf`. 4. The recipient's stream receives, e.g.: ``` event: event data: {"type":"rename","file_id":"<hashed>","from":"/Secret-Plan.pdf","to":"/Secret-Plan-v2.pdf"} ``` **Expected:** the recipient only receives events for the shared file. **Actual:** the recipient receives activity events for unshared siblings in the owner's parent folder. ## Impact A single-file share recipient gains a real-time feed of file-activity metadata for the owner's parent folder — sibling names, operation types, and rename targets they were never granted access to. No file contents are exposed. ## Remediation - For single-file shares, subscribe to the shared file's ID, or reject event subscriptions on the single-file share root view. - Store an authorization scope (navigator/share root) per subscriber and publish only events whose path stays within that scope. - Incorporate user/share scope into topic keys, not just file ID + client ID. - On subscriber reactivation, re-verify the requester still matches the subscriber and is authorized for the topic.

Source published
24 Jul 2026 20:49:02 UTC
Source modified
18 Aug 2026 15:10:42 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

osv · GO-2026-6102

Published

Cloudreve: Broken Access Control in file event stream: a single-file share recipient is subscribed to the owner's parent folder and receives activity events for unshared siblings in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve

Cloudreve: Broken Access Control in file event stream: a single-file share recipient is subscribed to the owner's parent folder and receives activity events for unshared siblings in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve

Source published
18 Aug 2026 14:32:29 UTC
Source modified
18 Aug 2026 15:00:16 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 19 Nov 09:03 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current