Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Sources need attention Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

Pocket ID: Open Redirect on the OIDC /authorize page via unvalidated redirect_uri with prompt=none

CVSS 3.1 4.3 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 4.3 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 4.3 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/backend 2.9.0osv · severity unknownKEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-55834

Published

Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.6.0 until 2.9.0, frontend/src/routes/authorize/+page.ts reads the redirect_uri query parameter and frontend/src/routes/authorize/+page.svelte uses the raw callbackURL in redirectWithError when prompt=none cannot complete silent authorization. The client-side path only blocks javascript and data schemes and does not invoke the backend callback allow-list validation, so an unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid client_id can redirect a victim browser to an arbitrary HTTP or HTTPS origin for phishing or OIDC error and state smuggling. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-67828

Published

Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.6.0 until 2.9.0, frontend/src/routes/authorize/+page.ts reads the redirect_uri query parameter and frontend/src/routes/authorize/+page.svelte uses the raw callbackURL in redirectWithError when prompt=none cannot complete silent authorization. The client-side path only blocks javascript and data schemes and does not invoke the backend callback allow-list validation, so an unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid client_id can redirect a victim browser to an arbitrary HTTP or HTTPS origin for phishing or OIDC error and state smuggling. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-55834

Published

Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.6.0 until 2.9.0, frontend/src/routes/authorize/+page.ts reads the redirect_uri query parameter and frontend/src/routes/authorize/+page.svelte uses the raw callbackURL in redirectWithError when prompt=none cannot complete silent authorization. The client-side path only blocks javascript and data schemes and does not invoke the backend callback allow-list validation, so an unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid client_id can redirect a victim browser to an arbitrary HTTP or HTTPS origin for phishing or OIDC error and state smuggling. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-2wvm-8mvp-22qv

Published

### Summary The OIDC authorization page in the pocket-id frontend redirects the browser to an attacker-controlled URL without consulting the backend redirect_uri allow-list when the request uses prompt=none. An attacker who knows a valid client_id can craft an /authorize link that sends a victim (or a victim's browser doing a silent re-auth) to any external https URL, enabling phishing and OAuth response smuggling. The backend allow-list validation that protects the normal authenticated flow is bypassed because this path is handled entirely client-side. ### Details For an OIDC authorization request with prompt=none, the SvelteKit frontend short-circuits the flow before the backend ever validates the redirect_uri against the client's registered callback list. File: frontend/src/routes/authorize/+page.ts (line 14) parses the raw redirect_uri query parameter from the incoming URL. File: frontend/src/routes/authorize/+page.svelte - in onMount(), when the request carries prompt=none and the user cannot be silently authorized (for example the visitor is not logged in, so login_required must be returned), the page builds the callback URL from the raw redirect_uri and performs: window.location.href = `${callbackURL}?error=login_required...` The callbackURL is taken directly from the user-supplied redirect_uri. The only filtering applied is a scheme check that blocks javascript: and data: URLs; any http: or https: origin passes through. The backend allow-list validator GetCallbackURLFromList (which the authenticated code path uses to confirm the redirect_uri matches one of the client's registered callback URLs) is never invoked on this branch. This means the per-client redirect_uri allow-list, the central control that makes redirect_uri safe in OAuth/OIDC, is not enforced for the prompt=none error-return path. A client_id is not a secret: client metadata is retrievable at /api/oidc/clients/:id/meta, and client_ids appear in any integration's authorization links. Confirmation that the bypass is purely frontend: an unauthenticated POST to the backend /api/oidc/authorize endpoint correctly returns 401 ({"error":"You are not signed in"}), so the backend never authorizes the request. The redirect nonetheless happens in the browser because +page.svelte issues window.location.href before/without a successful backend authorization. A second variant exists for an authenticated victim: when prompt=none is combined with a first-time (not yet consented) authorization of a client, the same client-side path can be reached. Contrast: the standard interactive flow (no prompt=none) posts to the backend, which validates redirect_uri against the registered list before returning a callback. The defect is specific to the client-side prompt=none short-circuit. ### PoC Prerequisites: a running pocket-id instance, a registered OIDC client whose client_id is known to the attacker (obtainable from /api/oidc/clients/:id/meta or any existing integration), and a victim whose browser opens the link (the victim need not be logged in for the login_required branch). 1. Attacker constructs an authorization URL pointing at the victim's pocket-id, supplying an external redirect_uri and prompt=none: https://idp.victim.example/authorize?client_id=<known_client_id>&redirect_uri=https://attacker.example/collect&response_type=code&scope=openid&prompt=none 2. Victim opens the link. The frontend authorize page loads, determines the silent auth cannot succeed (login_required), and executes: window.location.href = "https://attacker.example/collect?error=login_required&state=..." 3. The browser is redirected to https://attacker.example/collect. Expected result on a fixed build: the page would refuse the redirect because redirect_uri does not match the client's registered callback list and would render an error in place instead of navigating off-origin. Validation level: code-level confirmation at commit fc42f62. This is a browser-side window.location.href redirect, so it is not reproducible with curl; the backend was confirmed to reject the unauthenticated request (401) while the frontend performs the navigation regardless. Evidence notes saved to screenshots/001_open_redirect_evidence.txt. ### Impact Unauthenticated attacker, victim interaction required (clicking or being silently redirected). The trusted pocket-id domain is used to bounce a victim to an arbitrary external site, which is effective for credential phishing (the user trusts the IdP origin in the initial link) and for leaking OIDC error/state parameters to an attacker endpoint. Integrity impact is limited to redirection; no confidentiality or availability loss of pocket-id itself. Note: an abandoned PR (#1450) addressed a related protocol-relative URL issue in a different email-redirect path but was not merged and does not cover this authorize-page path.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-6305

Published

Pocket-ID has an Open Redirect on the OIDC /authorize page via unvalidated redirect_uri with prompt=none in github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/backend. NOTE: The source advisory for this report contains additional versions that could not be automatically mapped to standard Go module versions. (If this is causing false-positive reports from vulnerability scanners, please suggest an edit to the report.) The additional affected modules and versions are: github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/backend from v2.6.0 before v2.9.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-55834

Published

pocket-id

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "pocket-id",
                    "product": "pocket-id",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": ">= 2.6.0, < 2.9.0",
                            "status": "affected"
                        }
                    ]
                }

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

euvd · EUVD-2026-67828

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Aug 28, 2026, 4:27:58 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 28, 2026, 8:28:38 PM

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2026-55834

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-601

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-28T20:18:30.030

lastModified: 2026-09-09T21:09:13.080

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-2wvm-8mvp-22qv

Published

github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/backend

Go

SEMVER · introduced 2.6.0 → fixed 2.9.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GO-2026-6305

Published

github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/backend

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 19 Nov 05:53 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current