Gitea Open Source Git Server · Vulnerability
cve-program · CVE-2026-55987
PublishedOAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009)
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-58141
PublishedOAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009)
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-55987
PublishedOAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009)
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-vrhc-jjfc-m3m3
Published## Description Gitea's OAuth2 sign-in callback reactivates a deactivated user account (`IsActive=false`) when the user signs in through an authentication source that does not issue refresh tokens (notably GitHub, and any OIDC/OAuth2 source configured without `offline_access`). PR #38009 added a gate intended to reactivate users only when the OAuth2 auto-sync cron had disabled them, using "the stored refresh token is empty" as the signal. That signal is wrong: for sources that never issue refresh tokens, an empty refresh token is the normal state of every user, so the gate cannot distinguish a cron-disabled account from one an administrator deliberately deactivated. The next time the administrator-deactivated user signs in through the provider, Gitea sets `IsActive=true` and grants a full session, silently undoing the administrator's action. This is the exact behavior #38009 was written to prevent. (`ProhibitLogin`, the hard ban, is enforced separately and is not affected.) No special privileges are required beyond being the deactivated user and being able to sign in through the source. ### Root Cause `routers/web/auth/oauth.go` (the `handleOAuth2SignIn` reactivation gate): ```go if !u.IsActive { extLogin, hasExt, err := user_model.GetExternalLogin(ctx, authSource.ID, gothUser.UserID) if err != nil { ctx.ServerError("GetExternalLogin", err); return } isDisabledByAutoSync := hasExt && extLogin.RefreshToken == "" // wrong signal if isDisabledByAutoSync { opts.IsActive = optional.Some(true) // reactivates the account } } ``` The assumption that `RefreshToken == ""` is produced only by the auto-sync cron is false: - The cron's disable path is unreachable for sources without refresh tokens. `services/auth/source/oauth2/source_sync.go` returns early: `if !provider.RefreshTokenAvailable() { return ... }`, so it never disables (or touches the tokens of) such users. - The stored token is exactly what the provider returned, with no synthesizing: `services/externalaccount/user.go` stores `RefreshToken: gothUser.RefreshToken`. When the provider issues none, this is `""` from the first login. - GitHub never issues a refresh token: `goth` hardcodes `func (p *Provider) RefreshTokenAvailable() bool { return false }` (`providers/github/github.go`). OIDC/OAuth2 without `offline_access` likewise store `""`. So for a GitHub (or no-refresh-token) source, `RefreshToken == ""` is the state of every user, including one an administrator deactivated, and the gate reactivates them. ### Proof of Concept Setup: - A Gitea instance with a GitHub authentication source (Admin Panel -> Authentication Sources -> OAuth2 -> GitHub), or any OAuth2/OIDC source configured without `offline_access`. - Account V: a normal user who has signed in at least once through that source (an `external_login_user` row exists with empty `refresh_token`). Steps: 1. As an administrator, open Admin Panel -> Users -> V and uncheck "Activated" (`is_active=false`). Confirm V's requests now bounce to the activation page. 2. As V, sign in again via "Sign in with GitHub" and complete the provider flow. 3. V lands in the application with a working session. `SELECT is_active FROM "user" WHERE lower_name='v';` now returns `true`. Expected (intended by #38009): V stays `is_active=false` and is routed to the activation page. Actual: V is `is_active=true` with a full session — the administrator's deactivation is undone. ``` - GitHub user, ADMIN deactivated refreshToken="" -> REACTIVATED + session granted <<< admin action undone - OIDC user w/ refresh token, ADMIN deactivated refreshToken="..." -> stays disabled (control) - OIDC user, AUTO-SYNC cron disabled refreshToken="" -> REACTIVATED (intended) RESULT: BYPASS CONFIRMED. ``` Gitea's own regression test `TestOAuth2CallbackReactivationGating` ("auto-sync-disabled user is reactivated") sets `RefreshToken=""` and asserts reactivation after a full OIDC callback — that state is identical to a GitHub-source user an administrator deactivated. ### Impact Any Gitea instance using a GitHub authentication source (one of the most common) or an OIDC/OAuth2 source without refresh tokens, that relies on the "Activated" toggle to disable accounts, is affected. A deactivated user restores their own account to active and obtains a session, regaining whatever access the account had. Deactivation does not clear `IsAdmin`, so a deactivated administrator regains admin access. Bound: accounts disabled with "Prohibit Login" stay blocked; this defeats the `IsActive=false` deactivation only.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GO-2026-6078
PublishedGitea: OAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009) in gitea.dev
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Exploitation and risk
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cve-program · CVE-2026-55987
PublishedOAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009)
OAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009)
- Source published
- 13 Aug 2026 16:44:42 UTC
- Source modified
- 14 Aug 2026 20:06:36 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
euvd · EUVD-2026-58141
PublishedOAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009)
OAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009)
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 13, 2026, 4:44:42 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 14, 2026, 8:06:36 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2026-2304: Gitea: Mehrere Schwachstellen
CVE-2026-58417 · CVE-2026-58420 · CVE-2026-58425 · CVE-2026-58427 · CVE-2026-58428 · CVE-2026-58429 · CVE-2026-58431 · CVE-2026-58432 · CVE-2026-58433 · CVE-2026-58434 · CVE-2026-58435 · CVE-2026-58436 · CVE-2026-58437 · CVE-2026-58438 · CVE-2026-58439 · CVE-2026-58440 · CVE-2026-58441 · CVE-2026-58442 · CVE-2026-58443 · CVE-2026-58444 · CVE-2026-58445 · CVE-2026-58507 · CVE-2026-58508 · CVE-2026-58510 · CVE-2026-58511 · CVE-2026-59763 · CVE-2026-59765 · CVE-2026-59766 · CVE-2026-23603 · CVE-2026-42931 · CVE-2026-50105 · CVE-2026-54481 · CVE-2026-55982 · CVE-2026-55984 · CVE-2026-55986 · CVE-2026-55987 · CVE-2026-56443 · CVE-2026-56654 · CVE-2026-56657 · CVE-2026-56750 · CVE-2026-56755 · CVE-2026-57886 · CVE-2026-57894 · CVE-2026-57897 · CVE-2026-58314 · CVE-2026-58416
- Source published
- Aug 13, 2026, 4:44:42 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Aug 14, 2026, 8:06:36 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 19 Nov 2026 16:52:21 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 8.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-55987
PublishedOAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009)
OAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009)
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-863
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-13T17:17:25.063
lastModified: 2026-08-26T16:53:48.300
- Source published
- 13 Aug 2026 17:17:25 UTC
- Source modified
- 26 Aug 2026 16:53:48 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 14:19:05 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 · Secondary · 8.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
osv · GHSA-vrhc-jjfc-m3m3
PublishedGitea: OAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009)
## Description Gitea's OAuth2 sign-in callback reactivates a deactivated user account (`IsActive=false`) when the user signs in through an authentication source that does not issue refresh tokens (notably GitHub, and any OIDC/OAuth2 source configured without `offline_access`). PR #38009 added a gate intended to reactivate users only when the OAuth2 auto-sync cron had disabled them, using "the stored refresh token is empty" as the signal. That signal is wrong: for sources that never issue refresh tokens, an empty refresh token is the normal state of every user, so the gate cannot distinguish a cron-disabled account from one an administrator deliberately deactivated. The next time the administrator-deactivated user signs in through the provider, Gitea sets `IsActive=true` and grants a full session, silently undoing the administrator's action. This is the exact behavior #38009 was written to prevent. (`ProhibitLogin`, the hard ban, is enforced separately and is not affected.) No special privileges are required beyond being the deactivated user and being able to sign in through the source. ### Root Cause `routers/web/auth/oauth.go` (the `handleOAuth2SignIn` reactivation gate): ```go if !u.IsActive { extLogin, hasExt, err := user_model.GetExternalLogin(ctx, authSource.ID, gothUser.UserID) if err != nil { ctx.ServerError("GetExternalLogin", err); return } isDisabledByAutoSync := hasExt && extLogin.RefreshToken == "" // wrong signal if isDisabledByAutoSync { opts.IsActive = optional.Some(true) // reactivates the account } } ``` The assumption that `RefreshToken == ""` is produced only by the auto-sync cron is false: - The cron's disable path is unreachable for sources without refresh tokens. `services/auth/source/oauth2/source_sync.go` returns early: `if !provider.RefreshTokenAvailable() { return ... }`, so it never disables (or touches the tokens of) such users. - The stored token is exactly what the provider returned, with no synthesizing: `services/externalaccount/user.go` stores `RefreshToken: gothUser.RefreshToken`. When the provider issues none, this is `""` from the first login. - GitHub never issues a refresh token: `goth` hardcodes `func (p *Provider) RefreshTokenAvailable() bool { return false }` (`providers/github/github.go`). OIDC/OAuth2 without `offline_access` likewise store `""`. So for a GitHub (or no-refresh-token) source, `RefreshToken == ""` is the state of every user, including one an administrator deactivated, and the gate reactivates them. ### Proof of Concept Setup: - A Gitea instance with a GitHub authentication source (Admin Panel -> Authentication Sources -> OAuth2 -> GitHub), or any OAuth2/OIDC source configured without `offline_access`. - Account V: a normal user who has signed in at least once through that source (an `external_login_user` row exists with empty `refresh_token`). Steps: 1. As an administrator, open Admin Panel -> Users -> V and uncheck "Activated" (`is_active=false`). Confirm V's requests now bounce to the activation page. 2. As V, sign in again via "Sign in with GitHub" and complete the provider flow. 3. V lands in the application with a working session. `SELECT is_active FROM "user" WHERE lower_name='v';` now returns `true`. Expected (intended by #38009): V stays `is_active=false` and is routed to the activation page. Actual: V is `is_active=true` with a full session — the administrator's deactivation is undone. ``` - GitHub user, ADMIN deactivated refreshToken="" -> REACTIVATED + session granted <<< admin action undone - OIDC user w/ refresh token, ADMIN deactivated refreshToken="..." -> stays disabled (control) - OIDC user, AUTO-SYNC cron disabled refreshToken="" -> REACTIVATED (intended) RESULT: BYPASS CONFIRMED. ``` Gitea's own regression test `TestOAuth2CallbackReactivationGating` ("auto-sync-disabled user is reactivated") sets `RefreshToken=""` and asserts reactivation after a full OIDC callback — that state is identical to a GitHub-source user an administrator deactivated. ### Impact Any Gitea instance using a GitHub authentication source (one of the most common) or an OIDC/OAuth2 source without refresh tokens, that relies on the "Activated" toggle to disable accounts, is affected. A deactivated user restores their own account to active and obtains a session, regaining whatever access the account had. Deactivation does not clear `IsAdmin`, so a deactivated administrator regains admin access. Bound: accounts disabled with "Prohibit Login" stay blocked; this defeats the `IsActive=false` deactivation only.
- Source published
- 21 Jul 2026 21:02:10 UTC
- Source modified
- 27 Jul 2026 17:11:22 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Publisher rating · HIGH
osv · GO-2026-6078
PublishedGitea: OAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009) in gitea.dev
Gitea: OAuth2 sign-in reactivates an administrator-deactivated account on auth sources without refresh tokens (incomplete fix of #38009) in gitea.dev
- Source published
- 27 Jul 2026 15:32:45 UTC
- Source modified
- 27 Jul 2026 17:00:26 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.