Gitea Open Source Git Server · Vulnerability

Token public-only scope bypassed on Limited-visibility owners (Repository + Package categories) — residual after CVE-2026-25714 / PR #37118

Token public-only scope bypassed on Limited-visibility owners (Repository + Package categories) — residual after CVE-2026-25714 / PR #37118

Token public-only scope bypassed on Limited-visibility owners (Repository + Package categories) — residual after CVE-2026-25714 / PR #37118

## Summary After [PR #37118](https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/37118) / **CVE-2026-25714** (`fix: Unify public-only token filtering in API queries and repo access checks`, merged 2026-05-18, backport `#37773` to 1.26.2 — the May 2026 unification pass for public-only token filtering, reporter Medoedus per the 1.26.2 release notes), the `public-only` PAT scope is still bypassable on **Repository** and **Package** scope categories when the owner's `Visibility = Limited` (instance-internal). The sibling `Org` / `User` / `ActivityPub` cases in the same `checkTokenPublicOnly` switch correctly reject Limited owners via `!Visibility.IsPublic()`. The Repository / Package cases use `repo.IsPrivate` or `Owner.Visibility.IsPrivate()`, both of which return `false` for `VisibleTypeLimited` — so a `public-only` PAT strictly exceeds anonymous reach on a Limited owner. Tested on `gitea/gitea:1.26.2`. The decisive marker is that PR #37118's unification IS applied in the version under test (User-category PROBE returns `403 "token scope is limited to public users"`). Despite that, the Repository-category PROBE on the same Limited owner with the same PAT returns `200` and serves content. ## Affected entry points (4 spots) | File:Line | Function | Affected surface | |---|---|---| | `routers/api/v1/api.go:292` | `checkTokenPublicOnly` Package case | API v1 packages | | `routers/api/packages/api.go:76` | `reqPackageAccess` middleware | All 24 native package registries (`/api/packages/<type>/...`) | | `services/context/api.go` | `TokenCanAccessRepo` helper | All API v1 Repository-category endpoints — content, issues, PRs, releases, labels, milestones, etc. | | `services/context/permission.go:32` | `CheckTokenScopes` (called via `CheckRepoScopedToken`) | Web download endpoints `/raw`, `/media`, `/attachments`. LFS routes (`services/lfs/server.go:470/472`, `services/lfs/locks.go:62/151/216/284`) also chain through this helper. | All four sinks check `repo.IsPrivate` or `Owner.Visibility.IsPrivate()` only. `VisibleTypeLimited` falls through. ```go // modules/structs/visible_type.go func (vt VisibleType) IsPrivate() bool { return vt == VisibleTypePrivate } // line 39-40 func (vt VisibleType) IsLimited() bool { return vt == VisibleTypeLimited } // line 33-34 ``` ## Same-file evidence (`routers/api/v1/api.go:246-299` after PR #37118) ```go case auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization: orgPrivate := ... && !ctx.Org.Organization.Visibility.IsPublic() // !IsPublic ✓ case auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryUser: if ... && !ctx.ContextUser.Visibility.IsPublic() { ... } // !IsPublic ✓ case auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryActivityPub: if ... && !ctx.ContextUser.Visibility.IsPublic() { ... } // !IsPublic ✓ case auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryPackage: if ctx.Package != nil && ctx.Package.Owner.Visibility.IsPrivate() { // IsPrivate ONLY ✗ ctx.APIError(http.StatusForbidden, "token scope is limited to public packages") return } ``` `TokenCanAccessRepo` (`services/context/api.go`) reduces to `!repo.IsPrivate`: ```go // A public-only token cannot reach a private repo; any other token is unrestricted by this check. func (ctx *APIContext) TokenCanAccessRepo(repo *repo_model.Repository) bool { return repo == nil || !ctx.PublicOnly || !repo.IsPrivate } ``` `CheckTokenScopes` (`services/context/permission.go:32`): ```go if publicOnly && repo != nil && repo.IsPrivate { ctx.HTTPError(http.StatusForbidden) return } ``` ## PoC (Docker e2e VERIFIED on `gitea/gitea:1.26.2`, 2026-06-05) Full script in the report (`run-poc.sh`). Setup: 1. Create user `limuser`. `PATCH /api/v1/admin/users/limuser` with body `{"visibility":"limited", ...}` — response confirms `"visibility":"limited"`. 2. Upload a generic package as `limuser`: `PUT /api/packages/limuser/generic/secretpkg/1.0.0/secret.txt` with body `secret-content-internal-only` → `201`. 3. Create user `attacker`. 4. Mint PAT for `attacker` with `scopes=["read:package","read:user","read:repository","public-only"]`. Result on `gitea/gitea:1.26.2` — nine PROBEs: ``` PROBE A (download package via attacker PAT) HTTP=200 Body: secret-content-internal-only PROBE C (read README of limuser's PUBLIC repo) HTTP=200 Body: {"name":"README.md", ...} PROBE F (sanity — User category, same PAT, same owner) HTTP=403 Body: {"message":"token scope is limited to public users"} PROBE G (Repository category, same PAT, same owner) HTTP=200 Body: {"name":"README.md", ...} ← bypass PROBE H (list limuser's repos, User category) HTTP=403 Body: {"message":"token scope is limited to public users"} PROBE M (git HTTPS smart protocol — info/refs) HTTP=200 Body: 001e# service=git-upload-pack ... HEAD ... ← full clone enabled PROBE N (write attempt: POST contents/hacked.txt) HTTP=403 Body: {"message":"user should have a permission to write to the target branch"} Integrity:N confirmed PROBE O (Limited ORG — same bypass class) Org category : HTTP=403 {"message":"token scope is limited to public orgs"} Repo category : HTTP=200 README content ← bypass Anonymous baseline (no auth) on every above endpoint: HTTP=401/404 ``` Gitea's own server error string in PROBE F / H / O — *"token scope is limited to public users"* / *"public orgs"* — is the explicit declaration of intent. Repository / Package category violates that intent on the same Limited owner. ## Why this is not a duplicate of CVE-2026-25714 CVE-2026-25714 / PR #37118 (the May 2026 unification pass for public-only token filtering, merged 2026-05-18, backported to 1.26.2 via PR #37773) realigned `checkTokenPublicOnly`'s Org / User / ActivityPub cases on `!Visibility.IsPublic()` and introduced the `TokenCanAccessRepo` helper for the Repository / Issue / Notification cases. PROBE F on `1.26.2` returns `403 "token scope is limited to public users"` for the User category — i.e. PR #37118's unification IS in effect on the version under test. The Repository / Package leak occurs *after* that fix; the Limited gap is the next residual issue on the same hygiene effort (the Package case was not touched, and `TokenCanAccessRepo` reduces to `!repo.IsPrivate` without consulting owner visibility), not the same bug. ## Suggested fix (4 spots, 1-line shape each) ```go // routers/api/v1/api.go:292 (checkTokenPublicOnly Package case) - if ctx.Package != nil && ctx.Package.Owner.Visibility.IsPrivate() { + if ctx.Package != nil && !ctx.Package.Owner.Visibility.IsPublic() { // routers/api/packages/api.go:76 (reqPackageAccess middleware) - if ctx.Package != nil && ctx.Package.Owner.Visibility.IsPrivate() { + if ctx.Package != nil && !ctx.Package.Owner.Visibility.IsPublic() { // services/context/api.go (TokenCanAccessRepo helper) - return repo == nil || !ctx.PublicOnly || !repo.IsPrivate + return repo == nil || !ctx.PublicOnly || + (!repo.IsPrivate && repo.Owner != nil && repo.Owner.Visibility.IsPublic()) // services/context/permission.go:32 (CheckTokenScopes) - if publicOnly && repo != nil && repo.IsPrivate { + if publicOnly && repo != nil && + (repo.IsPrivate || (repo.Owner != nil && !repo.Owner.Visibility.IsPublic())) { ``` This aligns the Repository / Package categories with the User / Org / ActivityPub siblings already shipped in PR #37118. ## Reporter JebeenLee

Gitea: Token public-only scope bypassed on Limited-visibility owners (Repository + Package categories) — residual after CVE-2026-25714 / PR #37118 in gitea.dev