AgenticMail: Cross-agent task authorization bypass in AgenticMail API

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

AgenticMail gives AI agents real email addresses and phone numbers. In @agenticmail/api prior to version 0.9.64, a low-privileged authenticated AgenticMail agent can enumerate another agent's pending/claimed tasks by supplying the target agent name to `GET /api/agenticmail/tasks/pending?assignee=<name>`. The returned task objects include the task IDs and payloads. The same task IDs can then be used with the capability-style task mutation endpoints (`/tasks/:id/claim`, `/tasks/:id/result`, `/tasks/:id/complete`, `/tasks/:id/fail`) to claim, complete, or fail tasks assigned to a different agent. Because ordinary authenticated agents can discover agent names through `GET /api/agenticmail/accounts/directory`, the task ID effectively stops being a secret capability. This turns the intended capability model into a cross-agent authorization bypass. Version 0.9.64 contains a fix.

Source published

20 Jul 2026 22:01:43 UTC

Source modified

21 Jul 2026 14:56:03 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

Source terms

CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

AgenticMail gives AI agents real email addresses and phone numbers. In @agenticmail/api prior to version 0.9.64, a low-privileged authenticated AgenticMail agent can enumerate another agent's pending/claimed tasks by supplying the target agent name to `GET /api/agenticmail/tasks/pending?assignee=<name>`. The returned task objects include the task IDs and payloads. The same task IDs can then be used with the capability-style task mutation endpoints (`/tasks/:id/claim`, `/tasks/:id/result`, `/tasks/:id/complete`, `/tasks/:id/fail`) to claim, complete, or fail tasks assigned to a different agent. Because ordinary authenticated agents can discover agent names through `GET /api/agenticmail/accounts/directory`, the task ID effectively stops being a secret capability. This turns the intended capability model into a cross-agent authorization bypass. Version 0.9.64 contains a fix.

Source published

20 Jul 2026 22:17:16 UTC

Source modified

24 Oct 2026 20:10:00 UTC

Observed here

25 Oct 2026 14:19:16 UTC

Source terms

NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

## Summary A low-privileged authenticated AgenticMail agent can enumerate another agent's pending/claimed tasks by supplying the target agent name to `GET /api/agenticmail/tasks/pending?assignee=<name>`. The returned task objects include the task IDs and payloads. The same task IDs can then be used with the capability-style task mutation endpoints (`/tasks/:id/claim`, `/tasks/:id/result`, `/tasks/:id/complete`, `/tasks/:id/fail`) to claim, complete, or fail tasks assigned to a different agent. Because ordinary authenticated agents can discover agent names through `GET /api/agenticmail/accounts/directory`, the task ID effectively stops being a secret capability. This turns the intended capability model into a cross-agent authorization bypass. ## Affected component Package: `@agenticmail/api` Observed version: `0.9.62` Repository: `agenticmail/agenticmail` Relevant code paths: - `packages/api/src/app.ts`: `createAuthMiddleware(...)` is mounted before `createAccountRoutes(...)` and `createTaskRoutes(...)`, so these routes are reachable by any valid bearer token. - `packages/api/src/routes/accounts.ts`: `GET /accounts/directory` is available to any authenticated user and returns agent names. - `packages/api/src/routes/tasks.ts`: `GET /tasks/pending?assignee=name` resolves arbitrary agent names and returns that agent's pending/claimed tasks. - `packages/api/src/routes/tasks.ts`: `/tasks/:id/claim`, `/tasks/:id/result`, `/tasks/:id/complete`, `/tasks/:id/fail`, and `/tasks/:id` do not check whether the authenticated caller is the task assignee, assigner, or otherwise authorized for the task. ## Impact An attacker only needs a valid agent API key. They can: 1. List agent names using `/accounts/directory`. 2. Query another agent's task queue using `/tasks/pending?assignee=<victimName>`. 3. Read sensitive task payloads intended for the victim agent. 4. Use the disclosed task ID to complete/fail/claim the victim's task or submit attacker-controlled results. ## Local reproduction I reproduced this locally with a focused Vitest test mounted directly on `createTaskRoutes`. The test creates two agents, Alice and Bob, and one pending task assigned to Bob. Alice authenticates with her own agent key and performs the following sequence: 1. `GET /api/agenticmail/tasks/pending?assignee=Bob` with `Authorization: Bearer ak_alice`. 2. The response is HTTP 200 and includes Bob's task ID and payload: `task-for-bob`, `{ "task": "secret task intended for Bob" }`. 3. Alice then sends `POST /api/agenticmail/tasks/task-for-bob/complete` with her own bearer token and an attacker-controlled result. 4. The task status becomes `completed` and the stored result is controlled by Alice. The local verification command was: ```bash npm run test --workspace=@agenticmail/api -- task-routes-authz.test.ts ``` Result: ```text PASS src/__tests__/task-routes-authz.test.ts (1 test) ``` ## Expected behavior Task listing and task mutation endpoints should enforce an authorization relationship between the authenticated caller and the task. For example: - `GET /tasks/pending?assignee=<name>` should either be restricted to the current agent, master/admin callers, or an explicit delegated relationship. - `/tasks/:id/claim`, `/tasks/:id/result`, `/tasks/:id/complete`, `/tasks/:id/fail`, and `/tasks/:id` should verify that the caller is the assignee, assigner, master/admin, or otherwise explicitly authorized. - If capability-based task IDs are retained, the API should not expose those IDs to unrelated agents through the assignee-name listing path. ## Credit Please credit the finder as: Yaohui Wang

Source published

18 Jun 2026 17:20:55 UTC

Source modified

20 Jul 2026 22:26:45 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · HIGH