SSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL
cve-program · CVE-2026-58441
PublishedSSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-58168
PublishedSSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-58441
PublishedSSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-xmj7-xj85-hfc3
Published### Summary Gitea's `restore-repo` CLI command restores a repository from a dump directory/archive. When parsing `pull_request.yml` from that dump, the `Head.CloneURL` field is used to add a git remote and fetch from it with no validation, because the safety check that's supposed to guard it (`CheckAndEnsureSafePR`) is called with an empty `commonCloneBaseURL`, which silently disables it. This lets a malicious dump make the Gitea server execute `git fetch` against an attacker-chosen URL (SSRF), or disclose a local git repository via `file://`. This is a different root cause from the recently fixed path-traversal issue in the same command (#38215), which patched `DownloadURL`/`PatchURL` but not `Head.CloneURL`. ### Details `services/migrations/restore.go`'s `GetPullRequests()` unmarshals `pull_request.yml` directly into `base.PullRequest` structs with no validation of `Head.CloneURL`: ```go err = yaml.Unmarshal(bs, &pulls) ... for _, pr := range pulls { if pr.PatchURL != "" { pr.PatchURL = "file://" + util.FilePathJoinAbs(r.baseDir, pr.PatchURL) } CheckAndEnsureSafePR(pr, "", r) // <-- empty baseURL } ``` `CheckAndEnsureSafePR` (`services/migrations/common.go`) is supposed to reject `Head.CloneURL`/`PatchURL` values that don't share a common base URL: ```go func hasBaseURL(toCheck, baseURL string) bool { if len(baseURL) > 0 && baseURL[len(baseURL)-1] != '/' { baseURL += "/" } return strings.HasPrefix(toCheck, baseURL) } func CheckAndEnsureSafePR(pr *base.PullRequest, commonCloneBaseURL string, g base.Downloader) bool { valid := true if pr.PatchURL != "" && !hasBaseURL(pr.PatchURL, commonCloneBaseURL) { pr.PatchURL = "" valid = false } if pr.Head.CloneURL != "" && !hasBaseURL(pr.Head.CloneURL, commonCloneBaseURL) { pr.Head.CloneURL = "" valid = false } return valid } ``` `strings.HasPrefix(anything, "")` is always `true` in Go. Because `restore.go` is the only caller that passes `""` as `commonCloneBaseURL`, this check is a complete no-op on the restore-repo path — `Head.CloneURL` survives unchanged regardless of its value. Every other downloader (`github.go`, `gitlab.go`, `gitea_downloader.go`, `codebase.go`, `codecommit.go`, `onedev.go`) passes a real base URL, so they are not affected. `services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go` then uses the unvalidated value directly: ```go err := g.gitRepo.AddRemote(remote, pr.Head.CloneURL, true) // ... later: fetch from that remote ``` resulting in the server executing `git fetch` against an attacker-controlled URL sourced from the dump file. **RCE via git's `ext::` transport helper was tested and ruled out** — a normal `git` install rejects it by default (`fatal: transport 'ext' not allowed`), independent of Gitea's own configuration. This report is scoped to SSRF and local git-repository disclosure. Confirmed present, byte-for-byte identical, in `v1.26.4` (latest stable tag), `release/v1.27`, and `main`, by direct checkout and diff. ### PoC 1. Create a dump directory following the normal `restore-repo` layout (`repo.yml`, etc.), and add a `pull_request.yml` containing at least one entry with: ```yaml - number: 1 head: cloneURL: "http://<attacker-controlled-or-internal-host>:<port>/ssrf-proof" ref: "main" ``` 2. Run `gitea restore-repo` against that dump directory for any repo owner. 3. Observe on the target host/listener: an actual `git` HTTP discovery request arrives, e.g. `GET /ssrf-proof/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack`, driven entirely by the value from the dump file. Verified the core mechanism (steps 2–3, i.e. the unvalidated `Head.CloneURL` surviving `CheckAndEnsureSafePR("")` and then being used in a real `git remote add` + `git fetch`) with a minimal, standalone Go program built from the **verbatim, unmodified** `hasBaseURL` / `CheckAndEnsureSafePR` function bodies (attached: `gitea_ssrf_poc.go`), run end-to-end against a local HTTP listener. The listener's access log confirms the request actually arrives. ### Impact An attacker who can get an administrator to run `gitea restore-repo` against a malicious dump (the same threat model already accepted for the just-fixed path-traversal issue in this command, #38215) can make the Gitea server issue a `git fetch` against an arbitrary attacker-chosen URL. This allows: - SSRF against internal-only services or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from the Gitea host. - Disclosure of local git repositories reachable via `file://` paths readable by the Gitea process. No public disclosure planned. Happy to provide further detail on request.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GO-2026-6084
PublishedGitea: SSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL in gitea.dev
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
Exploitation and risk
Source statusCISA KEV lists vulnerabilities known to be exploited. FIRST EPSS estimates the likelihood of exploitation in the next 30 days. An unavailable score does not mean zero risk.
Which CVEs have scores here?
This view includes predictions for CVE identifiers explicitly listed in public NuGet advisories. Microsoft release pages have their own prediction coverage. Check source status for the scope and latest checks.
No exploitation or prediction data is available here for these CVEs. This does not mean they are safe or unlikely to be exploited.
cve-program · CVE-2026-58441
PublishedSSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL
SSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL
- Source published
- 13 Aug 2026 16:44:54 UTC
- Source modified
- 14 Aug 2026 19:57:53 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
euvd · EUVD-2026-58168
PublishedSSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL
SSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 13, 2026, 4:44:54 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 14, 2026, 7:57:53 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2026-2304: Gitea: Mehrere Schwachstellen
CVE-2026-58417 · CVE-2026-58420 · CVE-2026-58425 · CVE-2026-58427 · CVE-2026-58428 · CVE-2026-58429 · CVE-2026-58431 · CVE-2026-58432 · CVE-2026-58433 · CVE-2026-58434 · CVE-2026-58435 · CVE-2026-58436 · CVE-2026-58437 · CVE-2026-58438 · CVE-2026-58439 · CVE-2026-58440 · CVE-2026-58441 · CVE-2026-58442 · CVE-2026-58443 · CVE-2026-58444 · CVE-2026-58445 · CVE-2026-58507 · CVE-2026-58508 · CVE-2026-58510 · CVE-2026-58511 · CVE-2026-59763 · CVE-2026-59765 · CVE-2026-59766 · CVE-2026-23603 · CVE-2026-42931 · CVE-2026-50105 · CVE-2026-54481 · CVE-2026-55982 · CVE-2026-55984 · CVE-2026-55986 · CVE-2026-55987 · CVE-2026-56443 · CVE-2026-56654 · CVE-2026-56657 · CVE-2026-56750 · CVE-2026-56755 · CVE-2026-57886 · CVE-2026-57894 · CVE-2026-57897 · CVE-2026-58314 · CVE-2026-58416
- Source published
- Aug 13, 2026, 4:44:54 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Aug 14, 2026, 7:57:53 PM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 19 Nov 2026 17:49:32 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 6.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
nvd · CVE-2026-58441
PublishedSSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL
SSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-918
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-13T17:17:28.123
lastModified: 2026-08-26T16:53:48.300
- Source published
- 13 Aug 2026 17:17:28 UTC
- Source modified
- 26 Aug 2026 16:53:48 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 14:19:16 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 3.1 · 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 · Secondary · 6.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
osv · GHSA-xmj7-xj85-hfc3
PublishedGitea: SSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL
### Summary Gitea's `restore-repo` CLI command restores a repository from a dump directory/archive. When parsing `pull_request.yml` from that dump, the `Head.CloneURL` field is used to add a git remote and fetch from it with no validation, because the safety check that's supposed to guard it (`CheckAndEnsureSafePR`) is called with an empty `commonCloneBaseURL`, which silently disables it. This lets a malicious dump make the Gitea server execute `git fetch` against an attacker-chosen URL (SSRF), or disclose a local git repository via `file://`. This is a different root cause from the recently fixed path-traversal issue in the same command (#38215), which patched `DownloadURL`/`PatchURL` but not `Head.CloneURL`. ### Details `services/migrations/restore.go`'s `GetPullRequests()` unmarshals `pull_request.yml` directly into `base.PullRequest` structs with no validation of `Head.CloneURL`: ```go err = yaml.Unmarshal(bs, &pulls) ... for _, pr := range pulls { if pr.PatchURL != "" { pr.PatchURL = "file://" + util.FilePathJoinAbs(r.baseDir, pr.PatchURL) } CheckAndEnsureSafePR(pr, "", r) // <-- empty baseURL } ``` `CheckAndEnsureSafePR` (`services/migrations/common.go`) is supposed to reject `Head.CloneURL`/`PatchURL` values that don't share a common base URL: ```go func hasBaseURL(toCheck, baseURL string) bool { if len(baseURL) > 0 && baseURL[len(baseURL)-1] != '/' { baseURL += "/" } return strings.HasPrefix(toCheck, baseURL) } func CheckAndEnsureSafePR(pr *base.PullRequest, commonCloneBaseURL string, g base.Downloader) bool { valid := true if pr.PatchURL != "" && !hasBaseURL(pr.PatchURL, commonCloneBaseURL) { pr.PatchURL = "" valid = false } if pr.Head.CloneURL != "" && !hasBaseURL(pr.Head.CloneURL, commonCloneBaseURL) { pr.Head.CloneURL = "" valid = false } return valid } ``` `strings.HasPrefix(anything, "")` is always `true` in Go. Because `restore.go` is the only caller that passes `""` as `commonCloneBaseURL`, this check is a complete no-op on the restore-repo path — `Head.CloneURL` survives unchanged regardless of its value. Every other downloader (`github.go`, `gitlab.go`, `gitea_downloader.go`, `codebase.go`, `codecommit.go`, `onedev.go`) passes a real base URL, so they are not affected. `services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go` then uses the unvalidated value directly: ```go err := g.gitRepo.AddRemote(remote, pr.Head.CloneURL, true) // ... later: fetch from that remote ``` resulting in the server executing `git fetch` against an attacker-controlled URL sourced from the dump file. **RCE via git's `ext::` transport helper was tested and ruled out** — a normal `git` install rejects it by default (`fatal: transport 'ext' not allowed`), independent of Gitea's own configuration. This report is scoped to SSRF and local git-repository disclosure. Confirmed present, byte-for-byte identical, in `v1.26.4` (latest stable tag), `release/v1.27`, and `main`, by direct checkout and diff. ### PoC 1. Create a dump directory following the normal `restore-repo` layout (`repo.yml`, etc.), and add a `pull_request.yml` containing at least one entry with: ```yaml - number: 1 head: cloneURL: "http://<attacker-controlled-or-internal-host>:<port>/ssrf-proof" ref: "main" ``` 2. Run `gitea restore-repo` against that dump directory for any repo owner. 3. Observe on the target host/listener: an actual `git` HTTP discovery request arrives, e.g. `GET /ssrf-proof/info/refs?service=git-upload-pack`, driven entirely by the value from the dump file. Verified the core mechanism (steps 2–3, i.e. the unvalidated `Head.CloneURL` surviving `CheckAndEnsureSafePR("")` and then being used in a real `git remote add` + `git fetch`) with a minimal, standalone Go program built from the **verbatim, unmodified** `hasBaseURL` / `CheckAndEnsureSafePR` function bodies (attached: `gitea_ssrf_poc.go`), run end-to-end against a local HTTP listener. The listener's access log confirms the request actually arrives. ### Impact An attacker who can get an administrator to run `gitea restore-repo` against a malicious dump (the same threat model already accepted for the just-fixed path-traversal issue in this command, #38215) can make the Gitea server issue a `git fetch` against an arbitrary attacker-chosen URL. This allows: - SSRF against internal-only services or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from the Gitea host. - Disclosure of local git repositories reachable via `file://` paths readable by the Gitea process. No public disclosure planned. Happy to provide further detail on request.
- Source published
- 21 Jul 2026 20:37:29 UTC
- Source modified
- 27 Jul 2026 17:11:27 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE
osv · GO-2026-6084
PublishedGitea: SSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL in gitea.dev
Gitea: SSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL in gitea.dev
- Source published
- 27 Jul 2026 15:32:45 UTC
- Source modified
- 27 Jul 2026 17:00:26 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
- Source terms
- OSV · upstream source license applies
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.