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Cross-repository label-ID enumeration oracle via unscoped DeleteIssueLabel API

cve-program · severity unknownEUVD CVSS 3.1 2.7 CVSS 3.1 · 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 · Secondary 2.7 LOWCVSS_V3 Publisher rating LOWFixed by code.gitea.io/gitea 1.27.0osv · severity unknownFixed by gitea.dev 1.27.0KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-58445

Published

Cross-repository label-ID enumeration oracle via unscoped DeleteIssueLabel API

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euvd · EUVD-2026-58172

Published

Cross-repository label-ID enumeration oracle via unscoped DeleteIssueLabel API

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-58445

Published

Cross-repository label-ID enumeration oracle via unscoped DeleteIssueLabel API

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-pgqf-926r-548m

Published

## Summary The API endpoint `DELETE /repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues/{index}/labels/{id}` loads the label by ID with a **global, unscoped** lookup and never verifies the label belongs to the URL's repository (or its owning organization). Because the response status differs by whether the label ID exists **anywhere on the instance** (204) versus not (422), an authenticated user can use the endpoint as a **cross-repository label-ID existence / enumeration oracle**, including for labels in repositories and organizations they cannot access. ## Severity - The leaked information is minimal (existence/count of label IDs instance-wide); **no label name, color, or owning repository is disclosed, and no cross-repository write occurs.** ## Affected / patched versions - **Affected:** through **1.26.3** (latest at time of report). - **Patched:** none yet. ## Details `DeleteIssueLabel` resolves the label with a global loader and never checks its scope: ```go // routers/api/v1/repo/issue_label.go (DeleteIssueLabel) label, err := issues_model.GetLabelByID(ctx, ctx.PathParamInt64("id")) // global, unscoped ``` `GetLabelByID` (`models/issues/label.go`) is `e.ID(labelID).Get(l)` with **no** `repo_id` / `org_id` filter. The handler never verifies `label.RepoID == ctx.Repo.Repository.ID` (nor the org-label equivalent), and the downstream `issue_service.RemoveLabel` (`services/issue/label.go`) only re-checks the doer's write permission on the **issue's own** repository — never that the label belongs to it. Every sibling label handler is correctly scoped — `GetLabel` / `EditLabel` / `DeleteLabel` (repo and org) use `GetLabelInRepoByID` / `GetLabelInOrgByID` and return 404 for a foreign ID. `DeleteIssueLabel` is the only outlier. **Why it is only an oracle:** `deleteIssueLabel` (`models/issues/issue_label.go`) deletes the `issue_label` row keyed by `(issue.ID, label.ID)`. For a foreign label, no such row exists → the function returns early **before** any mutation or comment creation. So there is no cross-repo write and no leak of the label's name. But the HTTP status differs: - label ID exists anywhere on the instance (incl. private repos/orgs) → **204 No Content** - label ID does not exist → **422** (`ErrLabelNotExist`) Label IDs are sequential auto-increment, so this enumerates the instance-wide label population and probes existence of specific IDs across tenant boundaries. ## Proof of Concept Verified end-to-end on a build of the `v1.26.3` tag. - `alice` (private repo `alice/secret`) creates a label → internal id **1**. - Attacker `bob` (separate user; public repo `bob/pub` with issue #1; **no access** to `alice/secret`) holds a token with `write:issue` on his own repo. ```text bob DELETE /api/v1/repos/bob/pub/issues/1/labels/1 -> HTTP 204 (alice's PRIVATE label id exists) bob DELETE /api/v1/repos/bob/pub/issues/1/labels/99999999 -> HTTP 422 (no such label) ``` Differing only by the label ID: `204` vs `422` distinguishes "label ID exists" from "does not exist." `bob` has zero rights to `alice/secret` but can still learn label id 1 exists. (Alice's label is untouched — no write.) Reproduction steps: 1. Create two users `alice`, `bob`. As `alice`, create a private repo and a label on it (note the label `id` from the API response). 2. As `bob`, create any repo with an issue, and a token with `write:issue`. 3. `curl -u bob:$T -X DELETE https://<gitea>/api/v1/repos/bob/pub/issues/1/labels/<alice_label_id>` → **204**. 4. `curl -u bob:$T -X DELETE https://<gitea>/api/v1/repos/bob/pub/issues/1/labels/99999999` → **422**. 5. The differing status across an ID `bob` cannot otherwise see is the oracle. ## Impact Cross-tenant authorization-key bypass producing a label-ID existence/enumeration oracle: an authenticated user can determine whether arbitrary label IDs (including in private repositories and organizations they cannot access) exist, and enumerate the instance-wide label population. ## Remediation Scope the loader like every sibling handler, returning 404 for a label that is not in the URL repository (or its owning organization), so the status no longer distinguishes existence: ```go // routers/api/v1/repo/issue_label.go — in DeleteIssueLabel, after loading the label if label.RepoID != ctx.Repo.Repository.ID && label.OrgID != ctx.Repo.Repository.OwnerID { ctx.APIErrorNotFound() return } ``` (Equivalently, resolve via `GetLabelInRepoByID` and, for org repositories, also accept the repo owner's org labels — mirroring the scoping in `GetLabel`/`EditLabel`/`DeleteLabel`.)

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osv · GO-2026-6067

Published

Gitea: Cross-repository label-ID enumeration oracle via unscoped DeleteIssueLabel API in gitea.dev

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Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-58445

Published

Gitea Open Source Git Server

Vendor product

Publisher's version information

Shown as published. These rules are not interpreted as NuGet package version ranges.

{
                    "vendor": "Gitea",
                    "product": "Gitea Open Source Git Server",
                    "versions": [
                        {
                            "version": "0",
                            "lessThanOrEqual": "1.26.4",
                            "status": "affected",
                            "versionType": "semver"
                        }
                    ],
                    "defaultStatus": "unaffected"
                }

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euvd · EUVD-2026-58172

Published

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Aug 13, 2026, 4:44:56 PM

dateUpdated: Aug 14, 2026, 7:08:41 PM

1 related source bulletins · separate from aliases

WID-SEC-W-2026-2304: Gitea: Mehrere Schwachstellen

CVE-2026-58417 · CVE-2026-58420 · CVE-2026-58425 · CVE-2026-58427 · CVE-2026-58428 · CVE-2026-58429 · CVE-2026-58431 · CVE-2026-58432 · CVE-2026-58433 · CVE-2026-58434 · CVE-2026-58435 · CVE-2026-58436 · CVE-2026-58437 · CVE-2026-58438 · CVE-2026-58439 · CVE-2026-58440 · CVE-2026-58441 · CVE-2026-58442 · CVE-2026-58443 · CVE-2026-58444 · CVE-2026-58445 · CVE-2026-58507 · CVE-2026-58508 · CVE-2026-58510 · CVE-2026-58511 · CVE-2026-59763 · CVE-2026-59765 · CVE-2026-59766 · CVE-2026-23603 · CVE-2026-42931 · CVE-2026-50105 · CVE-2026-54481 · CVE-2026-55982 · CVE-2026-55984 · CVE-2026-55986 · CVE-2026-55987 · CVE-2026-56443 · CVE-2026-56654 · CVE-2026-56657 · CVE-2026-56750 · CVE-2026-56755 · CVE-2026-57886 · CVE-2026-57894 · CVE-2026-57897 · CVE-2026-58314 · CVE-2026-58416

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

nvd · CVE-2026-58445

Published

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-203 · CWE-639

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-08-13T17:17:28.543

lastModified: 2026-08-26T16:53:48.300

No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

osv · GHSA-pgqf-926r-548m

Published

code.gitea.io/gitea

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 1.27.0

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osv · GO-2026-6067

Published

gitea.dev

Go

SEMVER · introduced 0 → fixed 1.27.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 20 Nov 21:09 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 270 fully read · documentation 469/469 current