Tandoor Recipes: Blind SSRF via AI provider URL (api_base)
Collected exploitation and prediction evidence
Risk source coverageCISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.
No collected risk observation for these identifiers. This does not establish absence of exploitation or a zero probability.
cve-program · CVE-2026-59970
PublishedTandoor Recipes is an application for managing recipes, planning meals, and building shopping lists. Prior to 2.6.10, passes an administrator-controlled AI provider URL directly to LiteLLM without applying the server's outbound-request SSRF checks when an authenticated user creates a Space, configures an AI provider with a URL targeting an internal address, and invokes an AI action. In cookbook/views/api.py, the affected AI actions call completion through TARGET/api/ai-import/ and api/ai-step-sort/ while bypassing safe_request. The attack works because the server connects to the supplied provider URL from each AI action and exposes connection success, refusal, or timeout as a blind network-reachability oracle. This can reach internal services, other hosts on the server network, and cloud metadata endpoints and map reachable internal hosts and ports. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.10.
- Source published
- 16 Oct 2026 19:21:07 UTC
- Source modified
- 21 Oct 2026 21:26:53 UTC
- Observed here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
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CVSS 3.1 · 7.7 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N