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The ixo Blockchain is a Layer 1 blockchain that runs on both Testnet and Mainnet. Prior to version 8.0.0, the x/bonds module moved funds from an address that was resolved from a DID verification method, without verifying that the resolved a…

Exact source revision recorded 25 Oct 2026 14:19:22 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.

nvd · CVE-2026-61604

Published

The ixo Blockchain is a Layer 1 blockchain that runs on both Testnet and Mainnet. Prior to version 8.0.0, the x/bonds module moved funds from an address that was resolved from a DID verification method, without verifying that the resolved address belonged to the transaction signer. Affected handlers included MsgMakeOutcomePayment, MsgBuy, MsgSell, MsgSwap, and MsgWithdrawShare, as well as the batch order processor. Because any account may list an arbitrary blockchainAccountID as a verification method on a DID it controls (without the consent of that address's owner), an attacker could register victims' addresses as verification methods on their own DID and then move the victims' balances into a bond the attacker controlled — later withdrawing and bridging the proceeds off-chain. This was exploited on ixo mainnet (ixo-5) on 2026-06-20. The attack required no victim keys, signatures, or system compromise — any account holding a balance in a token a bond could use was at risk. This was fixed in v8.0.0, delivered via the on-chain v8 software-upgrade. The x/bonds module is disabled: every bonds message is rejected on all routes (top-level, authz, CosmWasm, and ICA), and the bonds batch EndBlocker is a no-op so no further reserve movements can occur. All node operators and validators must upgrade to v8.0.0. The flaw is in chain state-machine logic and can only be remediated by running the patched binary. There is no application-level workaround. The vulnerability is in consensus logic; remediation requires the network to run the patched (v8.0.0) binary. The bonds module remains disabled in v8.0.0 and will only be re-enabled in a future release once the signer-authorization model has been corrected.

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-285 · CWE-862

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-09-24T18:17:15.707

lastModified: 2026-09-30T17:32:07.107

Source published
24 Sep 2026 18:17:15 UTC
Source modified
30 Sep 2026 17:32:07 UTC
Observed here
25 Oct 2026 14:19:22 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 9.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

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Sources read 12 Nov 06:57 UTC · 266 of 275 readable · 264 fully read · documentation 469/469 current