@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp has path traversal in vault.batch tool that allows arbitrary file write outside intended vault directory

NotebookLM MCP is an MCP server and HTTP service for interacting with Google NotebookLM and exporting generated content to local vault directories. Versions 1.6.0 through 2.0.2 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the `POST /batch-to-vault` endpoint, also exposed through the `batch_to_vault` MCP tool beginning in version 1.7.0, because attacker-controlled `vault_dir` and `slug_prefix` values can cause Markdown and JSON files to be written outside the intended vault directory to any location writable by the server process. Version 2.0.3 sanitizes `slug_prefix` and supports vault containment when `NOTEBOOKLM_VAULT_ROOT` is configured; containment is not enabled if that variable is unset. Users unable to upgrade should run the server as a dedicated unprivileged account restricted to the intended vault, keep the HTTP endpoint limited to localhost, and validate `vault_dir` values supplied by LLMs processing untrusted content.

Source published

21 Sep 2026 21:00:58 UTC

Source modified

22 Sep 2026 15:38:52 UTC

Observed here

23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC

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CVSS 4.0 · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N