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nebula-mesh: Certificate revocation is never enforced at the mesh

CVSS 3.1 8.1 HIGHEUVD CVSS 3.1 8.1 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 8.1 HIGHCVSS_V3 Publisher rating HIGHFixed by github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh 0.7.1osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh 0.7.1KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-61699

Published

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.7.1, revocation is the only in-band mechanism that isolates a compromised/offboarded host from a Nebula mesh. Because the blocklist never reaches any peer's config.yml, a Blocked host retains full overlay reachability to every peer under its CA (and internal services on the mesh) for up to 30d (agent) / 365d (mobile). An attacker who exfiltrates host.key+host.crt can run stock slackhq/nebula directly, ignore the agent's 403/410 poll responses, and stay connected after the operator revokes the host. Operator-visible state (UI shows blocked, audit log records it) is misleading. This issue has been patched in version 0.7.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-71720

Published

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.7.1, revocation is the only in-band mechanism that isolates a compromised/offboarded host from a Nebula mesh. Because the blocklist never reaches any peer's config.yml, a Blocked host retains full overlay reachability to every peer under its CA (and internal services on the mesh) for up to 30d (agent) / 365d (mobile). An attacker who exfiltrates host.key+host.crt can run stock slackhq/nebula directly, ignore the agent's 403/410 poll responses, and stay connected after the operator revokes the host. Operator-visible state (UI shows blocked, audit log records it) is misleading. This issue has been patched in version 0.7.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-61699

Published

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.7.1, revocation is the only in-band mechanism that isolates a compromised/offboarded host from a Nebula mesh. Because the blocklist never reaches any peer's config.yml, a Blocked host retains full overlay reachability to every peer under its CA (and internal services on the mesh) for up to 30d (agent) / 365d (mobile). An attacker who exfiltrates host.key+host.crt can run stock slackhq/nebula directly, ignore the agent's 403/410 poll responses, and stay connected after the operator revokes the host. Operator-visible state (UI shows blocked, audit log records it) is misleading. This issue has been patched in version 0.7.1.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-cm26-5974-52h8

Published

### Summary nebula-mesh revokes a host by adding its certificate fingerprint to a per-CA blocklist and shipping that list to every other agent on each poll. Slack's Nebula enforces certificate revocation ONLY through the `pki.blocklist` list in `config.yml` (no CRL/OCSP). The project's own code states this: `internal/pki/durations.go:15` — "Revocation via the blocklist remains the immediate security control." The server side is fully implemented (computes per-CA blocklist via `GetBlocklistForCA`, returns it in the agent-updates response, sets `has_updates=true` when non-empty). The agent side was never implemented: 1. The agent decodes the `blocklist` JSON field into `UpdatesResponse.Blocklist` (`internal/agent/poller.go:33`) and then DISCARDS it — `poll()` applies `CertificatePEM`, `CACertPEM`, `ConfigYAML`, but never references `updates.Blocklist` (`internal/agent/poller.go:300-339`). 2. The config generator has NO field to emit `pki.blocklist` — `pkiSection` is only `ca`/`cert`/`key` (`internal/configgen/marshal.go:42-46`) and `GeneratorInput` carries no blocklist (`internal/configgen/generator.go:23-52`). So even the server-rendered `config.yml` shipped via `ConfigYAML` cannot carry it. Result: a blocked/offboarded/compromised host's certificate is never rejected by its peers. Its handshakes keep succeeding for the full remaining cert lifetime — up to 30 days for agent hosts (`DefaultAgentCertDuration`) and 365 days for mobile hosts (`DefaultMobileCertDuration`). Blocking a host in the UI/API has no effect on the data plane. ### Affected components - Agent drops the blocklist: `internal/agent/poller.go:33` (decode target), `internal/agent/poller.go:300-339` (poll() applies cert/CA/config, never the blocklist). - Generator cannot emit it: `internal/configgen/marshal.go:42-46` (`pkiSection{CA,Cert,Key}`), `internal/configgen/generator.go:23-52` (`GeneratorInput` has no blocklist), `internal/api/enroll.go:255-330` (`renderHostConfig`, source of shipped ConfigYAML). - Server correctly produces/ships it (proves intent): `internal/store/sqlite.go:2034` (`GetBlocklistForCA`), `internal/api/updates.go:182-191` (`resp.Blocklist`), `internal/api/updates.go:277` (`has_updates` set on blocklist change). - Dead helper: `internal/pki/blocklist.go` (`Blocklist` type) is never used in non-test code — no server-side enforcement either. ### Reachability (hop by hop) 1. Operator clicks Block on host B (or B is compromised/offboarded). B's fingerprint enters the per-CA `blocklist` table. 2. Every other host A under the same CA polls `GET /api/v1/agent/updates`; server returns `blocklist: [<B-fp>, ...]` and `has_updates=true`. 3. A's agent decodes `Blocklist` then discards it; `poll()` has no blocklist branch. 4. Even on a config re-render, `configgen.Generate` emits `pki: {ca,cert,key}` with no `blocklist` key (proven by PoC). 5. A's Nebula daemon has an empty blocklist and accepts handshakes from B's still-valid cert. B keeps full mesh access. ### Impact Revocation is the only in-band mechanism that isolates a compromised/offboarded host from a Nebula mesh. Because the blocklist never reaches any peer's config.yml, a Blocked host retains full overlay reachability to every peer under its CA (and internal services on the mesh) for up to 30d (agent) / 365d (mobile). An attacker who exfiltrates `host.key`+`host.crt` can run stock slackhq/nebula directly, ignore the agent's 403/410 poll responses, and stay connected after the operator revokes the host. Operator-visible state (UI shows blocked, audit log records it) is misleading. ### Proof of Concept (benign) `internal/configgen/blocklist_poc_test.go` renders a fully-populated host config and asserts the output contains the `pki` section but NO `blocklist` key: ``` $ go test ./internal/configgen/ -run TestPoC_NMESH001 -v === RUN TestPoC_NMESH001_GeneratedConfigOmitsBlocklist CONFIRMED: generated config has a pki section but no blocklist key pki: ca: /etc/nebula/ca.crt cert: /etc/nebula/host.crt key: /etc/nebula/host.key ... --- PASS ``` The agent half is verifiable by inspection: `poll()` has branches for CertificatePEM/CACertPEM/ConfigYAML/RekeyRequired but none for Blocklist. ### Distinctness NOT a duplicate of GHSA-339v / CVE-2026-53602 (revocation durability = a blocked host getting a NEW cert re-issued; its fix `CheckIssuanceAllowed` is present and orthogonal). This bug is that the EXISTING cert is never rejected at peers — the distribution/enforcement layer. Checked against all 17 known advisories; none cover blocklist application in the agent or `pki.blocklist` generation. ### Remediation 1. Add `Blocklist []safeString` to `pkiSection` (yaml `blocklist,omitempty`) and `GeneratorInput`; consider also `pki.disconnect_invalid: true`. 2. Have the agent apply `updates.Blocklist` by re-rendering/rewriting `config.yml` + SIGHUP (same path as `ConfigYAML`). Simplest: fold the blocklist into the server-rendered `ConfigYAML` so it flows through the existing write path. 3. Add a regression test asserting a non-empty server blocklist yields a `pki.blocklist` entry in the agent's written config.yml.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-5986

Published

nebula-mesh: Certificate revocation is never enforced at the mesh in github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

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cve-program · CVE-2026-61699

Published

nebula-mesh: Certificate revocation is never enforced at the mesh

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.7.1, revocation is the only in-band mechanism that isolates a compromised/offboarded host from a Nebula mesh. Because the blocklist never reaches any peer's config.yml, a Blocked host retains full overlay reachability to every peer under its CA (and internal services on the mesh) for up to 30d (agent) / 365d (mobile). An attacker who exfiltrates host.key+host.crt can run stock slackhq/nebula directly, ignore the agent's 403/410 poll responses, and stay connected after the operator revokes the host. Operator-visible state (UI shows blocked, audit log records it) is misleading. This issue has been patched in version 0.7.1.

Source published
4 Sep 2026 19:43:28 UTC
Source modified
8 Sep 2026 12:59:24 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 8.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-71720

Published

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.7.1, revocation is the only in-band mechanism that isolates a compromised/offboarded host from a Nebula mesh. Because the blocklist never reaches any p…

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.7.1, revocation is the only in-band mechanism that isolates a compromised/offboarded host from a Nebula mesh. Because the blocklist never reaches any peer's config.yml, a Blocked host retains full overlay reachability to every peer under its CA (and internal services on the mesh) for up to 30d (agent) / 365d (mobile). An attacker who exfiltrates host.key+host.crt can run stock slackhq/nebula directly, ignore the agent's 403/410 poll responses, and stay connected after the operator revokes the host. Operator-visible state (UI shows blocked, audit log records it) is misleading. This issue has been patched in version 0.7.1.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

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datePublished: Sep 4, 2026, 7:43:28 PM

dateUpdated: Sep 8, 2026, 12:59:24 PM

Source published
Sep 4, 2026, 7:43:28 PM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Sep 8, 2026, 12:59:24 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
18 Nov 2026 11:24:29 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 8.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

nvd · CVE-2026-61699

Published

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.7.1, revocation is the only in-band mechanism that isolates a compromised/offboarded host from a Nebula mesh. Because the blocklist never reaches any p…

nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.7.1, revocation is the only in-band mechanism that isolates a compromised/offboarded host from a Nebula mesh. Because the blocklist never reaches any peer's config.yml, a Blocked host retains full overlay reachability to every peer under its CA (and internal services on the mesh) for up to 30d (agent) / 365d (mobile). An attacker who exfiltrates host.key+host.crt can run stock slackhq/nebula directly, ignore the agent's 403/410 poll responses, and stay connected after the operator revokes the host. Operator-visible state (UI shows blocked, audit log records it) is misleading. This issue has been patched in version 0.7.1.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-299 · CWE-672

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-09-04T20:17:24.347

lastModified: 2026-09-08T21:05:26.920

Source published
4 Sep 2026 20:17:24 UTC
Source modified
8 Sep 2026 21:05:26 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 14:19:22 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 8.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

osv · GHSA-cm26-5974-52h8

Published

nebula-mesh: Certificate revocation is never enforced at the mesh

### Summary nebula-mesh revokes a host by adding its certificate fingerprint to a per-CA blocklist and shipping that list to every other agent on each poll. Slack's Nebula enforces certificate revocation ONLY through the `pki.blocklist` list in `config.yml` (no CRL/OCSP). The project's own code states this: `internal/pki/durations.go:15` — "Revocation via the blocklist remains the immediate security control." The server side is fully implemented (computes per-CA blocklist via `GetBlocklistForCA`, returns it in the agent-updates response, sets `has_updates=true` when non-empty). The agent side was never implemented: 1. The agent decodes the `blocklist` JSON field into `UpdatesResponse.Blocklist` (`internal/agent/poller.go:33`) and then DISCARDS it — `poll()` applies `CertificatePEM`, `CACertPEM`, `ConfigYAML`, but never references `updates.Blocklist` (`internal/agent/poller.go:300-339`). 2. The config generator has NO field to emit `pki.blocklist` — `pkiSection` is only `ca`/`cert`/`key` (`internal/configgen/marshal.go:42-46`) and `GeneratorInput` carries no blocklist (`internal/configgen/generator.go:23-52`). So even the server-rendered `config.yml` shipped via `ConfigYAML` cannot carry it. Result: a blocked/offboarded/compromised host's certificate is never rejected by its peers. Its handshakes keep succeeding for the full remaining cert lifetime — up to 30 days for agent hosts (`DefaultAgentCertDuration`) and 365 days for mobile hosts (`DefaultMobileCertDuration`). Blocking a host in the UI/API has no effect on the data plane. ### Affected components - Agent drops the blocklist: `internal/agent/poller.go:33` (decode target), `internal/agent/poller.go:300-339` (poll() applies cert/CA/config, never the blocklist). - Generator cannot emit it: `internal/configgen/marshal.go:42-46` (`pkiSection{CA,Cert,Key}`), `internal/configgen/generator.go:23-52` (`GeneratorInput` has no blocklist), `internal/api/enroll.go:255-330` (`renderHostConfig`, source of shipped ConfigYAML). - Server correctly produces/ships it (proves intent): `internal/store/sqlite.go:2034` (`GetBlocklistForCA`), `internal/api/updates.go:182-191` (`resp.Blocklist`), `internal/api/updates.go:277` (`has_updates` set on blocklist change). - Dead helper: `internal/pki/blocklist.go` (`Blocklist` type) is never used in non-test code — no server-side enforcement either. ### Reachability (hop by hop) 1. Operator clicks Block on host B (or B is compromised/offboarded). B's fingerprint enters the per-CA `blocklist` table. 2. Every other host A under the same CA polls `GET /api/v1/agent/updates`; server returns `blocklist: [<B-fp>, ...]` and `has_updates=true`. 3. A's agent decodes `Blocklist` then discards it; `poll()` has no blocklist branch. 4. Even on a config re-render, `configgen.Generate` emits `pki: {ca,cert,key}` with no `blocklist` key (proven by PoC). 5. A's Nebula daemon has an empty blocklist and accepts handshakes from B's still-valid cert. B keeps full mesh access. ### Impact Revocation is the only in-band mechanism that isolates a compromised/offboarded host from a Nebula mesh. Because the blocklist never reaches any peer's config.yml, a Blocked host retains full overlay reachability to every peer under its CA (and internal services on the mesh) for up to 30d (agent) / 365d (mobile). An attacker who exfiltrates `host.key`+`host.crt` can run stock slackhq/nebula directly, ignore the agent's 403/410 poll responses, and stay connected after the operator revokes the host. Operator-visible state (UI shows blocked, audit log records it) is misleading. ### Proof of Concept (benign) `internal/configgen/blocklist_poc_test.go` renders a fully-populated host config and asserts the output contains the `pki` section but NO `blocklist` key: ``` $ go test ./internal/configgen/ -run TestPoC_NMESH001 -v === RUN TestPoC_NMESH001_GeneratedConfigOmitsBlocklist CONFIRMED: generated config has a pki section but no blocklist key pki: ca: /etc/nebula/ca.crt cert: /etc/nebula/host.crt key: /etc/nebula/host.key ... --- PASS ``` The agent half is verifiable by inspection: `poll()` has branches for CertificatePEM/CACertPEM/ConfigYAML/RekeyRequired but none for Blocklist. ### Distinctness NOT a duplicate of GHSA-339v / CVE-2026-53602 (revocation durability = a blocked host getting a NEW cert re-issued; its fix `CheckIssuanceAllowed` is present and orthogonal). This bug is that the EXISTING cert is never rejected at peers — the distribution/enforcement layer. Checked against all 17 known advisories; none cover blocklist application in the agent or `pki.blocklist` generation. ### Remediation 1. Add `Blocklist []safeString` to `pkiSection` (yaml `blocklist,omitempty`) and `GeneratorInput`; consider also `pki.disconnect_invalid: true`. 2. Have the agent apply `updates.Blocklist` by re-rendering/rewriting `config.yml` + SIGHUP (same path as `ConfigYAML`). Simplest: fold the blocklist into the server-rendered `ConfigYAML` so it flows through the existing write path. 3. Add a regression test asserting a non-empty server blocklist yields a `pki.blocklist` entry in the agent's written config.yml.

Source published
14 Jul 2026 20:28:18 UTC
Source modified
21 Jul 2026 19:19:17 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Publisher rating · HIGH

osv · GO-2026-5986

Published

nebula-mesh: Certificate revocation is never enforced at the mesh in github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh

nebula-mesh: Certificate revocation is never enforced at the mesh in github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh

Source published
17 Jul 2026 19:42:05 UTC
Source modified
21 Jul 2026 19:15:34 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

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