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CVE-2026-62374

SD JWT JS is a JavaScript implementation of the Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT) specification. In version…

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 7.1 HIGHCheck source for fixed versionsKEV status unknown
Original advisory

Historical advisory recorded 2 Nov 2026 18:59:24 UTC. Read the latest advisory.

nvd · CVE-2026-62374

Published

SD JWT JS is a JavaScript implementation of the Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT) specification. In version 0.19.0 and earlier, `@sd-jwt/decode`, also used by `@sd-jwt/core`, silently drops a tampered Disclosure whose digest no longer matches the Issuer-signed `_sd` array and returns a reduced claim set, reporting success while the Issuer signature remains valid. Both a tampered Disclosure that remains valid JSON and a Disclosure containing invalid UTF-8 bytes reach this silent-drop behavior. In the latter case, the `TextDecoder / Buffer` decoding path substitutes U+FFFD replacement characters, recovering syntactically valid disclosure data instead of rejecting the malformed input. This violates RFC 9901 section 7.1 step 5, which requires rejection of unreferenced Disclosures, and section 7.1 step 3 / section 4.2.1, which require rejection of invalid Disclosures. A malicious holder can exploit this omission primitive, including through `SDJwtInstance.verify()` when key binding is required. An on-path attacker can also tamper with a Disclosure when the relying party does not enforce key binding; enforced key binding rejects on-path tampering because it invalidates the KB-JWT `sd_hash` binding. If the relying party defaults to allowing access when a constraining age, role, or restriction claim is absent, the silent claim reduction can change an authorization decision without an error. This issue is fixed in `@sd-jwt/core` version 0.20.0; no patched version of the standalone `@sd-jwt/decode` package is identified.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

nvd · CVE-2026-62374

Published

SD JWT JS is a JavaScript implementation of the Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT) specification. In version 0.19.0 and earlier, `@sd-jwt/decode`, also used by `@sd-jwt/core`, silently drops a tampered Disclosure whose digest no longer match…

SD JWT JS is a JavaScript implementation of the Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT) specification. In version 0.19.0 and earlier, `@sd-jwt/decode`, also used by `@sd-jwt/core`, silently drops a tampered Disclosure whose digest no longer matches the Issuer-signed `_sd` array and returns a reduced claim set, reporting success while the Issuer signature remains valid. Both a tampered Disclosure that remains valid JSON and a Disclosure containing invalid UTF-8 bytes reach this silent-drop behavior. In the latter case, the `TextDecoder / Buffer` decoding path substitutes U+FFFD replacement characters, recovering syntactically valid disclosure data instead of rejecting the malformed input. This violates RFC 9901 section 7.1 step 5, which requires rejection of unreferenced Disclosures, and section 7.1 step 3 / section 4.2.1, which require rejection of invalid Disclosures. A malicious holder can exploit this omission primitive, including through `SDJwtInstance.verify()` when key binding is required. An on-path attacker can also tamper with a Disclosure when the relying party does not enforce key binding; enforced key binding rejects on-path tampering because it invalidates the KB-JWT `sd_hash` binding. If the relying party defaults to allowing access when a constraining age, role, or restriction claim is absent, the silent claim reduction can change an authorization decision without an error. This issue is fixed in `@sd-jwt/core` version 0.20.0; no patched version of the standalone `@sd-jwt/decode` package is identified.

Additional publisher context

NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.

Source analysis status: Deferred

Weakness classifications: CWE-176 · CWE-754

Original publisher date fields

published: 2026-10-29T17:18:10.143

lastModified: 2026-10-30T19:39:14.897

Source published
29 Oct 2026 17:18:10 UTC
Source modified
30 Oct 2026 19:39:14 UTC
Saved here
2 Nov 2026 18:59:24 UTC
Source terms
NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.

CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 7.1 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

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