SurrealDB versions before 3.2.0 fail to validate namespace and database scope in custom API routes, allowing authenticated users to invoke endpoints in different namespaces/databases. Attackers with valid credentials for any namespace/database can access custom API endpoints in other tenants by specifying the target scope in the URL path, reading sensitive data or triggering unintended operations.
SurrealDB versions before 3.2.0 fail to validate namespace and database scope in custom API routes, allowing authenticated users to invoke endpoints in different namespaces/databases. Attackers with valid credentials for any namespace/database can access custom API endpoints in other tenants by specifying the target scope in the URL path, reading sensitive data or triggering unintended operations.
SurrealDB versions before 3.2.0 fail to validate namespace and database scope in custom API routes, allowing authenticated users to invoke endpoints in different namespaces/databases. Attackers with valid credentials for any namespace/database can access custom API endpoints in other tenants by specifying the target scope in the URL path, reading sensitive data or triggering unintended operations.
## Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-848m-r628-vrxw. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
## Original Description
SurrealDB versions before 3.2.0 fail to validate namespace and database scope in custom API routes, allowing authenticated users to invoke endpoints in different namespaces/databases. Attackers with valid credentials for any namespace/database can access custom API endpoints in other tenants by specifying the target scope in the URL path, reading sensitive data or triggering unintended operations.
An authenticated user scoped to one namespace/database could invoke a custom API (`DEFINE API`) belonging to a different namespace/database, reaching another tenant's endpoint.
The route `/api/{namespace}/{database}/{endpoint}` took the namespace and database from the URL and applied them to the caller's session before the endpoint was looked up or run, without checking that the caller's authenticated scope covered them. Because a custom API handler runs with permissions disabled (definer's rights), the endpoint's own `PERMISSIONS` clause was the only gate — open to everyone for a `PERMISSIONS FULL` endpoint. The `api::invoke()` function was affected the same way, resolving against the session's selected namespace/database (settable via the `surreal-ns` / `surreal-db` headers or `USE`).
### Impact
What an attacker **can** do:
- With valid credentials for any one namespace/database (a `VIEWER` is enough), invoke a custom API in another namespace/database by naming the victim scope in the URL.
- Read data that endpoint returns — including from `PERMISSIONS NONE` tables, since the handler runs with permissions disabled — or trigger any writes and side effects it performs.
What it **can't** do:
- Reach a scope without valid credentials for some namespace/database on the instance; this is not an unauthenticated bypass.
- Affect single-tenant deployments, or any deployment where callers already hold instance-wide (root) scope.
### Patches
The namespace/database is now validated against the caller's authenticated level — which the request cannot change — before the endpoint is resolved or run. A target scope outside that level is rejected with `403 Forbidden`, both at the HTTP entry point and at the dispatch step shared with `api::invoke()`. Root reaches any scope; namespace principals their namespace; database and record principals their exact namespace/database; anonymous callers remain governed by the endpoint's `PERMISSIONS`.
- Versions 3.2.0 and later are not affected by this issue.
### Workarounds
Users unable to patch should consider the following workarounds:
- Disable the custom API HTTP route via capabilities where it is not required.
- Treat separate deployments, not namespace/database boundaries, as the tenant isolation boundary on shared instances.
- Prefer a `PERMISSIONS WHERE` clause that checks the authenticated identity over `PERMISSIONS FULL` (reduces exposure but does not restore the boundary).
### Resources
- [SurrealQL Documentation — DEFINE API](https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/statements/define/api)
- [SurrealDB Documentation — Capabilities](https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealdb/security/capabilities)
- `fix(core/api): reject cross-tenant custom API access` (included in SurrealDB 3.2.0)
### Acknowledgements
SurrealDB thanks [sondt99](https://github.com/sondt99) for reporting this issue.
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jul 20, 2026, 12:04:31 PM
dateUpdated: Jul 28, 2026, 1:05:33 AM
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-639
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-07-20T12:19:42.563
lastModified: 2026-07-23T20:17:20.513
1 source CPE criteria · context only
cpe:2.3:a:surrealdb:surrealdb:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
No normalized affected-package data is projected for this source revision. The original publisher record may contain additional product and version evidence; this does not establish that a package is unaffected.