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SurrealDB 3.1.0 before 3.1.5 Field Permission Bypass via Traversal

CVSS 4.0 5.3 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 4.3 MEDIUMEUVD CVSS 4.0 5.3 CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary 5.3 MEDIUMCVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary 4.3 MEDIUMCVSS_V3 CVSS_V4 Publisher rating MODERATECVSS_V3 Publisher rating MODERATEFixed by surrealdb 3.1.5KEV status unknown

cve-program · CVE-2026-63738

Published

SurrealDB versions 3.1.0 before 3.1.5 fail to enforce field-level SELECT permissions when records are accessed through graph-edge or back-reference traversals. Attackers with table-level SELECT access can read field values hidden by field-level permissions by materializing records through graph traversals instead of direct table scans.

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euvd · EUVD-2026-45909

Published

SurrealDB versions 3.1.0 before 3.1.5 fail to enforce field-level SELECT permissions when records are accessed through graph-edge or back-reference traversals. Attackers with table-level SELECT access can read field values hidden by field-level permissions by materializing records through graph traversals instead of direct table scans.

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nvd · CVE-2026-63738

Published

SurrealDB versions 3.1.0 before 3.1.5 fail to enforce field-level SELECT permissions when records are accessed through graph-edge or back-reference traversals. Attackers with table-level SELECT access can read field values hidden by field-level permissions by materializing records through graph traversals instead of direct table scans.

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osv · GHSA-9c3h-q3pp-fw5x

Withdrawn

## Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-hv6h-hc26-q48p. This link is maintained to preserve external references. ## Original Description SurrealDB versions 3.1.0 before 3.1.5 fail to enforce field-level SELECT permissions when records are accessed through graph-edge or back-reference traversals. Attackers with table-level SELECT access can read field values hidden by field-level permissions by materializing records through graph traversals instead of direct table scans.

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osv · GHSA-hv6h-hc26-q48p

Published

A record user could read field values hidden from them by field-level SELECT permissions by reaching the records through a graph-edge (`->`) or back-reference (`<~`) traversal instead of a direct `SELECT`. When a table was readable at the table level but carried a field hidden by a field-level permission (`DEFINE FIELD secret ON knows PERMISSIONS FOR select NONE`), a direct `SELECT * FROM knows` hid `secret` — but reaching the same records through a traversal that yields full objects — `person:bob->(SELECT * FROM knows)`, `person:bob<~(SELECT * FROM comment)`, or a projected target vertex `->knows->(SELECT * FROM person)` — returned it intact. The root cause: the shared `resolve_record_batch` helper used by `GraphEdgeScan` (`FullEdge`) and `ReferenceScan` (`FullRecord`) enforced only the table-level SELECT permission and pushed raw record data, never running the field-level filtering (`build_field_state` / `filter_fields_by_permission`) that ordinary table scans and `fetch_record` apply. ### Impact A record user can read the values of fields hidden by field-level SELECT permissions, on tables they already hold table-level SELECT on, by materialising the records through a graph-edge, back-reference, or target-vertex traversal — recovering the values directly, for every record the traversal returns. The disclosure is confined to the field-permission layer: it grants **no unauthorised cross-table, cross-record, or cross-namespace/database access**. The table's own SELECT permission — including any row-level `WHERE` predicate — is still enforced, so the caller only reaches records they were already entitled to read; only the per-field SELECT filtering within those records is skipped. Root and record-owner sessions are unaffected, and data cannot be modified (confidentiality only). Table-level enforcement on these traversals landed in 3.1.0 (the fix for GHSA-vjjx-rfw4-rmfc); releases before 3.1.0 additionally exposed whole records on tables the caller could not read, and are covered by that advisory. ### Patches `resolve_record_batch` (the shared helper that materialises full records for graph and reference traversals) now applies field-level SELECT permissions and read-time `COMPUTED` fields to each record, matching the regular table-scan and `fetch_record` paths. Versions 3.1.5 and later are not affected. ### Workarounds - Force the unaffected legacy executor with `--planner-strategy compute-only` (env `SURREAL_PLANNER_STRATEGY`). - Do not rely on field-level SELECT permissions to hide values on tables reachable as a graph edge, reference target, or traversal vertex; restrict at the table level instead. - Use namespace / database isolation as the primary boundary where feasible. ### Resources - [SurrealQL Documentation — DEFINE FIELD](https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/statements/define/field) - [SurrealQL Documentation — DEFINE TABLE … PERMISSIONS](https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/statements/define/table) - [SurrealQL Documentation — Graph relationships](https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/datamodel/relationships) - `fix(exec): apply field-level SELECT permissions + computed fields when graph/reference traversals materialize full records`

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