SurrealDB before 3.1.0 Port-Specific Deny Rule Bypass via HTTP Redirect
cve-program · CVE-2026-63743
PublishedSurrealDB before 3.1.0 contains a capability bypass vulnerability in HTTP redirect handling that allows authenticated users to circumvent port-scoped --deny-net rules. Attackers can chain an HTTP redirect from an allowed hostname to a denied host:port combination, and the redirect is followed because the port information is dropped during redirect policy evaluation.
Read the publisher's advisoryeuvd · EUVD-2026-45914
PublishedSurrealDB before 3.1.0 contains a capability bypass vulnerability in HTTP redirect handling that allows authenticated users to circumvent port-scoped --deny-net rules. Attackers can chain an HTTP redirect from an allowed hostname to a denied host:port combination, and the redirect is followed because the port information is dropped during redirect policy evaluation.
Read the publisher's advisorynvd · CVE-2026-63743
PublishedSurrealDB before 3.1.0 contains a capability bypass vulnerability in HTTP redirect handling that allows authenticated users to circumvent port-scoped --deny-net rules. Attackers can chain an HTTP redirect from an allowed hostname to a denied host:port combination, and the redirect is followed because the port information is dropped during redirect policy evaluation.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-97vg-427p-8hx5
PublishedSurrealDB offers `http::*` functions that can access external network endpoints, with the `--allow-net` and `--deny-net` capabilities used to restrict the set of network targets that can be reached. An authenticated user of SurrealDB can bypass a port-scoped `--deny-net <host>:<port>` rule by chaining an HTTP redirect: the initial request goes to an `--allow-net`-permitted hostname, the response's `3xx Location` header points at the denied `host:port`, and the redirect is followed even though the destination was explicitly denied. The root cause is in the redirect policy applied to outbound HTTP requests (`surrealdb/core/src/fnc/util/http/mod.rs`): the `NetTarget` for the redirect destination is built from `url.host_str()` alone and `url.port()` is dropped. The capability matcher (`surrealdb/core/src/dbs/capabilities.rs:259-264`) refuses to match a port-bearing rule against a port-stripped target (`Self::Host(host, Some(port)) => match tgt { _ => false }`), so the operator's port-scoped deny rule silently does not fire on the redirect target. ### Impact The impact of this vulnerability is circumvention of the `--deny-net` capability when the operator has scoped deny rules by port, and the resulting impact on systems external to SurrealDB. The ultimate impact is dependent on the deployment scenario. For example, if a SurrealDB operator uses `--deny-net <host>:<port>` to block specific internal services (such as a local Redis at `192.168.1.1:6379` or an unauthenticated cloud metadata service) while leaving the rest of the host reachable, an authenticated principal that can call `http::*` and host an attacker-controlled redirect target can reach the blocked service and act on whatever interface it exposes. Bounded to: - Principals already permitted to call `http::*`. - Capability configurations that scope deny rules by port. Host-only rules (`--deny-net <host>`) are not affected because the host-only rule arm of the matcher accepts port-stripped targets. ### Patches The redirect policy now constructs the `NetTarget` for the redirect URL with `url.port()` included, so port-specific deny rules apply to redirect targets identically to initial requests. A new integration regression test (`function_http_redirect_to_denied_port_blocked`) uses two wiremock servers to verify the redirect target is blocked and the denied server receives no requests. Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected. ### Workarounds - Replace port-specific deny rules with host-only deny rules where feasible (`--deny-net 192.168.1.1` instead of `--deny-net 192.168.1.1:6379`). Host-only rules match port-stripped targets, at the cost of denying every port on that host. - Disable `http::*` for untrusted principals (`--deny-funcs 'http::*'`) where the functions are not required. - Terminate outbound HTTP requests at a reverse proxy that enforces port-specific access controls.
Read the publisher's advisoryosv · GHSA-vq7c-3hc9-m5hr
Withdrawn## Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-97vg-427p-8hx5. This link is maintained to preserve external references. ## Original Description SurrealDB before 3.1.0 contains a capability bypass vulnerability in HTTP redirect handling that allows authenticated users to circumvent port-scoped --deny-net rules. Attackers can chain an HTTP redirect from an allowed hostname to a denied host:port combination, and the redirect is followed because the port information is dropped during redirect policy evaluation.
Read the publisher's advisoryAffected versions, risk and source history
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cve-program · CVE-2026-63743
PublishedSurrealDB before 3.1.0 Port-Specific Deny Rule Bypass via HTTP Redirect
SurrealDB before 3.1.0 contains a capability bypass vulnerability in HTTP redirect handling that allows authenticated users to circumvent port-scoped --deny-net rules. Attackers can chain an HTTP redirect from an allowed hostname to a denied host:port combination, and the redirect is followed because the port information is dropped during redirect policy evaluation.
- Source published
- 20 Jul 2026 12:04:37 UTC
- Source modified
- 28 Jul 2026 01:05:38 UTC
- Saved here
- 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
- Source terms
- CVE Program Terms of Use
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: cve-program · CVE Program Terms of Use. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · 5.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
CVSS 3.1 · 6.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
euvd · EUVD-2026-45914
PublishedSurrealDB before 3.1.0 contains a capability bypass vulnerability in HTTP redirect handling that allows authenticated users to circumvent port-scoped --deny-net rules. Attackers can chain an HTTP redirect from an allowed hostname to a denie…
SurrealDB before 3.1.0 contains a capability bypass vulnerability in HTTP redirect handling that allows authenticated users to circumvent port-scoped --deny-net rules. Attackers can chain an HTTP redirect from an allowed hostname to a denied host:port combination, and the redirect is followed because the port information is dropped during redirect policy evaluation.
Additional publisher context
EUVD source date text has no stated timezone and is retained without inventing a UTC instant. Related bulletin membership is not an alias, common cause or applicability claim. A missing vector with a zero score is treated as unrated. Complete vendor/product and underlying source evidence remains in the original JSON.
Original publisher date fields
datePublished: Jul 20, 2026, 12:04:37 PM
dateUpdated: Jul 28, 2026, 1:05:38 AM
- Source published
- Jul 20, 2026, 12:04:37 PM (timezone not stated)
- Source modified
- Jul 28, 2026, 1:05:38 AM (timezone not stated)
- Saved here
- 17 Nov 2026 17:39:42 UTC
- Source terms
- ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: euvd · ENISA EUVD · source terms and attribution apply. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
EUVD CVSS 4.0 · 5.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
nvd · CVE-2026-63743
PublishedSurrealDB before 3.1.0 contains a capability bypass vulnerability in HTTP redirect handling that allows authenticated users to circumvent port-scoped --deny-net rules. Attackers can chain an HTTP redirect from an allowed hostname to a denie…
SurrealDB before 3.1.0 contains a capability bypass vulnerability in HTTP redirect handling that allows authenticated users to circumvent port-scoped --deny-net rules. Attackers can chain an HTTP redirect from an allowed hostname to a denied host:port combination, and the redirect is followed because the port information is dropped during redirect policy evaluation.
Additional publisher context
NVD analysis and CPE criteria are source context, not proof that a package or your environment is affected. Complete affected data, logical configurations and SSVC are retained in the original JSON.
Source analysis status: Analyzed
Weakness classifications: CWE-918
Original publisher date fields
published: 2026-07-20T12:19:43.713
lastModified: 2026-07-22T15:46:28.590
1 source CPE criteria · context only
- cpe:2.3:a:surrealdb:surrealdb:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
The original JSON retains the logical configuration operators, exclusions and version bounds.
- Source published
- 20 Jul 2026 12:19:43 UTC
- Source modified
- 22 Jul 2026 15:46:28 UTC
- Saved here
- 25 Oct 2026 15:18:45 UTC
- Source terms
- NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: nvd · NIST NVD usage terms; underlying source attribution retained. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS 4.0 · [email protected] · Secondary · 5.3 CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS 3.1 · [email protected] · Secondary · 6.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
osv · GHSA-97vg-427p-8hx5
PublishedSurrealDB: Port-specific --deny-net rules silently bypassed on HTTP redirect
SurrealDB offers `http::*` functions that can access external network endpoints, with the `--allow-net` and `--deny-net` capabilities used to restrict the set of network targets that can be reached. An authenticated user of SurrealDB can bypass a port-scoped `--deny-net <host>:<port>` rule by chaining an HTTP redirect: the initial request goes to an `--allow-net`-permitted hostname, the response's `3xx Location` header points at the denied `host:port`, and the redirect is followed even though the destination was explicitly denied. The root cause is in the redirect policy applied to outbound HTTP requests (`surrealdb/core/src/fnc/util/http/mod.rs`): the `NetTarget` for the redirect destination is built from `url.host_str()` alone and `url.port()` is dropped. The capability matcher (`surrealdb/core/src/dbs/capabilities.rs:259-264`) refuses to match a port-bearing rule against a port-stripped target (`Self::Host(host, Some(port)) => match tgt { _ => false }`), so the operator's port-scoped deny rule silently does not fire on the redirect target. ### Impact The impact of this vulnerability is circumvention of the `--deny-net` capability when the operator has scoped deny rules by port, and the resulting impact on systems external to SurrealDB. The ultimate impact is dependent on the deployment scenario. For example, if a SurrealDB operator uses `--deny-net <host>:<port>` to block specific internal services (such as a local Redis at `192.168.1.1:6379` or an unauthenticated cloud metadata service) while leaving the rest of the host reachable, an authenticated principal that can call `http::*` and host an attacker-controlled redirect target can reach the blocked service and act on whatever interface it exposes. Bounded to: - Principals already permitted to call `http::*`. - Capability configurations that scope deny rules by port. Host-only rules (`--deny-net <host>`) are not affected because the host-only rule arm of the matcher accepts port-stripped targets. ### Patches The redirect policy now constructs the `NetTarget` for the redirect URL with `url.port()` included, so port-specific deny rules apply to redirect targets identically to initial requests. A new integration regression test (`function_http_redirect_to_denied_port_blocked`) uses two wiremock servers to verify the redirect target is blocked and the denied server receives no requests. Versions 3.1.0 and later are not affected. ### Workarounds - Replace port-specific deny rules with host-only deny rules where feasible (`--deny-net 192.168.1.1` instead of `--deny-net 192.168.1.1:6379`). Host-only rules match port-stripped targets, at the cost of denying every port on that host. - Disable `http::*` for untrusted principals (`--deny-funcs 'http::*'`) where the functions are not required. - Terminate outbound HTTP requests at a reverse proxy that enforces port-specific access controls.
- Source published
- 1 Jul 2026 20:20:40 UTC
- Source modified
- 4 Sep 2026 20:40:32 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE
osv · GHSA-vq7c-3hc9-m5hr
WithdrawnDuplicate Advisory: SurrealDB: Port-specific --deny-net rules silently bypassed on HTTP redirect
## Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-97vg-427p-8hx5. This link is maintained to preserve external references. ## Original Description SurrealDB before 3.1.0 contains a capability bypass vulnerability in HTTP redirect handling that allows authenticated users to circumvent port-scoped --deny-net rules. Attackers can chain an HTTP redirect from an allowed hostname to a denied host:port combination, and the redirect is followed because the port information is dropped during redirect policy evaluation.
- Source published
- 20 Jul 2026 12:33:09 UTC
- Source modified
- 4 Sep 2026 20:30:04 UTC
- Saved here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
Source: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. The publisher's wording is preserved. ChangeIntel groups the information and labels changes. The JSON record includes additional source fields.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Publisher rating · MODERATE