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hfs/hfsplus: fix u32 overflow in check_and_correct_requested_length

CVSS 3.1 7.8 HIGHCheck source for fixed versionsKEV status unknown

Historical advisory recorded 23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC. Read the latest advisory.

cve-program · CVE-2026-64361

Published

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hfs/hfsplus: fix u32 overflow in check_and_correct_requested_length check_and_correct_requested_length() compares (off + len) against node_size using u32 arithmetic. When the caller passes a large len value (e.g. from an underflowed subtraction in hfs_brec_remove()), off + len can wrap past 2^32 and produce a small result, causing the bounds check to pass when it should fail. For example, with off=14 and len=0xFFFFFFF2 (underflowed from data_off - keyoffset - size in hfs_brec_remove), off + len wraps to 6, which is less than a typical node_size of 512, so the check passes and the subsequent memmove reads ~4GB past the node buffer. Fix this by widening the addition to u64 before comparing against node_size. This prevents the u32 wrap while keeping the logic straightforward.

Read the publisher's advisory

Affected versions, risk and source history

cve-program · CVE-2026-64361

Published

hfs/hfsplus: fix u32 overflow in check_and_correct_requested_length

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hfs/hfsplus: fix u32 overflow in check_and_correct_requested_length check_and_correct_requested_length() compares (off + len) against node_size using u32 arithmetic. When the caller passes a large len value (e.g. from an underflowed subtraction in hfs_brec_remove()), off + len can wrap past 2^32 and produce a small result, causing the bounds check to pass when it should fail. For example, with off=14 and len=0xFFFFFFF2 (underflowed from data_off - keyoffset - size in hfs_brec_remove), off + len wraps to 6, which is less than a typical node_size of 512, so the check passes and the subsequent memmove reads ~4GB past the node buffer. Fix this by widening the addition to u64 before comparing against node_size. This prevents the u32 wrap while keeping the logic straightforward.

Source published
25 Jul 2026 08:50:17 UTC
Source modified
17 Aug 2026 04:54:07 UTC
Saved here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
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CVSS 3.1 · 7.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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