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Bluetooth: L2CAP: validate option length before reading conf opt value

Collected exploitation and prediction evidence

Risk source coverage

CISA KEV is observed exploitation evidence. FIRST EPSS is a dated prediction of exploitation in the next 30 days. Missing scores are unknown. This collector requests predictions only for explicit CVE aliases in the public NuGet archive; Microsoft release views retain their existing prediction scope.

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cve-program · CVE-2026-64403

Published

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: validate option length before reading conf opt value l2cap_get_conf_opt() derives the option length from the attacker-controlled opt->len field and immediately dereferences opt->val (as u8, get_unaligned_le16() or get_unaligned_le32(), or a raw pointer for the default case) before any caller has confirmed that opt->len bytes are present in the buffer. The callers (l2cap_parse_conf_req(), l2cap_parse_conf_rsp() and l2cap_conf_rfc_get()) only detect a malformed option afterwards, once the running length has gone negative, by which point the out-of-bounds read has already executed. An existing post-hoc length check keeps the garbage value from being consumed, so this is not a data leak in the current control flow. It is still a validate-after-use ordering bug: up to 4 bytes are read past the end of the buffer before it is known to contain them, and it is fragile to future changes in the callers. Fix it at the source. Pass the end of the buffer into l2cap_get_conf_opt() and refuse to touch opt->val unless the full option (header + value) fits. Each caller computes an end pointer once before the loop and checks the return value directly instead of inferring the error from a negative length.

Source published
25 Jul 2026 08:50:45 UTC
Source modified
19 Oct 2026 20:38:27 UTC
Observed here
23 Oct 2026 15:48:27 UTC
Source terms
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CVSS 3.1 · 7.1 CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H

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Sources read 8 Nov 15:15 UTC · 274 of 275 readable · 272 fully read · documentation 469/469 current